Supporting Nagorno-Karabakh Refugees: A Government Duty, Not a Gesture of Goodwill

Supporting Nagorno-Karabakh Refugees: A Government Duty, Not a Gesture of Goodwill

03.04.2025

 

 

 

On March 29, a rally took place at Freedom Square in Yerevan to defend the rights of forcibly displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Although numerous issues were raised during the gathering, it was evident that the primary reason and catalyst for the rally was the government's decision to discontinue the monthly 40,000+10,000 AMD support program for most Nagorno-Karabakh refugees starting April 1. This program was designed to help refugees cover housing and other expenses.

 

Initiated immediately after the forced displacement of people from Nagorno-Karabakh, the program enabled Karabakh refugees settled in Armenia to secure rental housing. In essence, this financial aid was the main reason why the majority of forcibly displaced persons did not end up homeless.

 

A year ago, the government introduced a housing assistance program for displaced persons, but it has been plagued with issues and remains highly ineffective despite recent modifications. A key indicator of its inefficiency is the fact that, a year after its launch, only about 50 families have managed to use the vouchers provided by the program to buy property. Given the failure to address the housing crisis, the termination of the 40+10 support program seems even more illogical.

 

Various government representatives and their numerous propagandists reacted aggressively to the rally at Freedom Square. Deputy Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, Taron Chakhoyan, referred to the refugee participants as "cannon fodder" and claimed that the opposition was exploiting them to push for a change in power. Arsen Torosyan, an MP from the ruling Civil Contract party, also made a post after the Nagorno-Karabakh refugees' rally, implying that the demonstrators had betrayed the warm welcome of Armenian society. He suggested that certain individuals and forces were again seeking "de-Armenianization," this time within Armenia itself.

 

These statements were made despite the fact that the rally’s organizers and participants did not raise any domestic political demands. In fact, they explicitly excluded figures with political agendas from speaking at the event. While some demands related to Armenia’s foreign policy and the collective rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were voiced during the rally, it was clear that the main concern was the social and economic situation of the displaced population and the risk of a drastic deterioration if the government did not reverse its decision.

 

In this context, the authorities' aggressive rhetoric and the targeted attacks by their propagandists against NK refugees were grossly inappropriate, fueling a new wave of hatred against the displaced community.

 

Regarding the government's responsibilities in addressing the problems faced by Karabakh refugees, these should be viewed primarily as a matter of accountability. While the authorities attempt to present the refugee support programs as acts of goodwill, that is far from the case.

 

Since the 1990s, every Armenian government has assumed the role of guarantor of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, a commitment reflected in Armenia’s fundamental policy documents. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration was no exception. This commitment was not only part of the ruling Civil Contract party’s electoral platform during the 2021 snap parliamentary elections but was also incorporated into the government’s subsequent program.

 

Although it became evident after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War that Armenia was no longer capable of fulfilling this security function militarily, the socio-economic component of that responsibility only grew stronger. 

 

More importantly, the Pashinyan government’s policies had a direct impact on the final outcome in September 2023 with the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

First, in the period leading up to 2020, the Armenian authorities’ incompetence and reckless foreign policy accelerated the onset of war without adequate preparation. Throughout the war, the government failed in crisis management and avoided taking responsibility for stopping hostilities when the eventual outcome was already clear.

 

Then, after 2020, the Armenian authorities progressively lowered their diplomatic red lines—agreeing to remove the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians’ rights and security from the peace treaty text, recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (including Nagorno-Karabakh) in Prague, and refusing to engage in negotiations after Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin Corridor, citing concerns that Armenia would be pressured to concede a corridor through Meghri. By these decisions, the Armenian government effectively gave Azerbaijan a diplomatic carte blanche to finalize the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

Given all this, the Armenian government bears direct responsibility for addressing the critical issues faced by Nagorno-Karabakh refugees- not only because it played a role in creating these problems but also because it had an obligation to prevent the circumstances that led to them. This responsibility will not be erased, no matter how much figures like Arsen Torosyan, Taron Chakhoyan, and other government propagandists try to divert the issue by inciting internal animosity and spreading anti-Karabakh rhetoric at the highest levels. Until the government fulfills its minimum obligation of securing permanent housing for Nagorno-Karabakh refugees, it will remain burdened by this responsibility. 

 

Tigran Grigoryan, 

Regional Center for Democracy and Security 

 

The article was originally published on Civilnet.