#DemocracyWatch – Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections were the most geopoliticized in the country’s modern history. All the major external actors involved in the South Caucasus had clear preferences in the race and were actively engaged during the pre-election period in promoting their respective agendas. While Russia supported the opposition through its traditional toolkit of information warfare and economic pressure, the EU adopted a more subtle and political approach.
Given the recent developments in Georgia, as well as the foreign policy positions of Armenia’s main political actors, Brussels made the pragmatic choice of implicitly supporting the ruling Civil Contract party led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. This support manifested itself in several ways. Beyond the obvious political signaling—such as holding the European Political Community Summit and the first-ever Armenia-EU Summit just days before the official start of the election campaign—the EU’s pragmatic approach was also reflected in its reluctance to publicly acknowledge or respond to worrying developments and trends in Armenia’s democratic trajectory.
These trends intensified during the year leading up to the parliamentary elections, as the government increasingly instrumentalized law enforcement agencies and the judiciary in pursuit of the ruling party’s narrow political interests, often justified in the name of broader goals. Through our Democracy Watch initiative, we documented this process and warned that these tendencies would continue after the elections.
The attention of Armenia’s international partners was overwhelmingly focused on countering threats stemming from Russia. The Russian threat also became a convenient justification for the EU’s reluctance to address democratic backsliding in Armenia. I warned at the time that this singular focus would contribute to sidelining the very real and serious problems affecting the country’s democratic trajectory.
As anticipated, these negative trends have continued in the post-election period. Just a month and a half after election day, the ruling party has already taken several steps that have been widely interpreted as unconstitutional and undemocratic.
First, the Central Electoral Commission made the highly controversial decision not to hold repeat voting at three polling stations where election results had been annulled due to serious violations. This move was later upheld by the Constitutional Court. Both actions raised serious concerns about the impartiality of the electoral process, as they effectively kept the Prosperous Armenia party, led by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, out of parliament while granting the ruling party three additional seats.
Tsarukyan’s troubles did not end there. Following Prime Minister Pashinyan’s explicit public threats, criminal proceedings were initiated against him, some of his assets were seized, and he was placed in pre-trial detention. In this case as well, there are strong grounds to believe that the justice system is being applied selectively and for political purposes.
Beyond these cases, the ruling party also moved swiftly to de facto disenfranchise a significant portion of the Armenian electorate by linking voting rights to a permanent residency requirement—a decision widely regarded as incompatible with the Constitution.
These developments reflect not only the continuation but arguably the intensification of pre-election trends during the post-election period. There is little indication that the ruling party’s approach to governance will change in the coming years.
This troubling reality is further exacerbated by the absence of a genuinely pro-democratic parliamentary opposition capable of effectively challenging the government and exposing its abuses. Existing opposition forces struggle to gain credibility because of their own past record and perceived ties to Russia. This allows the ruling party to maintain its populist, black-and-white political narrative while deflecting criticism by highlighting the flaws and questionable credentials of its opponents.
Under these circumstances, the primary focus of Armenia’s civil society, independent media, and international partners should be preventing—or at least mitigating—the country’s ongoing democratic backsliding. But before that can happen, there must first be an acknowledgment that Armenia is already experiencing a serious process of democratic regression and that addressing it will be one of the country’s principal challenges in the years ahead.
In this context, the role of genuinely independent civil society organizations and media outlets becomes even more important. Of course, these actors cannot—and should not—replace the functions of a democratic political opposition. Nevertheless, they can play a crucial role in preserving the possibility of future democratic progress.
In his recent article, Thomas Carothers, one of the world’s leading scholars of democracy, highlights the role that civil society organizations have played in preserving the possibility of democratic renewal in Hungary. He argues that Hungarian NGOs helped sustain the prospect of democratic change during sixteen years of democratic backsliding by maintaining independent reporting, exposing corruption, defending citizens’ rights through strategic litigation, supporting civic engagement, safeguarding electoral integrity, and providing platforms for alternative voices.
The comparison between Orbán-era Hungary and present-day Armenia may be debated. Nevertheless, it is evident that Armenia has been experiencing many of the same negative trends that previously unfolded in Hungary and similar political contexts. If left unchallenged, these processes will inevitably lead to further centralization of power, a shrinking space for free public deliberation, and diminishing prospects for democratic renewal.
This is precisely why, during this volatile period, it is essential to strengthen independent media and non-partisan civil society organizations capable of forming coalitions to resist democratic backsliding. Unfortunately, developments over the past year have moved in the opposite direction. Many organizations operating within the civil society space have willingly joined the government’s bandwagon in smearing and vilifying the few remaining independent media outlets in Armenia, often employing rhetoric reminiscent of Soviet-era public shaming campaigns and repeating the same talking points used by government officials in their attacks on independent journalism.
There has also been a growing tendency among some international partners to question fact-based reporting on government abuses, suggesting that insufficient attention is paid to the opposition. This is a paradoxical approach. In any political system, the government possesses far greater power and far more opportunities to abuse that power than the opposition. While the opposition—particularly one dominated by oligarchic interests—should certainly remain under constant scrutiny, expecting an artificial balance between coverage of the government’s actions and those of the opposition is both unrealistic and ultimately harmful.
Finally, supporting or implementing civil society initiatives that are, in effect, indistinguishable from the talking points and agenda of a political party is not democracy promotion—it is campaigning. A serious rethinking of these practices by all stakeholders committed to Armenia’s democratic future is long overdue. Without it, the erosion of democratic norms and institutions is likely to accelerate.
Democracy Watch is a joint initiative of CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security.