By Hayk Khanumyan
#DemocracyWatch – In 2017, I wrote a Facebook post mocking the fact that, in some Armenian communities, a representative of the ruling party was competing against another member of the same party. I suggested that this was exactly how an alternative to one-party, single-candidate elections in the Soviet Union might have developed if the latter had continued to exist.
Nine years later, the same picture has emerged in Armenia’s local elections. In several fairly large communities, the ruling party, now called Civil Contract, has secured approximately 95 percent of the vote without facing any real competition.
In one community, a Civil Contract team competed against another Civil Contract team running under a different name. The two teams joined forces after the election, securing a combined 77 percent of the vote. In communities where Civil Contract did face rivals, the results often gave the impression of noncompetitive elections, with the ruling party receiving between 70 and 96 percent of the vote. Only in a handful of communities did the party led by the prime minister suffer defeat.
Why are local elections failing to attract political forces? Is this situation a consequence of polarization in Armenia’s political landscape, a lack of resources, or other factors? In my view, the main reasons are high levels of poverty in Armenia’s regions, an underdeveloped private sector, the ruling party’s obsession with retaining control over administrative resources at any cost, and pressure on those who seek to demonstrate political ambition at the local level.
In half of Armenia’s regions, including Armavir, Tavush, Shirak, Aragatsotn, and Gegharkunik, there are more public-sector jobs than private-sector jobs. At the same time, poverty is most widespread in the regions. While the national poverty rate in Armenia stands at 21 percent, it reaches 43 percent in Shirak, 37 percent in Tavush, and 35 percent in Gegharkunik. In most regions, poverty rates significantly exceed the national average.
This means that residents of the regions face a substantial risk of falling into poverty if they lose their public-sector jobs. The private sector in the regions is also vulnerable. Given limited economic activity, regional businesses and companies depend on state and municipal contracts. As a result, many private-sector jobs are subject to the same dynamics as public-sector employment.
During the parliamentary elections, we witnessed cases of government critics being dismissed from their jobs. Similar reports have emerged during these local elections as well. It is fair to conclude that, since the mid-1990s, successive governments have repeatedly succumbed to the temptation to arbitrarily dismiss people because of their political views.
Consequently, competing against the ruling party in local elections carries significant risks for residents of Armenia’s regions. Those who engage in such political activity face a substantial risk of losing their jobs and falling into poverty.
Compounding these problems is the ruling party’s determination to retain control over administrative resources at any cost. Previous local elections have shown that candidates with the strongest chances of becoming community heads, as well as elected community heads, can face criminal prosecution.
Since 2021, the non-ruling-party heads of Kajaran, Goris, Meghri, Berd, Vardenis, Gyumri, and other communities have faced criminal prosecution. The most striking case is that of Mamikon Aslanyan, the former mayor of Vanadzor. After the political force he led won the 2021 local elections, he ended up in prison instead of taking office as community head. Although the opposition had won the election, the ruling party took control of the city by appointing an acting community head from its own ranks. In October 2026, the Court of Appeal acquitted Aslanyan on one of the charges brought against him.
The case of Goris Mayor Arush Arushanyan is also noteworthy. In 2021, while running as a candidate opposed to the ruling party, Arushanyan won the Goris community elections while in pretrial detention. In the 2026 local elections, however, he ran in the same alliance as Civil Contract. Pressure from the law enforcement system on Arushanyan may have contributed to a change in his political preferences.
The ruling party does not rely solely on criminal prosecution to take control of local government. It also actively recruits members of opposition factions in municipal councils. This helped Civil Contract take power in Yerevan in 2023. Through the same mechanism, the ruling party replaced in Alaverdi the community head elected by the political force that had won the election. A similar process led to the position of community leader in Akhuryan passing from a rival political force to Civil Contract.
To win local elections, the ruling party often employs all these methods simultaneously: criminal prosecutions, the use of administrative resources, pressure on public-sector employees, and other “creative” approaches. One such tactic is to obstruct municipal council proceedings and trigger new elections. This is what happened in the Vedi community. After the 2021 elections, Civil Contract did not hold a majority on the municipal council. Together with the Republic Party, it pursued a strategy of disrupting council sessions, which led to new elections being called in 2022. Civil Contract won those elections.
As a result, participating in elections in consolidated communities, particularly when opposition forces have an advantage over the ruling party, carries a range of risks. Opposition figures may face criminal prosecution, their supporters may lose their jobs, and even an opposition victory may fail to translate into control of local government because of obstruction by the government or the ruling party.
Local self-government elections are an important component of democratic governance because they enable citizens to participate in decision-making and hold authorities accountable at the community level. However, economic dependence, the potential abuse of administrative resources, criminal prosecutions of opposition community heads, and obstacles to implementing election results raise questions about the actual conditions for local political competition in Armenia.
Addressing these problems requires not only ensuring the legality of electoral processes but also creating an institutional environment in which political views do not lead to social or professional persecution and election results are fully reflected in the formation of local government. Otherwise, local elections may retain the formal features of democratic procedures without fulfilling their essential purpose: genuine political competition and the free expression of citizens’ will.
Democracy Watch is a joint initiative of CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security.