Russian-Style Propaganda in Armenia: Government Part of the Problem

05.01.2025

 

By Tigran Grigoryan

 

When I was invited to testify at the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s congressional hearing on Armenia last September, I drew the attention of the Russian propaganda machine. Posts about the hearing began appearing immediately after the event was announced. One of the largest Russian propaganda Telegram channels, Rybar, shared a post about the hearing.

 

After the hearing, pro-Russian Telegram channels in Armenia suddenly became avid followers of my CivilNet podcast on Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and regional developments in the South Caucasus. They somehow drew a connection between my congressional testimony and the topics I discuss weekly on the podcast. For instance, in one post, commonly known facts about the peace process were misrepresented as exclusive information I allegedly obtained during my trip to Washington, D.C. Some of my podcast commentary was blatantly distorted in this and other posts to fit their narrative.

However, pro-Russian Telegram channels are not the only tools to spread disinformation in Armenia. Recently, there has been a surge in anonymous websites that provide no information about their ownership or affiliations. These platforms propagate narratives and fake news targeting various civil society organizations, think tanks, and political figures in Armenia. To amplify their reach, all new posts on these sites are sponsored, enabling them to attract larger audiences.

 

Notably, the individuals behind these websites exploit democratic buzzwords to attack democratic actors and processes. For instance, the most visible website of this kind is called fact-check.am. The intent is clear—to lend a veneer of credibility to their malicious campaigns. Fact-checking journalism has been flourishing in Armenia in recent years, making it convenient for these propagandists to associate their outlet with this trusted area of journalistic work, thereby misleading the public and undermining genuine fact-checking efforts.

 

This particular website published an extensive article about the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, portraying our think tank as a powerful organization with vast resources, allegedly acting on orders from the West. The article was riddled with manipulations and outright falsehoods, much like all the other content on this newly created anonymous website. These pieces are further amplified through paid promotion on its associated social media accounts.

 

The resurgence of these types of propaganda outlets is a troubling trend for Armenia. Over the past decade, Russia and other authoritarian actors have extensively employed such hybrid tactics to interfere in political processes across various countries. With Armenia’s upcoming election season, it is crucial to take proactive measures to counter these malicious campaigns and uncover the individuals or entities behind them. Failing to address this issue could allow disinformation to undermine democratic processes and public trust.

 

Ideally, the government should take the lead in addressing this issue by developing a robust legal and institutional framework to make the weaponization of such hybrid tactics significantly more difficult. A proactive approach in this area would help safeguard democratic processes and protect society from the harmful effects of disinformation and propaganda.

 

However, in reality, the government and the ruling party are part of the problem rather than the solution. In 2021, an investigation by Infocom revealed that Taron Chakhoyan, the deputy head of the prime minister’s office, owned several anonymous websites engaged in Russian-style propaganda. The investigation also uncovered that content from these anonymous websites was frequently re-published by media outlets openly owned by members of the ruling party or their family members. This troubling connection highlights the government’s complicity in perpetuating disinformation rather than combating it.

 

Another similarity between the ruling party’s approach to propaganda and Russian-style propaganda is how Armenia’s Public TV, the country’s most popular media outlet, operates. While it is undeniably more open and less vitriolic than Russian TV channels, and it provides some space for genuinely dissenting voices, its reporting style and the format of political talk shows bear a striking resemblance to Russian propaganda outlets. This includes the framing of discussions, selective presentation of facts, and a tendency to amplify narratives that align with the government’s agenda.

 

In conclusion, the growing prevalence of disinformation and propaganda in Armenia, fueled by both external actors and domestic institutions, poses a significant threat to the country’s democratic development. The convergence of Russian-style hybrid tactics, with government complicity and the misuse of public platforms, creates an environment where truth is distorted and trust in democratic processes is eroded. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive approach that includes fostering media literacy, ensuring accountability, and promoting genuine democratic practices. Only through transparency, resilience, and collective effort can Armenia safeguard its democratic future and counter the dangerous influence of propaganda.

 

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative by CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank.

 

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.