



Regional Center
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The New Face of War: Lessons from the Russo- Ukrainian Conflict for Armenia

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Introduction

Modern warfare is no longer confined to traditional frameworks. Today, it represents a complex system where military operations on the front lines are closely intertwined with cyber warfare, information operations, and economic confrontation.

The Russo-Ukrainian war has shown that even in the 21st century, states can engage in wars of attrition, where the key resource is not just weaponry. It has also become a turning point, demonstrating that even nations with significant numerical superiority can be vulnerable to an adaptive and technologically savvy adversary. This conflict has shattered outdated doctrines, proving that resilience is determined not only by military might but also by the capacity for innovation. Drones have become a crucial element of the modern battlefield. The decentralization of command and small-group tactics are becoming the norm, just as society itself can be a key element of defense. Technological backwardness, along with an inability to mobilize society and reform the army, can lead to even more severe consequences.

Modern conflicts require a systemic approach: from army reforms and strengthening mobilization potential to developing the defense industry and integrating new technologies — from drones and cyber tools to automated troop control systems.

The Russo-Ukrainian war has changed the nature of modern conflict and called into question the effectiveness of traditional defense approaches. For Armenia, which has endured several painful defeats and finds itself in a vulnerable strategic position, this war is both a lesson and a warning. Armenia's recent experiences in 2020 and 2023 have shown that we are already part of this new reality.

1. The Return of Total War

The conflict in Ukraine has shattered the notion that modern wars are limited to "hybrid" actions or localized operations. We are seeing the return of classic total war, where all state resources are engaged: the military, economy, society, diplomacy, and the information space. This isn't just a front-line conflict but also a war of resources, control over technology, mobilization of allies, and the resilience of the home front.

Russia initially counted on a swift campaign, but the Ukrainian resistance turned it into a protracted and large-scale war, requiring the continuous involvement of all national resources and external aid. Total war always relies on a system of alliances. The support of partners provides access to weapons, technology, funding, and diplomatic resources, without which even a strong state risks exhaustion.

The main lesson is to abandon the illusion of a "short war." Even a limited confrontation can escalate into a prolonged conflict. Relying on a quick resolution or outside help can be a catastrophe. A country must be prepared for a long, multi-layered war, not only on the front lines but also in the economy, cyberspace, diplomacy, and on the home front. Ukraine's experience has shown that without a system of alliances, even a well-organized resistance risks being broken. For small and medium-sized states, having allies is a necessity and a condition for survival in total war.

2. Aerial Warfare of the 21st Century: Offense Versus Defense

One of the key lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as the recent Israeli-Iranian conflict, is a shift in the balance between air offensive and air defense capabilities. Modern warfare demonstrates that under the massive use of precision-guided missiles and drones, even the most advanced air defense systems can lose their ability to effectively repel attacks. Protection from aerial strikes remains, at best, partial.

The attacker has the advantage. This not only points to the technological lag of air defense systems behind offensive ones but also to a fundamental transformation of war. The massive use of inexpensive UAVs, reconnaissance-and-strike drones, ballistic missiles, and loitering munitions, launched in waves and from multiple directions, overwhelms air defense systems. Even with successful interceptions of some aerial threats, the economic ratio remains in favor of the attacker: the cost of interception far exceeds the cost of the attacking assets. Traditionally, air defense has been highly valued as a shield against a superior enemy force. However, modern conflicts show that even the most advanced air defense systems do not guarantee protection from massive and combined aerial strikes.

We should abandon the illusion that buying radars and a few surface-to-air missile batteries will solve the problem of aerial threats.

The focus must shift to offensive deterrence. What's needed is a comprehensive doctrine that combines passive and active measures, camouflage, dispersal, and adaptability. Stockpiles of offensive weapons can have far greater value than many defensive systems that prove to be costly and ineffective. It's necessary to invest in various classes of drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles, which can become part of a deterrence system.

3. Mobilization and Territorial Defense

The Russo-Ukrainian war has shown that resilience is largely determined by the ability to quickly mobilize the population and organize effective territorial defense. Both sides are also actively using foreign resources to replenish losses and increase combat readiness. Russia has brought in volunteers and mercenaries, mainly from Asia and Africa, and also receives military support from North Korea. According to confirmed reports, regular units of the North Korean army have participated in battles against Ukraine. Ukraine attracts volunteers from all over the world, who serve in the International Legion.

Ukrainian soldiers undergo training with NATO armies, and instructors from European countries help them master new weapons and modern tactical schemes, which has been a factor in enhancing the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Overall, the war in Ukraine has revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of mobilization and territorial defense, providing valuable experience for both sides.

In 2022, Russia announced a partial mobilization, which caused a sharp rise in public anxiety and an exodus of citizens abroad. The authorities continued recruiting and mobilizing under the guise of "partial" mobilization, tightening legislation and creating an electronic conscription registry.

Ukraine has been conducting a full-scale mobilization since the beginning of the invasion. The size of its armed forces has increased, and the conscription of military personnel continues. However, Ukraine still faces a critical shortage of personnel, and reforms to the mobilization system have been incomplete. Despite open discussions and measures to improve the system, the process remains slow. One of the most acute problems facing the Ukrainian army in the protracted war has been desertion and unauthorized abandonment of military units.

From 2022 to July 2025, Ukraine registered over 200,000 cases of unauthorized abandonment of military units and more than 50,000 cases of desertion, according to the Office of the Prosecutor General. Under Article 407 (unauthorized abandonment), there were 6,988 cases in 2022, 17,658 in 2023, 67,840 in 2024, and 110,511 in the first seven months of 2025 — a total of 202,997.

Under Article 408 (desertion), 50,058 cases were registered in the same period. The causes appear to be complex: fatigue from prolonged combat, lack of rotation, harsh service conditions, and psychological burnout. The mass scale of this phenomenon undermines the army's combat effectiveness and creates additional challenges for the mobilization system. Things were much better with Ukraine's territorial defense battalions. The creation of local Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) is a key factor in resilience. Ukraine's TDF plays an important role in the country's defense. It involves the training and organization of the civilian population to protect their territories. Volunteers and patriotic organizations have become a vital resource, forming new units, providing rear support, and strengthening the connection between the front and society.

Regional battalions, familiar with their local terrain, have protected infrastructure, guarded settlements, conducted reconnaissance, destroyed enemy armored columns, and neutralized sabotage groups, thereby relieving the regular army. The participation of citizens in the defense strengthens morale, reduces panic, and enhances national unity. In Russia, territorial defense units also exist, but their role in the current conflict is less prominent.

For Armenia, the experience of mobilization and TDF is relevant because of the need to form a defense tied to specific regions, integrate volunteers, and ensure their training and equipment. A modern digital system for accounting for reservists, regular exercises, technical equipment, and clear scenarios for interaction with the army must become part of a long-term strategy. Additionally, it is crucial to organize civil defense, including public training, alert systems, evacuation, and first aid. Motivating volunteers through social guarantees should become an element of a new defense culture.

In Armenia, amendments to the "On Defense" law have been adopted to create a territorial defense system,

which also defines the goals and objectives of TDF units in coordination with units and formations of the Armenian Armed Forces. However, it is not yet clear how the program for creating a territorial defense system is being implemented.

4. Drones, Creativity, and Innovation: Adaptability on the Battlefield

The war in Ukraine shows that injecting creativity, rapid adaptation, the ability to combine old and new, and the maximum use of mobile solutions can provide a tactical advantage, even with limited resources. Maintaining combat readiness and initiative depends not only on the number of troops and equipment but also on inventiveness on the battlefield. Modern warfare is no longer just about clashes of infantry and equipment. The massive use of drones is radically changing tactics, reconnaissance, and firepower. Ukraine has become a real laboratory for this process, showing how drones influence modern combat. They provide real-time reconnaissance, quickly identifying targets and allowing for high-precision fire correction. When accessibility becomes a weapon: commercial drones can be easily repurposed for combat missions, enabling pinpoint attacks.

Drones have become a mass-produced and accessible tool that can be used at the level of small units, significantly increasing their combat potential. Ukraine, and then Russia, began to rely on maneuverable small platforms: repurposing commercial and FPV drones for strikes and reconnaissance. Both adversaries are actively using jam-resistant drones with fiber-optic control for high-precision strikes and increasing their range. At the same time, systems for electronic warfare (EW) and drone countermeasures are developing, creating constant technological competition.

Ukraine and Russia are actively training drone operators, both among the military and among volunteers and civilians, increasing their capacity for effective use. Both sides are actively adapting their capabilities to an intense conflict, using unconventional approaches and improvisation, where key elements have become the conversion of "dumb" munitions into guided ones, ground robotic platforms, naval suicide drones, adaptation of equipment and logistics, as well as information and cyber operations. As an example of the systematization of innovation is the Ukrainian defense-technology cluster, Brave1.

As part of the initiative "Decisive Innovations. Ukraine's Next Steps in the Tech War," it holds grant competitions with a priority on the production of explosives and the development of tactical ballistic missiles (similar to HIMARS), as well as surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) to combat drones. Special attention is paid to systems based on artificial intelligence (AI), including autonomous drones and interceptors. The main goal of such projects is to support the current needs of the front and ensure long-term technological superiority. Logistics and supply have become one of the most creative solutions during the war.

The use of civilian networks and transport for delivery to the front lines plays a special role. Instead of large military convoys vulnerable to strikes, both sides are actively using small, maneuverable groups with pickup trucks, cars, buggies, quad bikes, and motorcycles to quickly deliver goods and move assault groups. In the case of Ukraine, the Starlink satellite system provides communication for coordinating supplies and managing resources in real time. The military and volunteers create their own digital platforms to track requests and the movement of goods from the rear to the front.

All these approaches have transformed logistics into an adaptive and high-tech system that allows for the maintenance of combat readiness in an intense conflict. Creativity is also evident in the field of cyber and information operations. Ukraine actively uses OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). After the start of the war, a number of new OSINT projects emerged in Ukraine that document the locations and movements of Russian troops. Ukrainian cyber units also use social media to mobilize society.

Russia also uses OSINT methods, focusing on systemic cyberattacks and spreading deepfakes and disinformation through Telegram channels and official media to influence the perception of the war and international opinion.

5. Innovations on the Battlefield

Some examples of battlefield innovations demonstrate the ability of both sides to adapt to the challenges of technological warfare. The Ukrainian side, with the help of its allies, has developed and launched the mass production of the Magura V5 naval kamikaze drones, which changed the nature of the war at sea and allowed for asymmetrical strikes on the Russian fleet.

In the field of air defense, the Franken-SAM initiative emerged — a program to integrate Western missiles into Soviet-era launchers, which helps compensate for the lack of ammunition and effectively use existing systems. Ukraine is also converting Soviet-made aircraft to use NATO weaponry, using mobile command posts, installing missile launchers on trucks, adding protective structures to self-propelled howitzers, and using inflatable decoys and anti-drone nets on important supply routes.

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are also being widely used. UGVs are becoming not just the future but the present of warfare, and Ukraine is pioneering this path. To support the long-term use and development of all drone types, Ukraine created the Unmanned Systems Forces in early 2024. This new branch integrates drones and robotics across all military services, standardizing their training and battlefield application based on feedback from the front lines. UGVs perform tasks from delivering ammunition and evacuating the wounded to firing grenade launchers and anti-drone turrets. Around 40 Ukrainian companies are currently creating over 200 UGV models, with a planned production of 15,000 vehicles by 2025.

Among the most notable developments are the "Khyzhak," which uses artificial intelligence for drone combat, the "Liut," equipped with a 7.62 mm machine gun, and the heavy logistics UGV "Murakha.". As part of the Brave-1 program, more than 70 prototypes have been tested for resilience against electronic warfare, and Ukraine's new Unmanned Systems Forces are already standardizing their use. Ukrainian UGVs are, to some extent, now compensating for Russia's superiority in manpower.

Russia, faced with the threat from Ukrainian drones, began to massively install protective cages on tanks and other equipment, and later, multi-ton metal "shells" ("turtle tanks").

Russia also equips light trucks with launchers and creates "smart" minefields capable of identifying the type of approaching target and detonating as programmed. Following Ukraine's lead, Russian forces are also developing Unmanned Ground Systems for various tasks. One innovation in this area is a variant of the "Courier" UGV, which is equipped with a laser system for the remote demining and destruction of different types of mines. Russia has also begun the mass use of UMPK kits, which convert ordinary gravity bombs into guided glide bombs.

This has allowed Russian aviation to deliver powerful strikes on Ukrainian positions without entering the engagement zone of front-line air defense and assisting infantry advances. Moreover, Russia has adopted the tactic of mass attacks with Geran-2 kamikaze drones (Iranian Shahed-136) to exhaust Ukraine's stocks of expensive anti-aircraft missiles.

Both Russia and Ukraine are also actively developing electronic warfare. A multi-layered countermeasure system has been deployed against drones and communication devices, from powerful army-level EW complexes to portable devices protecting individual positions and anti-drone rifles. Both sides are experimenting with combining old methods and new technologies, increasing effectiveness and adapting combat operations to the changing landscape of the conflict.

For Armenia, this means the need for mass adoption of UAVs as a standard tool for reconnaissance and strikes at all levels. It is important to establish domestic production of FPV drones, purchase modern reconnaissance and strike aircraft, and develop anti-drone countermeasures — from electronic warfare to physical interception systems.

It is also important to train operators among the military, reservists, and civilians. Furthermore, creativity and rapid adaptation must become part of the military culture. A small state cannot afford to fall behind in the technological race and must maximize the potential of civil society to find unconventional solutions and develop defense technologies.

The lessons of the war show that adaptive logistics are essential, leveraging civilian networks and transportation for rapid delivery of resources. The importance of information warfare and open-source intelligence (OSINT) must not be underestimated. By using open-source data, the quality of intelligence collection and situational awareness can be significantly improved. Just as Ukrainian and Russian cyber units use social media to mobilize society, Armenia can employ digital platforms to counter disinformation.

6. Tactical Decentralization and Initiative

The success of modern battles also depends on the ability of low-level units and commanders to make their own decisions, adapt quickly, and show initiative without constant top-down control.

In a dynamic battle, centralized command often fails to react in time. Therefore, delegating decision-making authority to the company and platoon level allows for the quick use of emerging opportunities. A tactic where command sets objectives but doesn't dictate methods for their execution increases the responsibility and motivation of junior commanders. The Ukrainian army is actively adapting to the principle of "mission command." The Russian army has historically adhered to a centralized command system. All important decisions are made at high levels, and the role of junior commanders is limited to executing orders. However, as the war has progressed, the Russian army is increasingly using tactics that require greater autonomy at the lower level.

Despite these changes, the Ukrainian army still has an advantage in maneuverability. Ukrainian commanders have learned to make their own decisions, which has allowed them to adapt more quickly when facing a numerically superior enemy. While Russia has shown adaptability, it continues to face problems rooted in its traditional military culture. The lack of a developed non-commissioned officer corps as the foundation for decentralized command and bureaucracy slows down the decision-making process.

Russia's adaptation is more a reaction to the harsh realities of combat than a systemic reform. For Armenia, this means the need to train officers and sergeants to make their own decisions and to develop leadership skills and stress resistance. It is essential to encourage initiative and protect those who decide to make independent choices, even if mistakes occur. Reducing bureaucracy and simplifying communications will increase responsiveness.

Practical steps include implementing programs like mission command at all levels, creating training centers for sergeants with a focus on practical skills in stressful conditions, motivating initiative, and reducing intermediaries between command and soldiers.

7. High-Precision Weapons and Asymmetric Actions

The Russo-Ukrainian war has seen the active use of high-precision weapons and asymmetric actions. High-precision weaponry has played a special role, enabling strikes on important targets such as command posts, warehouses, airfields, supply lines, and air defense systems.

This has allowed Ukraine to compensate for the enemy's numerical and technical superiority through accuracy, mobility, and coordination. Strikes on infrastructure and important targets have become not only a military but also a psychological strategy.

High-precision weapons are used by mobile units, which allows them to change positions quickly and avoid return fire. The integration of artillery, MLRS, and aviation into a single digital fire control system has been of great importance, enhancing the effect of each strike.

Ukraine actively uses reconnaissance drones and satellite data for precise targeting. The arrival of HIMARS mobile missile systems was a turning point. Their accuracy and range allowed Ukraine to destroy ammunition depots, troop concentrations, and headquarters deep in the enemy's rear.

This undermined Russian logistics and weakened the power of their artillery. With the appearance of Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles, Ukraine gained the ability to strike strategic targets, including the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.

Russia, in turn, uses a wide arsenal of long-range weapons, including Kalibr cruise missiles, Iskander ballistic missiles, and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, to carry out massive strikes on military and infrastructure targets deep within Ukrainian territory, aiming to cause maximum damage. Ukrainian naval drones have become an effective asymmetric tool against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.

With these, Ukraine, despite not having a large fleet, was able to strike ships, forcing the enemy to withdraw them to safer waters. Another important element of asymmetric actions has been the special operations of Ukrainian intelligence services in the Russian rear.

These include the successful hijacking of a Russian Mi-8 military helicopter, as well as the destruction of long-range bomber aircraft and other equipment at airfields. Such operations demonstrate the ability to inflict damage on the enemy using unconventional methods, including the physical elimination of key figures in the military-industrial complex, generals, and state propaganda. In turn, Russia also conducts operations to physically eliminate influential Ukrainian public figures. Overall, the conflict demonstrates the significant role of high-precision weapons and asymmetric actions.

For Armenia, this experience is particularly important. In conditions of numerical and resource inequality, the focus must be on long-range and precise strike capabilities — modernized artillery with guided munitions, mobile anti-tank guided missile systems, and tactical missiles. It is necessary to build a digital combat management system that will integrate drones, reconnaissance, and fire assets. At the same time, specialized units capable of delivering asymmetric strikes on logistics and critical infrastructure should be formed. The development of human potential is another key area. Armenia needs officers and operators capable of coordinating fire in real time and effectively using high-precision weapons. With modern systems, mobile strike assets, and trained specialists, it will be possible to ensure deterrence against a stronger opponent.

8. Development of Assault Units and Small-Group Tactics

The full-scale war in Ukraine has become a testing ground for modern approaches to warfare. One of the factors that has defined the dynamics of the battles is the development of assault units and the widespread use of small-group tactics. Small assault groups have become a key tool on the battlefield.

In modern warfare, the decisive factor is not so much the mass of troops as the ability of small, autonomous, and professionally trained units to achieve local success. This requires a new system of personnel training, flexible command, and saturating the army with communication devices, UAVs, and light armored vehicles.

Given the high saturation of reconnaissance and fire assets, traditional methods of breaking through defenses with large forces have become ineffective and costly. Russia, faced with Ukraine's organized defense, began to create specialized assault units. An example is the "assault model" of the Wagner Group. The essence lies in the use of autonomous small groups that perform narrow tactical tasks: seizing strongholds, penetrating vulnerable sections of the defense, and conducting urban warfare.

Ukraine, in turn, is developing similar small-group tactics during defensive and counter-offensive operations. Mobile units, equipped with modern communications and coordinated with artillery, have been used to bypass fortified positions, attack enemy strongholds, conduct raids and diversions in the rear, and disrupt logistics and communications.

In urban combat, Ukrainian groups focus on mobility and surprise, which allows them to maintain the initiative even against a numerically superior enemy. This approach compensates for the deficit of offensive capabilities and reduces losses in head-on attacks. The mobility of small groups enables maneuverability, unexpected directions of attack, and minimizes the impact of enemy artillery. The active use of reconnaissance and strike drones increases the precision and combat effectiveness of small units.

In Armenia's context, applying these principles can be particularly effective. In mountainous and border areas, small assault groups trained for raids and close combat, integrated with drones and autonomous control, will allow for compensating for the enemy's numerical superiority and increasing the overall combat capability of the army. The experience of the Armenian armed forces clashing with Azerbaijani assault units in 2020 demonstrated the effectiveness of dispersed and clandestine tactics. Azerbaijani units, using mobile special forces groups, quickly and dispersed penetrated deep into the Armenian defense, disrupting its stability and acting autonomously and unexpectedly, creating difficulties for traditional defense.

9. Modern Fortification and Infrastructure Protection

The Russo-Ukrainian war has shown the importance of traditional engineering defense methods as one of the key factors for stability on the battlefield. Despite the widespread use of drones and high-precision weapons, trenches, bunkers, concrete shelters, and echeloned defenses have once again proven their effectiveness. Such structures have become the basis for protecting troops from artillery, aviation, and armored vehicles. Ukraine and Russia have demonstrated that a multi-layered system of fortifications can become an obstacle even for well-prepared offensive operations. Hundreds of kilometers of trenches and communication passages allow for organizing a defense that is resilient to massive strikes. Cities, transport arteries, and bridges have been fortified, and the security of logistics and the deployment of reserves have been ensured. The technological component has also been integrated into fortification lines: surveillance systems, short-range air defense, and anti-tank positions. At the same time, engineering structures have been built not only on the front lines but also in the rear, where they provide security for command posts, warehouses, and important infrastructure.

In several areas, the Russian army has also reinforced its engineering defenses, creating multi-layered barriers, minefields, and long-term fortifications, which on flat plains can hold back the enemy and minimize losses.

For Armenia, given its geography and potential threats, the development of fortifications should be a priority.

According to reports from open sources, work is already underway to build powerful fortifications on key border areas.

Both mountainous and flat regions require large-scale engineering re-equipment. Fortifications must cover not only the borders but also important supply routes, communication nodes, and rear bases. Echeloned defense, integrated with air defense, EW, and sensor systems, will allow for detecting and repelling drone attacks, artillery strikes, and breakthrough attempts.

The training of engineering units capable of quickly building and restoring fortifications under combat conditions is also important. Fortification remains a key element of defense, especially in conditions of high mountains and limited maneuverability.

Engineering protection, reinforced with modern technologies, provides a chance to hold back a superior enemy, preserve important infrastructure, and ensure the stability of the defensive line.

Conclusion: From Vulnerability to Resilience

Armenia's security environment has fundamentally changed, and the country can no longer afford to rely on outdated doctrines, ad-hoc mobilization, or the assumption that external actors will guarantee its survival. The lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrate that modern conflict is not a limited battlefield phenomenon but a “total war” that engages every dimension of a nation's life — its economy, civil society, technological capacity, and even the psychological resilience of its population. For Armenia, this reality requires a decisive break with past approaches and a coherent long-term strategy that combines military reform, industrial development, and societal mobilization.

First, preparedness must begin with the population itself. A transparent mobilization system, basic training in civil defense, and regular exercises at the community level are not optional add-ons but prerequisites for resilience.

These measures not only improve readiness but also build public confidence that defense is not the responsibility of the army alone — it is a shared national duty. Without societal involvement, Armenia risks both military weakness and demographic decline, as unmanaged mobilization pressures could accelerate emigration.

Second, the development of a domestic defense industry is essential. Inexpensive drones, electronic warfare tools, and flexible technologies now shape the offense–defense balance. By leveraging its strong IT sector, entrepreneurial talent, and the support of the diaspora, Armenia can create an innovation-driven defense ecosystem that gradually reduces dependence on external suppliers and provides the armed forces with adaptable, cost-effective capabilities. Training networks for drone operators and electronic warfare specialists will further ensure that human capital keeps pace with technological needs.

Third, reforms must address structural and institutional weaknesses. Bureaucratic inertia and resistance within the armed forces remain among the greatest risks to change. The establishment of an independent reform body, empowered to bypass entrenched interests and integrate civilian expertise, could provide the momentum needed to accelerate modernization.

A culture of decentralized command — where junior commanders are trained and trusted to take initiative — must replace the rigid, centralized system that has repeatedly proven ineffective in modern conflicts.

Fourth, resilience cannot be achieved without careful risk management. Investments in new deterrent systems must be paired with proactive diplomacy to avoid escalation. Defense spending must be balanced against economic sustainability, with anti-corruption measures ensuring that every dram allocated to the military strengthens actual capabilities. Here, the diaspora's role is indispensable — not only as a financial contributor but also as a source of expertise, innovation, and international advocacy.

Finally, Armenia must recognize that defense is inseparable from democracy, transparency, and public trust. In modern wars, society itself is a pillar of defense, and volunteer networks, diaspora engagement, and open communication are as critical as tanks or missiles. Strengthening national cohesion and cultivating a sense of shared responsibility will determine whether reforms succeed or collapse under political and social pressure. In sum, Armenia's path to resilience lies in embracing a holistic model of defense that integrates military modernization, industrial innovation, societal participation, and institutional reform.

This is not a short-term fix but a generational project that requires vision, persistence, and the courage to challenge entrenched habits. If pursued seriously, it can transform Armenia from a vulnerable state into a resilient nation — one capable of deterring aggression, mobilizing its people, and sustaining its sovereignty in an increasingly volatile region.