By Hayk Khanumyan
As a result of the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s attack in September 2023, the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh—around 150,000 people—was forcibly displaced from their places of residence and lost their homes. Beginning in 2022, the Armenian government launched housing assistance programs for different groups of people forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The first program was launched in 2022 through a government-approved state assistance program aimed at ensuring housing affordability for families displaced from certain areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. The beneficiaries of this program were citizens who were not born in Nagorno-Karabakh but resided in territories that were captured by Azerbaijan in 2020 or came under Azerbaijani control. The beneficiary was the family, and each family was provided with a certificate worth AMD 10 million (AMD 8 million in Yerevan) for the purpose of purchasing an apartment. A total of 4,308 families, comprising 15,338 people, were eligible for the program. Under the program, 3,948 families received certificates for purchasing housing, of which 3,717 actually used them. It was estimated that these families included more than 13,000 people.
The Armenian government allowed beneficiaries who had received certificates under this program but had not used them, as well as those who had not applied for a certificate at all, to apply for the state housing assistance program for families forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, which was adopted in May 2024.
The new program retained the principle of providing housing through certificates, but introduced certain changes to the mechanisms. In particular, while the first program did not impose a citizenship requirement, the second program, which was intended to cover a much larger segment of the population displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh (excluding families who already owned housing in Armenia), required all family members to be citizens of the Republic of Armenia.
In October 2023, the Armenian government decided that residents of Nagorno-Karabakh holding passports of the Republic of Armenia were not considered Armenian citizens and linked eligibility for the housing program to obtaining a new Armenian passport and acquiring Armenian citizenship. While owning real estate was not a barrier to eligibility under the first program, those who owned an apartment in Armenia were excluded from the second program.
Another major difference was that under the second program, the value of the certificate was calculated based on the number of family members and the geographic location where the family chose to purchase housing. Lists of eligible settlements were established, with AMD 3–5 million allocated per family member. The less attractive and more border-adjacent the settlement, the higher the amount allocated. Following amendments made before the 2026 National Assembly elections, Yerevan became the only location where the allocation remained at AMD 3 million per family member, while AMD 4 million was set for settlements near Yerevan and for regional administrative centers. This increased the number of people able to benefit from the program.
These were not the only changes made to the program over the past two years. The government eliminated a number of seemingly unreasonable restrictions, such as setting a minimum plot size for certificates issued for construction purposes and requiring beneficiaries to engage a construction company in order to build a house. These provisions had been criticized in various settings, including during protests organized by displaced people from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The program also allows people who purchased housing through a mortgage after September 27, 2020, to use their certificates toward repayment of the mortgage, with an allocation of AMD 2–3 million per person.
The program progressed slowly at first. Only a small number of families benefited from it during 2024. It began to gain momentum in mid-2025 and accelerated significantly during the spring of 2026 following amendments to the program.
For example, as of January 2026, 1,768 families had used their certificates to purchase housing, while by July 2026 that number had reached 3,300, covering approximately 15,000 people. The program’s slow start was also related to implementation problems. The banks involved in the process had not yet developed clear procedures, and some time was required to establish and communicate these procedures with the government.
The increase in the number of applicants was likely also influenced by the government’s restrictions on social assistance measures covering accommodation and other expenses for people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh. Having lost rent compensation, many families accelerated the process of obtaining a certificate and securing their own home.
These changes also affected trends in emigration from Armenia. Following the reduction in assistance, an increase in the number of people leaving Armenia was observed, but a year later the trend stabilized again. As of April 2026, approximately 15,000 people from Nagorno-Karabakh had left Armenia and had not yet returned since their forced displacement in 2023. Another approximately 7,400 had left Armenia between November 2020 and September 2023.
Since eligibility for the program depends on citizenship, there is also a connection between the number of people acquiring Armenian citizenship and the increase in the number of beneficiaries. Thus, while 3,098 people from Nagorno-Karabakh had applied for Armenian citizenship as of July 2024, by June 2026 the number of applicants had reached 39,650, of whom 27,296 had already acquired citizenship. This figure includes adults only.
The active use of housing purchase certificates is likely to continue in the near future. As of July 2026, approximately 7,000 families had received certificates, while only 3,300 had used them. This means that around 3,700 families are actively searching for housing to purchase. The amendments introduced in spring 2026, which allow certificates to be used at a rate of AMD 4 million per person in settlements near Yerevan, are likely to further increase interest in the program.
Another amendment allows families meeting certain age criteria to receive AMD 40,000 per family member per month for 10 years instead of using a housing purchase certificate. This may also increase the number of people benefiting from the program.
Thanks to state housing programs that have been in operation for between two and four years, approximately 28,000 people from Nagorno-Karabakh have already secured housing. It is difficult to estimate what percentage of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh owned housing in Armenia before the 2020 war. Regardless of that figure, however, it can be stated that the overwhelming majority of the forcibly displaced population—possibly around 80 percent—still does not have its own housing.
It should also be noted that in many cases, particularly in Yerevan and areas surrounding the capital, families take out additional mortgage loans on top of the housing certificate in order to purchase a home. This requires stable employment and sufficient creditworthiness.
It can be concluded that the number of housing certificates being used has increased significantly in recent months, and this trend is likely to continue over the coming year, given the number of certificates already issued and the number of people who have applied for citizenship. If the pace observed in recent months continues, it is possible that another 6,000 certificates could be used by the end of 2027, covering approximately 27,000 people.
However, this does not mean that the trend will continue indefinitely. Continued increases in real estate prices and the limited number of creditworthy families will eventually lead to a decline in the number of people able to use the certificates. Consequently, the housing needs of tens of thousands of forcibly displaced people will remain unresolved in the coming years.
To avoid facing a serious housing problem in 1.5–2 years, a number of additional measures need to be undertaken starting now. The first important consideration is to combine housing provision in the regions—particularly poorer regions such as Shirak, Gegharkunik, Lori, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor—with employment programs. Although families with three or more members can find housing in settlements in these regions using their certificates, they face the challenge of finding employment. In Armenian settlements where finding work is easier, real estate is more expensive, while the value of the certificates is lower than in settlements where employment opportunities are limited.
Employment programs could include the provision of loans for businesses established by displaced people, particularly in agriculture and food processing, as well as preferential lending opportunities for existing businesses in the targeted regions. This would allow them to expand their operations and create additional jobs, including for displaced people. Employment support programs should not target only displaced people; part of the assistance should also be directed toward residents of host communities in order to prevent potential tensions.
The government can also provide a degree of targeted guidance. For example, it could offer housing to the families of contract military personnel in regions close to their places of service. Contract military service was an important source of employment for the rural population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, a certain number of families could be encouraged to relocate to targeted regions, particularly as the government and enlarged communities are making significant investments in settlements, including in schools, kindergartens, and various infrastructure projects. All of this will be more effective if settlements maintain an optimal population size.
Therefore, the housing needs of people forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh should also be viewed through the lenses of economic revitalization in Armenia’s regions, poverty reduction, strengthening national resilience and defense capacity, and demographic development. Coordinating policy in these areas is the government’s responsibility, but it can also involve the efforts and resources of various donors, charitable organizations, and civil society organizations.
It is important to launch such a program immediately. Delaying it could have serious socioeconomic consequences, increasing poverty among displaced people and contributing to greater emigration.