Trump 2.0: Armenia’s foreign policy at a crossroads
13.11.2024
By Tigran Grigoryan
Following Donald Trump’s recent landslide victory in the U.S. presidential election, international observers and analysts are eager to assess what the next four years may mean for American foreign policy. Trump’s previous presidency reshaped U.S. global relations, ushering in an era marked by increased isolationism and unpredictability. For Armenia this shift in U.S. administration could significantly impact its foreign policy and complicate its regional position.
A primary concern is that U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus might significantly decrease. Over the past two years, Armenia’s government has sought to distance itself from Russia, aiming to gain political and diplomatic support from the U.S. and the EU. However, with Trump back in the Oval Office, this approach may prove challenging. During his first term, Trump did not prioritize the South Caucasus, and U.S. involvement in peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan as an OSCE Minsk Group co-chair was at a historic low. The Second Karabakh War erupted on his administration's watch, with Washington’s efforts to halt hostilities being largely symbolic.
There is little indication that his approach to the region will differ significantly this time around. This reduced U.S. engagement could create greater space for Azerbaijan to adopt a more assertive policy toward Armenia. Under these circumstances, the EU will likely attempt to play a bigger role, yet it may lack the resources and leverage necessary to ensure regional stability.
Beyond the risk of reduced engagement, the transactional nature of Trump’s foreign policy could further shape dynamics in the South Caucasus. While some hope this might lead to progress on Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey relations, past experiences—particularly in Syria—suggest that leaders like Erdoğan have effectively leveraged this approach to their advantage. The same could be true for Aliyev, who openly favored Trump as a candidate.
In Yerevan, there are hopes that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal might be presented to the new administration as an easy early foreign policy win. However, it remains highly doubtful that Trump will be willing to invest the necessary resources to push the process toward a solution.
Another key factor is Iran, which borders Armenia. During Trump’s first administration, the U.S. famously withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. Reports indicate that prominent Iran hawk Brian Hook will lead Trump’s transition team at the state department, and it’s likely that other key officials in the new administration will also advocate for a tougher stance toward Iran. A more hawkish U.S. approach could significantly limit Armenia’s options in its dealings with Tehran. With Iran being one of only two neighboring countries with an open border with Armenia, its role for Yerevan remains crucial.
The Armenian government and its counterparts in the Biden administration will aim to finalize as many ongoing initiatives as possible by January 20. Afterward, Yerevan will likely focus on engaging groups with ties to the incoming Trump administration, including U.S. politicians familiar with Armenia, Christian advocacy groups, and members of congressional delegations who have recently visited Armenia and may play crucial roles in Congress.
However, the effectiveness of these efforts remains uncertain, given the broader trends that will shape U.S. foreign policy priorities. This uncertainty will likely lead Armenia to adopt more balanced foreign policy rhetoric and actions than in recent years. This shift is already underway, partly driven by regional developments, including recent elections in Georgia. Yerevan will likely increase its engagement in regional formats and exercise greater caution in aligning with the West. This does not mean that cooperation with the EU and other Western partners will cease; rather, it suggests there will be additional constraints in the process.