The Emigration of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians Undermines Armenia’s Demographic Stability

25.02.2026

As of February 1, 2025, the number of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who have left Armenia and not yet returned stands at 15,000 people. The total number of forcibly displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is 150,000. This figure represents residents who left Nagorno‑Karabakh as a result of the 2020 war and the ethnic cleansing carried out by Azerbaijan in 2023. Consequently, to date, at least 10% of those who relocated to Armenia have left the country. Is this a typical proportion within Armenia’s broader emigration trends, or does it have distinct characteristics?

At its October 17, 2024 session, the Government of the Republic of Armenia approved the 2024–2040 Strategy for Improving the Demographic Situation. During its preparation, a substantial database was compiled, including available population data for Armenia over the past 125 years, as well as demographic data on Nagorno-Karabakh. Notably, when the strategy was being drafted, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic still existed, and the authors had the opportunity to obtain data from its state institutions and hold consultations with them.

The strategy contains a data-driven section describing Nagorno-Karabakh’s demographic profile. The population there stood out for being younger. Unlike Armenia’s aging population, the population pyramid of Nagorno-Karabakh showed a significantly larger share of children and youth. Compared to Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh also had a higher proportion of women of reproductive age: during the 2010s the fertility rate was 2.3, declining to 1.9 in 2019. By contrast, Armenia’s fertility rate is 1.6, and one of the strategy’s goals is to raise it to 1.8 by 2040. The share of families with a fourth or fifth child in Nagorno-Karabakh was 5–7 times higher than in Armenia. Life expectancy was similar to Armenia’s, and sex-selective abortions were virtually absent, as evidenced by the balanced ratio of boys to girls at birth. In other words, Nagorno-Karabakh was home to a younger population inclined toward having more children and rejecting selective abortions.

Such high birth rates in Nagorno-Karabakh were partly driven by specific social policies, including programs that provided housing for the birth of a sixth child, as well as various private initiatives that created additional incentives. Nevertheless, regardless of these measures, families in Nagorno-Karabakh were generally more inclined to have larger numbers of children.

There are no in-depth studies on the reasons for emigration of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians from Armenia, but some observations and correlations suggest that people leave due to insufficient income (employment opportunities and social support). For example, when the number of beneficiaries receiving rent compensation was significantly reduced starting in May 2025, an increase in emigration was observed: while the number of people who had left and not returned had stabilized at around 11,000 at the beginning of 2025—with some return migration—after May the figure began to rise. It can also be assumed that those leaving are mainly people of working age.

Cutting social programs for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians before resolving their housing situation—which has contributed to increased emigration among the forcibly displaced—contradicts the government’s 2024–2040 demographic strategy. The document sets goals such as achieving higher birth rates, promoting healthy lifestyles, ensuring active aging (so that an aging society does not become a burden on the young), and reducing the drivers of emigration. Several billion dollars are planned to be spent on related measures by 2040. Yet, to prevent the emigration of a population group characterized by youth, higher fertility, and rejection of selective abortion, the government chose to make savings. The annual cost of the rent-compensation program is about 50 billion drams, and it has been steadily decreasing (as those who purchase homes no longer qualify). In other words, the government chose to save 50 billion drams, which led to increased emigration among a group with desirable demographic indicators—while planning to spend much larger sums later to improve those same indicators. For comparison, in 2025 alone, income-tax refunds for mortgage repayments amounted to 100 billion drams, and this figure is expected to grow in the coming years.

The emigration of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians from Armenia is not merely a social or humanitarian issue; it has clear demographic, economic, and strategic dimensions. This process effectively neutralizes precisely the demographic potential that the state intends to invest billions of dollars to build over the coming decades. If short-term budget savings take precedence over long-term demographic and national interests, even the best strategies will remain on paper. Preserving the forcibly displaced population from Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia should be viewed not as a social burden, but as an investment in the country’s future demographic stability, workforce reproduction, and national security.

Hayk Khanumyan

RCDS