{"id":2814,"date":"2026-10-01T12:26:41","date_gmt":"2026-10-01T12:26:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rcds.am\/?p=2814"},"modified":"2026-10-01T12:26:42","modified_gmt":"2026-10-01T12:26:42","slug":"passivity-in-defense-as-delayed-defeat-what-kind-of-army-is-armenia-trying-to-build","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rcds.am\/hy\/passivity-in-defense-as-delayed-defeat-what-kind-of-army-is-armenia-trying-to-build","title":{"rendered":"Passivity in Defense as Delayed Defeat: What Kind of Army Is Armenia Trying to Build?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Eduard Arakelyan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reform of Armenia’s Armed Forces has been under discussion for several years now. During this time certain processes are taking place: the manning system is changing, weapons are being procured from various states, defense cooperation is expanding, and a domestic defense industry is developing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Still, the real state of the army is determined by what is happening in the units: the level of training, how command and control is structured, how effectively units work together, how fully they are actually manned, how well new equipment has been integrated into the force and, most importantly, what tasks the army faces and whether the army is capable of performing these tasks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Kind of Army Is Armenia Building, and for Which War?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The logic of force development implies, first, an assessment of threats, which forms an understanding of the likely adversary and war scenarios; these, in turn, determine military strategy, force structure, the training system, and requirements for weaponry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A significant part of the discussion in recent years has centered on individual elements: professionalization, new military education, new standards, territorial defense, the defense industry, and above all the procurement of French, Indian, Iranian, Chinese and Russian weaponry, among others. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

New weapons, like everything listed, are of course necessary, but they only make sense once it has been decided what task they are meant to solve, within what overall system, and against which adversary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After 2020, the situation changed: the army is no longer being built around the previous status quo. The conversation about the kind of army Armenia needs is limited to generalities from the leadership about a \u201cdefensive\u201d army equipped with \u201cdefensive\u201d weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is necessary to determine which war exactly this army must be capable of waging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Modern defense requires not only concrete shelters and firepower, but also early warning, mobility, dispersal, and a reserve capable of quickly concentrating on a priority axis. At the same time, strike assets of various levels are necessary, including long-range and counter-battery engagement, as well as the ability to conduct assault operations. In other words, a defensive army must have serious offensive capabilities and the ability to defeat the adversary. Otherwise, defense amounts, at best, to reacting to the adversary’s actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

29,743 Square Kilometers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is necessary to regard the political leadership’s statement that the goals and tasks of the Armed Forces of Armenia are limited exclusively to the framework of the internationally recognized territory of 29,743 km\u00b2 as a strategic guideline. And doesn’t a literal reading of this thesis mean that the army loses the ability to act where necessary in order to prevent or repel aggression?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the army is tasked with securing the internationally recognized territory of 29,743 km\u00b2, then during wartime the situation quickly stops fitting within the framework of political geography. At the same time, if the army is restricted to operating within that perimeter, how can it neutralize threats located outside of it? On this point, political wording has to be given military-operational content, so that it distinguishes between how deep force may be applied and a ban on operating outside the designated perimeter. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suppose the adversary has managed to occupy part of Armenia’s internationally recognized territory. The army’s natural task in that case cannot consist only of holding what is left of it. It must stop the advance, localize the breakthrough, strike the attacking forces, and conduct a counteroffensive. Imagine that, during an operation to push the adversary back beyond the limits of 29,743 km\u00b2, part of its forces withdraws across the line: must the army in this case automatically cease combat operations, because the designated area is the limit on the use of force?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most important point is preventive action. Must an army that operates exclusively within its internationally recognized territory wait until an adversary has finished preparing for an attack, launched strikes or even crossed the border?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In modern defense, preventive action, meaning the ability to respond to the adversary’s preparations for an attack, is among an army’s basic instruments. Defense must not begin after the first missiles, drones, and shells have hit. And if preparations for an attack are detected, an army must act preemptively. Preventive defense of 29,743 km\u00b2 is not necessarily a preemptive war beyond those 29,743 km\u00b2. And in that case, which should take priority:following the political line to the letter or preventing a threat to the territory itself? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political Guidelines and the Psychology of the Army<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Constant emphasis on the exclusively defensive character of the army is not an issue in and of itself. However, it may have a negative psychological effect if it starts to be viewed not as a general political stance, but as a restriction on the army’s own military initiative and as a prescribed list of actions that the army may or may not undertake depending on the situation on the ground. This guideline is already reflected in the terminology that is being used: the government has replaced the term “combat capability” in its lexicon with the term “defense capability,” which, applied to the army, is debatable. From a professional standpoint, it is utter nonsense. Defense capability is a broad nationwide indicator that also includes the economy and industry. An army, by contrast, has a specific attribute: combat capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question, though, is not whether the army will become defensive in its purpose, but rather how this defensive task will be carried out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defensive policy must not turn into the psychology of passive defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Armed Forces must be able to act with initiative, quickly and decisively, while retaining the possibility of defeating an adversary to the necessary extent. Competent defense does not imply abandoning offensive means and actions, but organizing them to impact the adversary. An army that is not capable of active defense and of engaging forces that are ready to attack is incapable of fully defending itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political slogans set aside, an army that waits to be struck sets itself up for failure. The difference lies in who sets the conditions of combat first. The one who holds the initiative determines the time, place, and tempo of the clash; the counterpart is forced to accept the already imposed conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The experience of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts of 2016-2023 shows that a bet exclusively on passive defense does not guarantee survival against a militarily superior adversary: any static positions, including reinforced-concrete ones, can be bypassed, suppressed, or destroyed by the mass use of fire assets. Passivity in defense is nothing more than delayed defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore the main questions regarding military reform today are: what kind of army is being created? Against what adversary? What war must it be able to wage? And to what extent is the existing system capable of fulfilling this task?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far there is no coherent practical answer to these questions. Having a concept, reform documents and regulations, new partners and isolated purchases does not yet prove that a new army model has emerged. Practice is judged by different criteria. A new set of weapons inside an inert system and with a passive psychology may ultimately produce a slow army with costly equipment, the loss of which could have even graver consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The article was originally<\/em> published<\/a><\/em> on CivilNet.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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By Eduard Arakelyan Reform of Armenia’s Armed Forces has been under discussion for several years now. During this time certain processes are taking place: the manning system is changing, weapons are being procured from various states, defense cooperation is expanding, and a domestic defense industry is developing. Still, the real state of the army is […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":2815,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[266],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2814","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.5","language":"hy","enabled_languages":["en","hy"],"languages":{"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":false},"hy":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t