The New U.S. National Security Strategy Through Armenia’s Lens
17.12.2025
At the beginning of December, the new U.S. National Security Strategy was published, triggering considerable debate in both the United States and Europe. The document codifies the fundamental principles that, in practice, underpin U.S. foreign policy during Donald Trump’s second presidential term.
The strategy explicitly speaks of a a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at preserving American dominance in the Western Hemisphere and limiting and reducing the role of external actors there.
Among the core foreign policy interests listed in the strategy are containing China in the Indo-Pacific region and maintaining American primacy there; preserving Europe’s freedom and security; and the “restoration of civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.” Notably, this latter point largely pertains to processes unfolding within Europe itself. The media also reported on a longer, unpublished version of the strategy in which anti-European narratives were more pronounced and which discussed building closer relations with European countries governed by right-wing administratons.
The document also lists two other core foreign policy interests: preventing the dominance of adversarial forces in the Middle East and maintaining U.S. technological supremacy.
Conspicuously absent from the strategy are ideological and value-based components. During Trump’s presidency, U.S. foreign policy has been highly pragmatic and transactional, and this reality runs like a red thread through the entire document. The United States abandons its long-standing policy of exporting its political and economic model to other countries, is prepared to work closely with key players that have non-democratic systems, and views threats emanating from Russia solely through the prism of European concerns. In that context, the U.S. expresses readiness to pursue diplomatic efforts to establish strategic stability in Eurasia and to mitigate the risks of conflict between European states and Russia. In other words, both in the case of the Ukrainian conflict and now in the Europe–Russia confrontation, Washington is turning into a neutral mediator, relinquishing the role of containing Russia and guaranteeing Europe’s security.
The document also offers an assessment of the post–Cold War order in which the United States played a dominant role. The new strategy states that this model did not serve the vital interests of the United States. Among the leading principles of U.S. foreign policy, it is clearly stated that Washington rejects the concept of global hegemony and instead transitions to a strategy of balance of power. This is, in effect, an acknowledgment of changes that have already taken place at the global level and of America’s own limitations.
Implications for the South Caucasus
To assess the impact of these cornerstone changes in U.S. strategy on Armenia and the South Caucasus, it is necessary to distinguish which of these approaches reflect the subjective views of the Trump team and may change with the advent of a new Democratic—or even a more traditional Republican—administration, and which represent objective, long-term trends and realities.
Perhaps the most important of these realities is the recognition that the United States is no longer the hegemon of the international order, but rather the most influential and most powerful actor within that system, alongside other great powers. It appears that, for the first time in a document of this level, the end of the unipolar world order is explicitly acknowledged. Of course, future administrations may challenge the claim found in the strategy that the period of exclusive American dominance established after the end of the Cold War did not serve U.S. national interests. However, the assessment of America’s new status in today’s world reflects an objective reality and is unlikely to be seriously contested by other actors. Many international relations theorists have advanced this assessment over the past decade.
This assessment also underpins the clear identification of regions and issues of vital importance to the United States and the emphasis placed on them. The document’s assertion that the U.S. cannot and should not play a decisive role in all parts of the world likewise stems from objective realities. From a South Caucasus perspective, if we look at the strategy and potential future developments, we see that regions in our immediate neighborhood—Europe and the Middle East—are losing importance for the United States.
In Europe’s case, the issue is partly rooted in the approaches of the Trump team, and U.S. policy would certainly change under a more traditional administration. Nevertheless, the damage inflicted on relations is likely to have long-term consequences. U.S. approaches toward the Middle East are more enduring and consistent. As early as Barack Obama’s first presidential term, the United States began its Pivot to Asia aimed at containing China. This policy was adjusted due to developments in Europe and the Middle East, but it has remained—and will continue to remain—relevant, because from a strategic standpoint China will be the United States’ principal geopolitical rival in the coming decades.
TRIPP and the logic of the new strategy
In light of the above, the reader may raise two key questions: first, given all this, how can one explain the Washington summit between Armenia and Azerbaijan held under U.S. mediation and American involvement in the process of unblocking regional communications through the TRIPP project? The second question concerns the long-term U.S. role in the South Caucasus.
The answers to these questions are found in the strategy itself. In the section outlining the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign, defense, and intelligence policy, there is a point titled “Realignment through peace ,” which states that even in regions peripheral to U.S. core interests, ''Seeking peace deals at the President’s direction'' is “is an effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets” The clause concludes by noting that the dividends from this policy can far exceed the relatively modest resources expended.
American interest in and engagement with the TRIPP program should be viewed precisely through the logic of this principle—achieving substantial dividends while expending minimal resources. TRIPP also fully fits within the strategy’s emphasis on transactional foreign policy and the prioritization of U.S. economic interests.
Taking all this into account, one of the most crucial issues for Armenia is a clear-eyed understanding of the role and significance of the South Caucasus in U.S. foreign policy. In the period following the Washington summit, some actors have advanced highly exaggerated assessments and narratives regarding America’s role in the South Caucasus. This document provides a good opportunity to understand U.S. priorities—including in the long term—and to develop more realistic expectations in relations with the United States, while at the same time making use of the new opportunities that have emerged.
Tigran Grigoryan
The article was originally published on CivilNet.