From Discipline to Prevention: Addressing Non-Combat Deaths in Armenia’s Armed Forces

By Grigori Sahakyan

The main indicator of any armed force’s professional maturity is not only the organization of large-scale military parades or the acquisition of modern weapons systems, but also the extent to which the state is capable of protecting the lives and health of its soldiers in peacetime. In this regard, in Armenia, where combat losses from enemy fire along the line of contact have been virtually absent since February 2024, the problem of non-combat deaths has manifested itself in its full depth. Reports of servicemen dying in barracks and while performing combat duty are no longer perceived by society as a chain of unrelated accidents. They pose a fundamental question to experts and the country’s leadership: is the military system capable of protecting those whom it has called upon to serve?

An analysis of the dynamics of losses over the past fifteen years reveals deeply troubling trends. According to statistical data and years of research by human rights organizations, particularly the Vanadzor Office of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, the number of non-combat deaths in Armenia’s Armed Forces increased by 45 percent in 2018–2025 compared with the preceding eight-year period. The situation has remained persistently grave in 2026. According to the periodic monitoring reports of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor Office, 30 cases of servicemen’s deaths were recorded in the first seven months alone, more than one-third of which were officially classified as suicide, incitement to suicide, or intentional killing.

At the same time, the statistics provided by the Ministry of Defence and the military prosecutor’s office differ substantially from public perceptions. The Ministry of Defence systematically uses the phrase “the death is not related to the circumstances of service,” thereby excluding road traffic accidents, chronic illnesses, or suicides occurring while servicemen are on leave or off duty from its official reporting framework. Such an approach artificially conceals the fundamental causes of these tragedies. Any violation of the law or extreme manifestation of destructive behavior in the military is the final link in a clear chain of causation, extending from living conditions and the quality of management to morale and motivation, and ultimately to disciplinary violations. Attempts to address the problem exclusively through harsh administrative measures and criminal prosecution, without eliminating systemic causes, produce the opposite effect, further deepening tensions within military units.

A persistent criminal subculture and extortion within the military lie at the root of many of these tragic developments. The extortion of money through bank cards, online lending, and accumulated gambling debts create a permanent atmosphere of pressure and fear within units. The situation is further aggravated by the inadequate legal and regulatory training of conscripts. Young servicemen are often unaware of mechanisms for protecting their rights, lack the skills necessary to deal with conflicts, and perceive discipline exclusively as a punitive instrument rather than as a system of professional safety.

Attempts to improve the military environment through financial incentives have also encountered serious systemic problems. The voluntary certification system for servicemen introduced as part of defence-sector reforms has become an additional factor contributing to social stratification. On the one hand, servicemen who successfully pass the certification process have been able to increase their basic financial compensation from 205,000 to 470,000 drams or more. On the other hand, according to statistics from the relevant National Assembly committee, only about 57 percent of participants were able to pass the certification in 2024–2025: approximately 7,700 out of 13,500 servicemen.

The main shortcoming of this reform is that the current certification process assesses individual proficiency exclusively in marksmanship, tactical and professional skills, and physical fitness. It completely disregards officers’ pedagogical skills, their ability to manage a unit, maintain a healthy psychological and moral environment, and prevent relationships not prescribed by military regulations. Moreover, a dangerous contradiction has emerged within units on the basis of financial inequality: servicemen holding the same positions receive substantially different levels of remuneration. As a result, officers who fail the certification process often sabotage the performance of their service duties, leaving them to their higher-paid colleagues.

This financial and moral division is further complicated by deep-rooted failures in the organization of service and the staffing of combat units. Battalions carrying out frontline duty are periodically sent conscripts with health restrictions. In practice, some members of a battalion are officially exempted from performing duty at combat positions because of their health condition. This creates an extreme imbalance in which the entire burden of combat duty falls on the remaining “healthy” members of the unit, causing chronic physical and emotional exhaustion. At the same time, dozens of soldiers exempted from combat duty remain in barracks under the supervision of just one officer. In the absence of regular combat training, this inevitably creates pockets of conflict.

Another key unresolved issue is the length of time units remain on combat duty. Existing schedules and prolonged continuous deployment at positions have a debilitating effect even on well-trained commanders, inevitably leading to a loss of concentration.

This is compounded by the severe physiological shock of the initial adaptation period. Before conscription, many young people spend years living according to a particular routine, becoming accustomed to going to sleep well after midnight. Upon entering the military, they are suddenly confronted with a strict schedule that requires them to wake at 6:30 a.m. and go to sleep at 10:30 p.m., while also performing combat duty. This can result in acute sleep deprivation. Because of physical exhaustion, soldiers fall asleep while performing sentry duties, yet instead of receiving medical assistance and being given an adaptation period, they receive disciplinary sanctions or face severe pressure from fellow servicemen and informal leaders.

Efforts to overcome these crises are hindered by the “conspiracy of silence” that has developed within the military environment. Complaining to commanders is traditionally perceived as a sign of weakness and can result in severe retaliation by informal leaders, because the soldier returns to the same unit after making the complaint. Commanders, too, have little incentive to identify problems objectively, since their operational and service performance evaluations are directly linked to the absence of emergencies in official reports. As a result, a system of mutual concealment develops in which an officer may find it advantageous to hide incidents of extortion or fighting, while systemic risks, including the use of outdated vehicles on difficult mountainous roads, accumulate until the next tragedy occurs.

A fundamental change in the situation requires abandoning purely repressive methods and moving toward a deep reform of the system of management, staffing, and oversight.

The first priority should be the establishment of an independent military ombudsman, an institution responsible for protecting human rights within the Armed Forces, adapted to Armenian realities and based on the successful model of the Bundestag Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Wehrbeauftragter). This body should be elected by the National Assembly of Armenia, report exclusively to parliament, and be fully independent of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. By establishing mobile working groups in the border regions of Syunik, Gegharkunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor, the Ombudsman’s Office would be able to conduct round-the-clock and unannounced inspections at any military unit and provide servicemen with confidential channels of communication.

The approach to officer certification also needs to be revised, moving from the assessment of individual servicemen toward a comprehensive evaluation of the commander as a manager and leader. An officer’s assessment and the amount of their additional financial compensation should be directly linked to the actual condition of the unit entrusted to them: its overall level of combat readiness, the state of military discipline, and the absence of emergencies, relationships not prescribed by military regulations, injuries, and extortion. Mandatory assessments of managerial and pedagogical abilities, conflict-resolution skills, and the ability to work with personnel should be introduced. An officer whose unit records a high level of injuries or incidents involving relationships not prescribed by military regulations should not be considered to have successfully passed certification, even if they personally achieve “excellent” results in all physical and marksmanship standards.

Based on the practical experience described above, it is critically important to review service schedules and reduce the number of consecutive days that units spend on combat duty. Continuous deployment at combat positions inevitably leads to declining concentration and exhaustion. Rotation cycles should therefore be optimized, while the periods between duties should be filled with adequate rest and combat training. At the same time, servicemen with medical restrictions should finally be removed from frontline duty and transferred entirely from combat units to specialized support units.

To prevent military extortion, it is necessary to introduce monitoring of bank-card transactions by servicemen performing compulsory military service in order to identify suspicious transfers. New conscripts should also undergo a mandatory 30-day adaptation period involving a gradual adjustment of their daily routine and legal training.

Reforming the Armed Forces cannot be limited to the acquisition of modern weapons. The real strength of an army lies in creating a transparent, fair, and professional system capable of protecting the life and dignity of every person wearing a military uniform.

Grigori Sahakyan is a reserve colonel and military expert.