The One-Day War of 2023 in Nagorno-Karabakh: Facts and Figures Versus Falsification

19.09.2025

In Armenian media, one can often hear the claim made by some politicians and propagandists that on September 19–20, 2023, Artsakh did not fight and simply “surrendered without a shot.”

Such narratives are spread by the Armenian authorities and by those close to them, as well as their affiliated media resources, with the aim of creating a certain psychological mood in society and placing the blame for the loss of Artsakh solely on the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and others.

In reality, after midday on September 19, 2023, Nagorno-Karabakh’s defense units engaged in combat operations under conditions of complete encirclement, with no coordination or operational cohesion, no food, no reserves, no ammunition supply, and under siege — conditions that were in some ways a major surprise for the adversary, who expected to suffer far fewer losses. After several local clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the large-scale attack on Armenia’s territory in September 2022, the adversary may have thought that strong resistance could not be expected from the self-defense forces of Artsakh, which were demoralized after the last war and exhausted from a long blockade.

Let us state in advance that yes, the enemy managed to achieve the objectives it had set for itself within 24 hours, blocking the main roads and encircling Stepanakert. But it did not come easily, as might have been assumed.

On the “Commando” and “Yashma” Units

A significant portion of the overall personnel losses was suffered by Azerbaijan’s assault units from the “Commando” brigades, which had been trained by Turkish specialists as part of the full restructuring of the army and its transition to the Turkish model.

To understand the difference between the two military formations currently existing in Azerbaijan — the Special Forces (HNU) and the “Commando” brigades — which can be said to have roughly the same purpose, a brief explanation is needed:

The “Commando” brigades, created in the image of Turkish army commando units, are meant to carry out combat missions on tactical and operational levels, whereas the primary combat tasks of the Special Forces (xüsusi təyinatlı qüvvələr, “Yashma”) are supposed to include narrower, specialized reconnaissance and sabotage operations, including those conducted behind enemy lines.

On Azerbaijani Losses

A week after the end of combat operations, Azerbaijan announced 192 soldiers killed, with the identities of another 11 servicemen still being verified. Thus, as of September 27, the officially published list included 203 soldiers killed. The number of wounded of varying severity exceeded 500 servicemen.

During the battles of September 19–20, 2023, the officially acknowledged Azerbaijani losses totaled 205. The 205th casualty was a sergeant from the Special Purpose Battalion of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) Operational Regiment, who sustained a head injury on September 19 and died on October 6 in a neurosurgical hospital.

The list does not include the losses of two groups of MIA personnel who were killed just hours before the start of the Azerbaijani offensive. The first group, consisting of three policemen, was killed at 01:00 on September 19 in the Fizuli region. The second group, consisting of four men, was killed at 04:30 near the village of Taghavard. According to the official version, they died when a military Kamaz truck hit an anti-tank mine.

The list also does not include Lieutenant Colonel Akram Shadmanov, chief of staff of a “Commando” brigade, and the brigade’s driver Tural Seidov, who were killed on September 24 by a mine explosion near the village of Sarnaghbyur in the Askeran region. Nor does it include Sergeant Hajiali Gasimov, a contract serviceman of the “Commando” special forces, who was severely wounded near Stepanakert on September 20 and died in January 2024.

The main losses of the Azerbaijani assault groups — both killed and wounded — were in the Martakert direction (around 70 killed) and in the Martuni direction (around 60 killed).

Most of the killed and wounded Azerbaijani servicemen had been active participants in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, and some had taken part in Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia in September 2022.

While there is no complete information on the ranks and specializations of the wounded Azerbaijanis, the classification of those killed — most of whom were military specialists — is as follows:

Officers: 42, including three lieutenant colonels:
- Huseynov Rashad, commander of the MIA Special Forces unit stationed in Ganja
- Rustamov Vusal, commander of the “Commando” brigade stationed in Gusar
- Shadmanov Akram, chief of staff of one of the “Commando” brigades
Junior officers: around 30
Contract service sergeants: around 30

The remaining losses were contract and conscript privates. Moreover, a significant portion of the contract and conscript soldiers who participated in the assault operations had completed the accelerated 60-day “Komando başlanğıc kursu” (Commando Basic Course) at mountain training centers.

Azerbaijani casualties have been identified by unit affiliation as follows:

“Commando” brigades and Special Forces (“Yashma”): about 120 servicemen. Azerbaijani sources list 41 as Commando servicemen and 7 as Special Forces, but a detailed study of each case shows the real number is three times higher.
Naval Infantry of the Azerbaijani Navy: 7 servicemen, most of them killed near the village of Khnapat in the Askeran region.
MIA Special Forces: 13 servicemen.

The identification of their identities and military unit affiliations was done through their uniforms and insignia, places of service, photos and videos, published interviews with family members, funeral materials, and other sources.

The remaining number of losses relates to those whose specific unit affiliation could not be determined.

It should be noted that the list of 205 includes personnel from armored and artillery units, which are regularly attached to assault brigades to provide fire support. Among the dead were a tank battalion commander and an artillery battery commander.

Overall, it can be asserted that during the 24 hours of fighting, Artsakh’s self-defense forces put more than 700 Azerbaijani servicemen out of action.

Without resistance and “shots fired,” the enemy would not have suffered such losses in a single day.

Never before — in neither the 2020 war nor during Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia in the fall of 2022 — had the enemy suffered such large losses in a single day.

For comparison, take Azerbaijan’s operation to capture Shushi in 2020: Azerbaijan officially acknowledged losing about 385 killed during that operation. But these losses also include the battles for Sghnakh, Karin Tak, and Shosh, and they stretched from late October to November 10.

At the start of Azerbaijan’s offensive, Artsakh’s self-defense forces practically had no prepared defensive fortifications or strongpoints necessary for even a minimally stable defense and for minimizing losses.

During the three years of the Russian peacekeeping contingent’s presence in Artsakh, at the demand of the Azerbaijani armed forces, Armenian units were forbidden to build defensive fortifications, and in some areas were even forced to stop building bunkers and shelters. There were even cases where Russian sappers blew up ready-made fortifications.

In many frontline positions, NK soldiers were limited to installing just a few gabions, making the position look more like a checkpoint than a fighting position.

This was a well-known fact in Artsakh, but most preferred not to make it public.

In addition, the enemy knew almost all communication routes, anti-aircraft and artillery positions, communication lines and means, the number of combat personnel in the army, including in frontline positions, as well as the types and quantities of weapons.

Under these conditions — technically and numerically inferior (on top of many negative factors accumulated during the three years since the 2020 war) — Armenian soldiers went into battle.

All this happened under conditions of army demoralization, total blockade, disorganization, and as a consequence, a drop in discipline and command-and-control within the units, with no clear planning from the army command, no military thinking (even at the tactical level), and against the backdrop of domestic political instability, which in the last nine months had turned into complete chaos and ungovernability as the local authorities were mired in internal political squabbles — also due to Armenia’s government distancing itself from the Artsakh issue.

Of course, even under such conditions, some preparatory measures could theoretically have prolonged the resistance of NK fighters by two, three, or perhaps four more days until the adversary, increasing its pressure, would have encircled Stepanakert. Azerbaijan had enough resources to commit fresh and larger forces to battle and to intensify the bombardment of settlements, including with Israeli precision weapons and TOS-1A heavy flamethrowers.

All this would only have delayed the surrender by a few days and resulted in even greater losses — both among servicemen and Artsakh’s civilian population.

In conclusion, we find it necessary to stress that the one-day war should not be viewed solely in terms of its outcome — capitulation and ethnic cleansing. Despite the extreme imbalance of forces, Azerbaijan encountered stiff resistance and paid a heavy price. It employed its elite troops and suffered losses comparable to those of Artsakh’s self-defense forces. Any manipulation of this topic is, to say the least, inappropriate and an insult to those who fought and gave their lives in a hopeless situation.

Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS

The article was originally published on CivilNet in November 2024.