State–Church Relations Through the Lens of Domestic and International Human Rights Law
20.01.2026
In the context of modern states, questions concerning the state and religion, as well as separation of state and church, encompassing both political and legal dimensions, have been a subject of scholarly and public debate in democratic world for about two centuries now. Scholars have developed a range of classification models to describe the relationship between the state and religion, reflecting diverse historical, cultural, and constitutional contexts. For example, European scholarship often distinguishes between models such as the French laïcité, characterised by strict separation of religion and state, and the established churches of the United Kingdom or the Lutheran state churches in Scandinavia, where historical churches maintain formal ties with the state. In the United states, typologies emphasise the balance between the Establishment Clause (no official religion) and the Free Exercise Clause (freedom to practice faith), highlighting the tension between government neutrality and individual religious freedoms.
In modern Armenia, however, this debate has remained largely absent, not only from political discourse but also from academic discussion. By contrast, substantially more has been written — and is therefore better known — about the Armenian Apostolic Church (hereafter the Church or Armenian church interchangeably) under the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire and under the Polozhenie (Положение), the ecclesiastical charter imposed by the Russian Empire and in force until 1917. While valuable in their own right, these studies have limited relevance for contemporary discussions, as they approach state–church relations primarily from a historical perspective and reflect conditions in which both the Armenian church and the Armenian people were subject to imperial rule. Relations between the state and the Armenian church historically in the last several centuries developed within an imperial governance framework, in which minority confessional communities were regulated by imperial authorities and no independent Armenian state existed. Apparently, that is the reason for the relative lack of discussions on state and church relations in the young modern Armenian state until recently.
It is both significant and noteworthy that the Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organisations was adopted by the Supreme Council of Armenia in June 1991—four years prior to the adoption of the first Constitution of the Republic—and remains in force to this day. Since gaining independence in 1991, Armenia has sought to establish itself as a modern and democratic state, to overcome the legacy of an atheistic model, and to lay the foundations for religious freedom in line with Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the abovementioned law explicitly refers in its preamble.
Independent Armenia—like many states classified as having a “favoured religion” by former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed—has faced a need for a delicate balance in its relations with the Church. Political and legal debate, as well as state policy, have largely focused on the extent to which the Armenian church, given its historical role and contemporary prominence, should enjoy a special status and a privileged position within the country’s religious landscape. Joining the Council of Europe in 2001, the state undertook obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights to ensure that any recognition or support for the Armenian church does not undermine the rights of minority religious communities, including the Armenian Evangelical church, emerging evangelical movements, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other faith groups. In practice, discussions have revolved around reconciling the Church’s historical and social significance for the nation with principles of equality and non-discrimination, to be compliant with international standards. The attempts to ensure equality and non-discrimination were not always successful, as evidenced by several cases brought before the Constitutional Court of Armenia and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Meanwhile, the question of the separation between the Armenian church and the Armenian state—or of defining a clear “wall of separation” between them—has never been seriously addressed, even at the academic level, perhaps because there has not been a pressing practical reason for such a debate. This is not unique to Armenia, and reflects a broader pattern observed in countries operating under similar models of state–church relations, such as Georgia. Given the limited public debate in this sphere and the insufficient understanding of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) as a human right among the citizens, it is unsurprising that approaches to this issue are construed largely stemming from political considerations, including and primarily being generated at the highest levels of government. These approaches do not often align with international legal standards or with the historical and normative foundations of state–church relations, including their grounding in human rights principles, as summarised by the international law.
In this article I elaborate on questions essential to understanding state–church relations as matters of public interest and concern. I examine the issues strictly from a FoRB perspective, avoiding political assessment, which lies beyond my field of expertise.
What is separation between church and state and what does that mean in international law and practice?
The principle of separation of church and state, enshrined in the constitutions of many democratic countries, including Armenia, originates from a long-standing philosophical and constitutional tradition aimed at protecting freedom of conscience and religion. Its core purpose has been twofold: to safeguard individuals from coercion in matters of belief, and to ensure the institutional autonomy of religious organisations by shielding them from undue state interference.
This understanding developed gradually in response to historical contexts in which religious authority and political power were deeply intertwined, often to the detriment of religious freedom and social stability. In pre-modern Europe, doctrines such as cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion) empowered rulers to determine the religion of their subjects, subordinating individual conscience to political authority and entangling religious institutions in systems of governance. The resulting conflicts, including prolonged religious wars in Europe, prompted sustained intellectual and legal reflection.
These concerns were central to the political thought of Enlightenment. Thinkers such as John Locke argued that freedom of conscience could not be secured unless ecclesiastical authority and state power were institutionally distinct, thereby preventing both state-imposed belief and religious domination of public authority. This intellectual shift laid the foundation for legal arrangements that treated religious belief as lying beyond the legitimate reach of the state.
The constitutional traditions that emerged in the late eighteenth century gave concrete legal expression to these ideas. In the American context, freedom of conscience was placed at the centre of individual liberty. Although the Declaration of Independence of 1776 refers to natural rights endowed by the Creator, its underlying philosophy—subsequently codified in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution—established that the state may neither establish an official religion nor interfere with the free exercise of religion. These guarantees were designed to protect both individuals and religious communities from coercion, political instrumentalization, and state control, while allowing religious actors to participate freely in public life.
A parallel, though distinct, development occurred in France. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 affirmed freedom of opinion, including religious opinion, as a fundamental right, subject only to limitations necessary for the maintenance of public order. This approach reflected a similar commitment to liberating conscience from political domination. It was later institutionalised through the 1905 Law on the Separation of the churches and the state, which formalised the principle of state neutrality by ending official recognition and public funding of religious denominations, thereby reinforcing the impartial role of the state in religious matters.
The separation of church and state did not emerge as a doctrine hostile to religion. Rather, this was a constitutional construal for safeguarding freedom of conscience, ensuring equality among citizens, and preventing the concentration of political and spiritual authority within the same institutional structures. Far from excluding religion from social, political or civic life, this model, alongside with other constraints imposed on the state, established in order to ensure the adherence to human rights, seeks to limit the state power, and preserve pluralism by preventing the state from identifying itself with, endorsing, funding or privileging any particular belief system.
This intellectual and constitutional legacy continues to shape contemporary European human rights law. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently affirmed that state neutrality and impartiality in religious matters are essential components of freedom of religion or belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Within this framework, religious individuals and communities remain free to participate in public and political life; the principal constraint applies to the state: it must refrain from establishing an official religion or granting preferential treatment to any religious community, including through the allocation of public resources. This principle of separation functions as a guarantee for ensuring pluralism, among other constitutional principles of democratic order, so that FoRB can be exercised by all without discrimination.
As a follower of the European legal and constitutional tradition, Armenia bases its modern legal framework on the same historical and philosophical foundations. Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia enshrines the principles of freedom of conscience and religion, while the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations establishes the legal framework for the functioning and autonomy of religious communities. Together, these provisions reflect the fundamental objectives observed in democratic systems: protecting individual freedom of belief, ensuring the independence of religious organisations, and maintaining the neutrality of the state in religious matters.
The law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of the Republic of Armenia literally follows these principles.
Section 17 of the Law stipulates that “In the Republic of Armenia, church and state are separate. On the basis of this separation the state: a) Shall not force a citizen to adhere to any religion. b) Shall not interfere in the activities and internal affairs of church and Religious Organizations as long as they operate in accordance with the law, no state agency or person acting on behalf of such agency shall operate within a Religious Organization. c) Prohibits the participation of the church in governing the state and shall not impose any governmental functions on the church or Religious Organization”[1].
Section 18 of the Law stipulated that “The state shall finance neither the activity of Religious Organizations nor of atheistic propaganda. At the same time, the state guarantees the right of the members or employees of Religious Organizations to take part in the civil and political life on an equal basis with other citizens[2]”
Armenian law explicitly states that it “prohibits the participation of the church in governing the state and shall not impose any governmental functions on the Church or Religious Organization.” The limitation that religious organisations “cannot perform state functions” means that religious organisations, including the Armenian church, are prohibited to exercise powers that are reserved exclusively to the state. This includes activities such as collecting taxes, issuing official documents like passports or birth certificates, enacting laws, etc. This prohibition is particularly important since for extended periods in the past, before the Soviet period, some quasi-governmental functions, including adjudication and education, were carried out among the stateless Armenian population that lived within the Ottoman or Russian Empires, by the Armenian church.
Limiting the exercise of state functions is an important constitutional principle aimed at preventing the creation or operation of parallel non-state structures—such as religious courts existing in some countries—that are reserved exclusively for the state under the constitution. International and European legal standards consistently affirm that core state functions—particularly the administration of justice—must remain exclusively within the constitutional authority of the state, as the establishment of parallel religious or non-state structures, such as religious courts, undermines legal certainty, equality before the law, and the rule of law, as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, the Venice Commission, and the OSCE/ODIHR[3].
This regulation does not imply that religious organisations, including the Armenian church, are excluded from political, public, social, or cultural life; they are not confined solely to the “spiritual realm.” On the contrary the law clearly stipulates that state guarantees the right of the members or employees of Religious Organizations to take part in the civil and political life on an equal basis with other citizens.
What is autonomy of religious organisations and why states cannot interfere?
The principle of autonomy of religious organisations is designed to protect religious institutions, including the church, from undue interference by the state. This autonomy is not only a right of religious organisations but also a legal and moral responsibility of the state, and is often referred to as the “responsibility to respect;” it obliges the state to refrain from infringing upon the independence or functioning of religious communities. There exists an extensive body of scholarly writing, decisions of US Supreme Court and ECtHR case law on this matter. For the purposes of this article, however, I will focus solely on the ECtHR’s interpretation, as it forms an integral part of the Armenian legal system and is binding for Armenian law.
On autonomy of religious organisations ECtHR said:
“Religious communities have traditionally and universally existed in the form of organised structures. In cases concerning the mode of organisation of a religious community, Article 9 (FoRB) of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 (freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association), which safeguards associative life against unjustified state interference. The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is therefore an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords”[4]
The following ECtHR cases illustrate how the principle of church autonomy has been applied in jurisprudence and in decisions that are already an integral part of Armenian legislation.
In Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, Romanian Orthodox priests sought to form a trade union against the church’s wishes. While a small panel of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) initially sided with the priests, the Grand Chamber in 2013 reversed the decision, affirming the Church’s right to self-governance and religious autonomy. This case reinforced the principle that governments must not interfere in the internal decisions of religious organisations, particularly regarding their spiritual leaders.
Similarly, in Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, a leadership dispute arose after the fall of communism. The Bulgarian government recognized only Patriarch Maxim’s leadership, evicting clergy and followers of an alternative Synod from churches and monasteries. The ECtHR ruled that this violated Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the state interfered in the church’s internal organization and favoured one faction over another.
Fernández‑Martínez v. Spain: the case concerned a dispute over the non-renewal of a priest’s contract, which raised questions about the church’s internal governance; the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the state must respect the internal decisions of religious organisations and cannot interfere in their governance. The ruling reaffirmed the principle that religious communities have autonomy under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly regarding the appointment and management of their clergy.
Conclusion
State–church relations, shaped by difficult historical circumstances, including the legacy of religious wars in Europe, lie at the very core of modern Western democracies and constitute one of the foundational pillars of human rights. While the concept of generations of rights is often contested by the human rights scholars, religious freedom draws on much earlier constitutional and legal traditions that were recognised long before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. International human rights law recognises that many religious organisations, including the Armenian church, long predate modern states and that respect for their autonomy — including the freedom to determine their internal structures, leadership, and practices — is a central component of freedom of religion or belief. At the heart of democratic constitutionalism is the principle that constitutions draw a clear line between the state and citizens, protecting individuals and their associations — including religious organisations — from arbitrary state action.
All said above means that the state, as the primary duty‑bearer under international and domestic human rights law, must refrain from undue interference in religious life and must take positive steps to ensure the effective enjoyment of religious freedoms. The power dynamic between the state and the church reflects broader human rights architecture: rights holders are protected against state power, and the state is responsible for respecting, protecting, and facilitating these rights. Here where the boundary is drawn.
Isabella Sargsyan
Expert on Freedom of Religion or Belief
[2] ibid
[3] Check See ECtHR, Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey (GC), no. 41340/98, 2003; Venice Commission, Report on Freedom of Religion and Belief, CDL-AD(2010)054; OSCE/ODIHR–Venice Commission, Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities (2014).
[4] https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/autonomy-of-religious-organisations