By Eduard Arakelyan
The Armed Forces Transformation Concept, designed for the 2024–2035 period, is an open professional document that coordinates the main directions of reform. The document is general in nature and does not contain detailed implementation mechanisms.
In addition to the public component, there is a classified section covering governance, military science, troop training, improvements to the planning system, as well as information and cybersecurity issues.
This analysis examines Chapter 8 of the Concept, which is devoted to professionalization. It concerns changes to the recruitment system and a number of transformations on which the practical effectiveness of the reform depends. At the same time, deadlines for implementing several fundamental measures have not been established, leaving the timeframe for achieving them uncertain.
An important provision is the thesis that transitioning to contract-based service does not, in itself, create a professional army. A key condition remains an adequate level of training, the availability of necessary capabilities and modern weaponry, regardless of the recruitment model. The document envisages revising the length of mandatory military service, increasing the participation of women, and establishing a non-commissioned officer corps to implement the principle of Mission Command, or command through the assignment of tasks.
However, the practical implementation of these programs under current conditions may face serious challenges.
Personnel Shortages and Systemic Problems in Combat Training
The reduction of mandatory military service from 24 to 18 months, implemented in January 2026 rather than in 2027 as envisaged by the Concept, narrowed the window available for training conscripts and making full use of them in established positions. The decision was implemented ahead of schedule and most likely had an electoral rationale.
Replacing conscripts with contract soldiers under the “Defender of the Homeland” program may face low recruitment rates and financial constraints. During the transition period, this creates a risk of personnel shortages. The use of reservists to secure the borders because of shortages of servicemen creates additional pressure on the economy and civilian population.
The problem with the combat readiness of enlisted personnel is that the army has not provided soldiers with knowledge corresponding to the requirements of modern warfare. The core problem lies in the training systems, which require revision and the maximum possible level of intensity.
There is a correlation between the intensity of combat training and discipline. The absence of modern, comprehensive, and technology-oriented training increases the likelihood of internal problems emerging within the military environment. The primitive organization of service creates conditions for hazing and other problems that may result in non-combat losses.
The document notes that a professional army is determined not by its recruitment model but by the level of training, quality of command and control, and modern weaponry. As long as the development of contract-based service is not accompanied by reforms to training systems and command principles, there is a risk that the reform will primarily concern recruitment rather than command and the quality of training.
In several respects, Armenia is comparable to states that retain mixed recruitment models, and their experience is worth examining as a set of solutions that could be adapted to Armenian conditions.
For example, Finland has retained universal military service while developing a professional cadre of officers, non-commissioned officers, and contract personnel. At the same time, the foundation of its defense capability is the reserve, which undergoes regular retraining. Professionalization in the Finnish model primarily means improving the quality of command, training, and equipment without abandoning the mobilization model.
Ukraine, in turn, demonstrates the particular characteristics of transformation under wartime conditions. The Ukrainian experience is primarily an example of the importance of a new type of mass army and the quality of training.
The full-scale war in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of restructuring personnel training while taking into account the use of unmanned systems, digital command and control, and the high degree of autonomy of units. Ukraine faced the need to continuously replenish professional units using reservists, once again confirming the importance of preparing the mobilization resource.
The Israeli model represents another way of combining different elements. Professional personnel provide command and combat capability, while conscription generates a large reserve. The effectiveness of the system, however, rests on relatively lengthy conscription and the regular mobilization of reservists, which distinguishes it from Armenia’s current realities.
For Armenia, this means that the reduction in the length of service should be compensated not only by increasing the number of contract soldiers, but first and foremost by increasing training intensity and the quality of the reserve.
Mission Command and the Transformation of Military Culture
Mission Command implies a transition toward a culture of trust, discipline, initiative, and decision-making by junior commanders. Without this, even flawlessly drafted NCO manuals will remain on paper.
A degree of institutional inertia persists among some members of the middle and senior officer corps formed under the post-Soviet hierarchical command model. Granting NCOs tactical autonomy may be perceived by some officers as a loss of control and a reduction in their own status, while differences in comparable salaries may also generate dissatisfaction. In a system with such a command culture, the main risk is that NCOs remain disciplinary controllers rather than direct tactical commanders.
Without officer training programs, changes to officer certification criteria, and the establishment of pilot units operating according to the Mission Command model, there is a risk that the measures will remain formal. Therefore, transformation must encompass not only NCOs but also officers, who shape the organizational culture of units.
The Ukrainian experience shows how quickly Mission Command can move into practical application. The principles of Mission Command began to be actively introduced into the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the full-scale war. The high tempo of combat operations and the need to make decisions at lower levels forced the Ukrainian command to grant junior commanders greater autonomy. The war became a practical testing ground and, at the same time, accelerated the implementation of the principle.
The Ukrainian experience also revealed the incomplete nature of the NCO corps reform. In addition, the constant replacement of casualties and training of new servicemen began to place an additional burden on the system. Ukraine continues to develop its NCO corps. A program approved in June 2026 envisages further measures through the end of 2027.
Israel’s long experience shows that Mission Command depends not only on the delegation of authority but also on commanders’ willingness to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Decentralized command has a long history in the Israeli military, and the Mission Command principle is identified as a foundation of its command-and-control concept.
However, even formalizing the principle in Israeli doctrine and applying it in practice does not guarantee its full implementation. Pressure from senior leadership and commanders’ reluctance to challenge established decisions may limit autonomy and initiative at lower levels of command.
The Finnish experience also demonstrates the importance of training junior commanders. Every year, a portion of conscripts undergoes specialized leadership training, creating a cadre capable of commanding small units during wartime. However, the Finnish model has not been tested under wartime conditions, and its experience with decentralized command should therefore be viewed primarily as an organizational guide.
Implementing Mission Command is one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish, requiring not only changes to the command structure but also a transformation of military culture.
Women in the Armed Forces: Human Resources and Military Utility
The recruitment of women into the Armed Forces requires clear distinctions. The main risk is that it could be implemented as an end in itself and replace military considerations, without being linked to specific functions and needs. In that case, the creation of women’s units could become merely formal.
The participation of women is linked not only to gender policy and personnel shortages but also to changes in the nature of modern warfare. The growing importance of high-technology specialties, including drone operators, air-defense specialists, cyber units, intelligence, analysis, and command and control, expands the range of military professions.
At the same time, the characteristics of local attitudes cannot be ignored. Despite the active participation of women in public life, military service is still largely perceived as a “non-feminine” occupation. Such perceptions persist both in society and within the military, creating barriers to the full utilization of women’s human-resource potential.
International experience demonstrates different models for integrating women into the armed forces.
In Israel, mandatory military service applies to women, allowing the armed forces to recruit personnel across a broad range of technical, support, and combat specialties and thereby expand their personnel base.
In Ukraine, under wartime conditions, mandatory military service applies to women in medical, pharmaceutical, and other critically important professions, while service remains voluntary for others. The main areas of women’s service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine include medical services, logistics, communications, IT, analysis, instructional work, command and administration, psychological services, artillery, intelligence, and demining.
Finland demonstrates another approach to expanding the personnel base. Women undergo voluntary military service under the same conditions as men and, upon completion, are registered in the reserve with comparable obligations. The Finnish model demonstrates the possibility of expanding the personnel pool without creating a separate training system.
For Armenia, these models are important as evidence that expanding women’s participation can first and foremost be viewed as a means of increasing the army’s personnel base, including in technical and high-demand specialties.
Possible Steps for Implementing the Concept
Synchronizing the Pace of Reform with Personnel Flows
1. The transformation process should be based on personnel strength indicators, requiring adaptive management during the transition period. It would be advisable to develop a roadmap for each stage of reform, with implementation deadlines and interim indicators. These could include:
- the percentage of positions filled by professional personnel, including NCOs;
- the share of conscripts who successfully complete the full basic training course;
- the results of practical assessments of units operating according to Mission Command principles;
- the attrition rate of contract servicemen after their first contract and the number who renew their contracts;
- the share of women in the army, including their representation in critical specialties.
This would make it possible to assess recruitment rates and their impact on personnel stability.
2. If contract recruitment lags behind the reduction in conscription, the temporary introduction of short-term contracts of six months to one year for previously discharged servicemen could be considered. Six-month contracts could be used for positions that do not require additional training, while one-year contracts would be preferable for understaffed specialist positions. Such a mechanism could temporarily address personnel shortages while also contributing to the formation of an active reserve.
Intensifying Combat Training
1. The mandatory basic training course for conscripts should be brought into line with the standards of modern warfare, including unmanned aerial vehicle operation, first aid, mine-laying and handling of explosive materials, survival skills, and other relevant capabilities. It is impossible to master every subject during the period of service, but soldiers should acquire fundamental skills and an understanding of how to apply them.
Ensuring a high intensity of combat training could also serve as a means of preventing hazing and other non-statutory relations.
2. The system of exercises and reserve training should be transformed and placed on a practical footing. Formal approaches to reserve call-ups should be eliminated, and the reserve should be viewed as a continuation of the training system rather than as a separate mobilization mechanism.
Instead of involving large numbers of reservists in ineffective mass exercises, part of the reserve should be directed toward targeted training in specialized fields, linking it to specific units and areas of responsibility.
Mission Command and the NCO Corps
1. Implementing the principles of Mission Command is the most difficult task.
Without transferring genuine authority to the first level of command, namely sergeants leading squads and fire teams, it will not be possible to ensure stable command in rapidly changing situations.
Israel’s practical experience demonstrates that Mission Command depends on commanders’ training and their willingness to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Even when the principle is formally established in doctrine, a gap may persist between regulations and practical application.
The sergeant should become a tactical leader, reducing the unnecessary burden on officers at platoon and company level. The transfer of genuine authority to NCOs should be accompanied by an evaluation system for officers.
2. It would be advisable to establish pilot units in each army corps where NCOs would exercise tactical autonomy and be able to apply it during exercises. The assessment should include decision-making under conditions of communications loss, organization of squad-level operations, interaction within the unit, and the ability to maintain command and control as the situation changes.
The possibility should also be considered of incorporating the level of NCO autonomy into the certification criteria for company and battalion officers, without undermining the commander’s overall control of the unit.
Rational Gender Policy
1. Programs for increasing women’s participation should be based on their effective integration within military structures, without creating demonstrative or nominal units. Women are needed in the military not because the army needs to demonstrate gender equality, but because professionalization requires an expansion and rational use of the personnel pool. Modern warfare is increasing the number of specialized professions, but the allocation of personnel to these positions should be based on military utility.
The practical experience of wartime Ukraine shows that women can become an important personnel resource, first and foremost in technical, medical, analytical, and support functions, and, where they meet specific requirements, also in combat specialties. This experience is important as an example of how to expand the personnel base.
2. Information and awareness-raising efforts should be carried out both within society and the military to overcome prejudices surrounding women’s military service and to foster a culture of respect and equal opportunities.
Conclusion
The professionalization of Armenia’s Armed Forces sets the right direction for transformation and is an important condition for implementing the Concept as a whole. Above all, it should be viewed as a tool for enhancing the army’s ability to conduct modern warfare. The transition to new forms of warfare is impossible without trained junior commanders capable of operating within an overall operational concept.
A professional army is not merely a professional soldier; it is also a professional decision-making system.
For Armenia, a mixed system appears optimal, in which professional personnel ensure training, command and combat readiness, while conscription and the reserve preserve the necessary mass and capacity for rapid mobilization.
If professionalization is synchronized with reforms to training, the reserve, the NCO corps, and command and control, it can improve the effectiveness of the system as a whole.
This article was prepared by the Regional Center for Democracy and Security (RCDS) with the financial support of the European Union within the framework of the “Sustainable, Impactful and Inclusive Civil Society” (SIICS) Project. Its content is the sole responsibility of RCDS and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
The “Sustainable, Impactful and Inclusive Civil Society” (SIICS) Project is implemented by the Democracy Development Foundation (DDF), People in Need, and the Boon Scientific and Cultural Foundation. It aims to strengthen the role of civil society in Armenia as a resilient, independent, and trusted actor in democratic governance, policy development, and community empowerment.