By Eduard Araqelyan

A recent Hetq publication, based on the testimony of a participant in a 25-day military training exercise, has once again brought long-standing problems within the Armenian Armed Forces into the public spotlight. The significance of the article lies not so much in its description of conditions at a single combat position, but in how it highlights a broader range of structural problems that have been discussed for years yet rarely become the subject of sustained public debate.

The author described inadequate engineering infrastructure at combat positions, shortcomings in the organization of the training exercise, the use of reservists outside their military occupational specialties, logistical problems, and discrepancies between available weapons and ammunition. Of particular interest was the claim that the position had ammunition for AK-74 assault rifles, while the rifles themselves were absent.

The issue of mismatched small arms at a single position requires a separate and thorough analysis. The problem, therefore, is not simply that “5.45 mm ammunition was available, but there were no AK-74 rifles.” Such a situation points not only to a logistical problem, but also to questions of planning, inventory management, and the organization of weapons control at the squad level—not to mention the fact that, in combat, a squad must operate as a single mechanism.

Almost immediately after the publication appeared, Lieutenant General Edvard Asryan, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia, arrived at the position for an unplanned inspection. Following the inspection, it was stated that some of the information presented by the author had not been confirmed. According to the Chief of the General Staff, the position had 5.45 mm and 7.62 mm ammunition, RPG-7 rounds, and ammunition for heavy weapons.

However, this raises the central question of the entire story. The inspection was conducted only after the publication had appeared. In the meantime, the particular position could have been resupplied, missing equipment could have been delivered, and at least the most obvious deficiencies could have been corrected. The inspection therefore effectively recorded the condition of the position at the time the Chief of the General Staff arrived, but it does not allow us to determine with confidence whether the position had been in the same condition during the period described by the participant in the military training exercise.

Moreover, the situation itself is highly symbolic. It gives the impression that the most reliable way to determine whether weapons and ammunition are available at a particular position is for the Chief of the General Staff to personally visit it. If verifying such basic matters requires the intervention of the highest military leadership, the question arises: where are the unit commanders, formation command, and existing internal control mechanisms at that point?

At the same time, it cannot be said that the facts presented by the author were completely refuted. On the contrary, the Chief of the General Staff acknowledged the existence of engineering deficiencies at the position, attributing them to the difficult climatic conditions of high-altitude terrain and ordering that the identified problems be addressed.

This explanation is also unconvincing. High-altitude terrain is hardly an unexpected circumstance for the Armenian military—it is a permanent feature of Armenia’s geography, in which the armed forces have operated for decades. Engineering preparations for military positions should therefore take these conditions into account from the outset.

One gets the impression that independent journalists should visit military training exercises more often. At least after their publications appear, the Chief of the General Staff personally visits positions, acknowledges the existence of problems, and issues orders to address them. Yet such a response should be the result of the regular internal oversight system, rather than a consequence of public pressure.

At the same time, a significant number of the questions raised by the Hetq author have remained unanswered publicly. The army’s leadership has not commented on the organization of the training exercise itself, the practice of assigning reservists outside their military occupational specialties, the lack of weapons maintenance equipment for much of the time spent at the position, or a number of other logistical issues.

The issue of reserve forces deserves particular attention. The practice of assigning reservists outside their military occupational specialties has long been systemic. For many years, the mobilization registration system was developed without sufficient alignment with the actual needs of the armed forces. As a result, the reserve still includes personnel trained in armored forces, air defense, and other military specialties, even though the corresponding equipment and staffing structures no longer exist or have been significantly reduced. In the event of mobilization, such personnel are often used as motorized infantry, rendering their previously acquired training largely irrelevant.

The statement issued by the Ministry of Defense was equally revealing. The ministry emphasized that it takes justified criticism constructively and is prepared to respond promptly to identified shortcomings. At the same time, it reminded the public that information concerning weapons, types of weapons, and ammunition constitutes confidential information and that its publication may entail liability.

However, the issue at the center of the discussion was not the amount of ammunition at a particular position, but the effectiveness of the system for supplying the troops. If, following a publication, the discussion shifts from the causes of the problem to the mere fact that it was made public, there is a risk that the secrecy regime will begin protecting not only military information.

Discipline or a Crisis of Management?

Notably, immediately afterward, the leadership of the Armenian Armed Forces noticeably intensified its efforts on issues of discipline. The Chief of the General Staff met with senior conscripts responsible for positions and with sergeants. The main topics were compliance with regulations governing relations between servicemen, strengthening discipline, and combating negative phenomena within the armed forces.

At first glance, such a response appears logical. But is discipline really the root cause of what is happening?

Today, the army’s leadership is primarily trying to address the consequences, while the causes lie much deeper. Discipline is a product of the quality of military management. Where commanders regularly monitor their units, where internal inspection mechanisms function, and where the sergeant corps has genuine responsibility for day-to-day service, most of these problems are identified before they result in serious incidents or become matters of public attention.

This is why the problems, including those raised in the Hetq publication, should not be viewed in isolation. To varying degrees, they all reflect the quality of military management.

Particularly telling is the fact that the publication was followed by a series of management decisions: a personal inspection by the Chief of the General Staff, meetings with sergeants, meetings with commanders, and orders to address the problems identified. Had the publication not appeared, would all these measures have been taken?

The combat effectiveness of an army is determined not only by the quantity of weapons it possesses, the level of funding, or increases in officers’ salaries. Equally important is the ability of the system itself to identify its shortcomings in a timely manner and correct them before they lead to tragedies or become the subject of journalistic investigations.

For now, however, the system appears to operate primarily in a reactive mode.

The article was originally published on CivilNet.