The Cost of Compliance: Armenian Civil Society’s Missed Responsibilities

29.09.2024

 

By Karena Avedissian

 

For the last few years, many Armenians have felt alone — left to contend with increasingly belligerent threats and the consequences of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. But, paradoxically, the country is receiving more interest from Western capitals than it has in its entire history, with hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on joint programs, institution building and bolstering civil society.

 

As a senior analyst at the Regional Center for Democracy and Security (RCDS), I’ve been part of dozens of meetings between Armenian civil society organizations and our Western partners who support these projects. Typically, we analysts take turns briefing the partners on significant developments in the country, helping them understand the context. But Armenia’s civil society seems often to misunderstand why they’re there in the first place.

 

Armenia is currently undergoing a rapid political shift away from Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) towards the West. Unlike Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, which have been on this path for longer, many Western partners remain relatively unfamiliar with Armenia’s context and often harbor misguided assumptions about it. While they meet with government officials to get an official perspective, they also rely on independent civil society members and experts to gain a fuller understanding of the situation. This system is structured to provide these Western partners with unbiased, in-depth analysis of Armenia’s primary challenges and needs, offering crucial context that goes beyond what they hear from state representatives.

 

All too often, well-meaning NGOs will uncritically portray Armenia’s democratic progress: everything is framed as going well, and the deeper issues are glossed over. Another issue is the portrayal of the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians — which we will explore in a later edition of Democracy Watch.

 

At these meetings, I’ve found a conspicuous downplaying of certain worrying trends in Armenia’s democratic landscape. These include growing cases of political repression, police misconduct, lack of transparency on policies that impact citizens, lack of transparency on officials’ expenditures, and harassment of journalists.

 

Undoubtedly, Armenia is making objective democratic progress in many ways, and there is much to praise. But, these issues aren’t isolated incidents—they represent a growing trend towards problematic norms. At these meetings, Armenian civil society members tend to downplay these developments, treating them as minor disruptions in an otherwise positive narrative. While I wouldn’t categorize the current government as undemocratic, there are concerning trends that, if left unchecked, could lead to significant problems.

 

At a meeting at a foreign diplomatic mission in Armenia, a colleague—one of the few critical voices in civil society—highlighted problems with police reform. The foreign diplomatic representative was visibly surprised, having received a far rosier depiction of Armenia’s progress. Her reaction revealed that Western partners are being given incomplete or overly optimistic assessments by my colleagues.

 

During a recent trip to Germany, I noticed some colleagues again presenting an overly optimistic picture to Western partners, omitting important challenges that needed addressing. When the German colleagues asked for feedback on their own role, I pointed out specific instances where the EU had fallen short. My colleagues’ reaction was almost as if I had committed a faux pas or been impolite. While they weren’t defending the ruling party in this case, it still reflected a mindset reminiscent of Soviet-era approaches—where meetings were more about networking and superficial goodwill than about meaningful, substantive discussions. This reaction underscores a fundamental misunderstanding of our role. Being critical isn’t rude; it’s a core part of our job.

 

Several factors contribute to the tendency to put a positive spin on the ruling party’s actions. Following Armenia’s 2018 democratic revolution, the threat of the old regime’s return was real. Many engaged in self-censorship, fearing that the revolution’s gains were fragile and reversible. At the time, maintaining a united front seemed necessary to keep the old guard at bay.

 

However, that was over four years ago. Much has changed since then. The loss of the 2020 war, the 2022 attacks, and the fall of Artsakh have left the government insecure, rather than fragile. While the ruling party’s hold on power might have seemed entrenched enough to begin to invite criticism, this insecurity now manifests in ways inconsistent with democratic norms.

 

Now, many still refrain from criticizing the government, but it’s not for fear that the old guard might come back, but for fear of being associated with it – something these civil society members use to malign their more critical colleagues behind closed doors. So many Armenians find the main opposition factions distasteful and odious that they prefer to remain silent about the ruling party’s worrying actions. This silence, unfortunately, only hinders the growth of a more popular and representative opposition.

 

Another factor contributing to experts’ uncritical stance is the migration of many civil society members into government positions following the 2018 revolution. Those remaining in civil society often hesitate to criticize their former colleagues and friends now in government. Personal relationships and social networks continue to exert significant influence.

 

Perhaps the least forgivable reason is that some nominally independent civil society members align themselves with government narratives to secure privileged positions. By offering favorable portrayals, or repeating government narratives, they are rewarded with air time on Public TV, exclusive access to insider information, and invited to closed-door government meetings. In short, they are compensated for their lack of criticism. This arrangement creates a symbiotic relationship where the expert gains prestige and access, while the government benefits from seemingly independent validation of its actions and policies.

 

There was a time when Georgia was widely seen as a democratic success story. However, as the country gradually backslid, many European partners, who had invested heavily in its democratic development, largely overlooked the warning signs—after all, “their (democratic) man” was in power. By the time they realized the extent of the decline, it was too late. Armenia now faces a similar risk.

 

The dangers of this uncritical approach are significant. When civil society fails to provide rigorous, objective analysis, it contributes to misguided policy decisions. Western partners are currently investing substantial resources in Armenia, but without candid feedback from independent voices, they risk overlooking key facts on the ground. This could leave them unprepared for future challenges, such as declines in social cohesion, economic growth, or human rights protections.

 

Armenia’s democratic development faces real challenges, and by being yes-men-at-all-costs, Armenian civil society is effectively ignoring these issues, revealing a fundamental misunderstanding about their role. Armenia – and yes, this government – has made strides in democratic development. But without facing up to reality, that progress could soon stop.

 

 

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative by CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank.

 

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.