Russia-Azerbaijan Tensions: A Temporary Rift or a Long-Term Shift?

25.02.2025

 

In recent months, tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia have been on the rise, marked by a growing wave of anti-Russian sentiment in Azerbaijani media and political circles. This is reflected in criticism of Russian policies and accusations of interference in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. The reason for Azerbaijan's grievances against Russia is Moscow's refusal to comply with the Azerbaijani president’s demands for an official apology over the crash of a passenger plane belonging to Azerbaijan’s state-owned airline, AZAL, the punishment of those responsible, and the payment of adequate compensation.

In February 2025, Azerbaijani authorities demanded the closure of the Russian cultural center "Russkiy Dom" (Russian House) in Baku, officially citing the organization's lack of legal registration despite multiple previous requests from the Russian side to resolve the issue.

The closure of "Russkiy Dom" demonstrates Azerbaijan's serious willingness to limit Russia's cultural and educational presence, which could affect how Russia is perceived in Azerbaijani society.

With approval from the highest levels of government, Azerbaijani media have begun exposing local agents of Russian influence. Retired Azerbaijani politicians and generals, such as former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, former political "gray cardinal" and close associate of Heydar Aliyev, Ramiz Mehdiyev, and former head of national security Eldar Mahmudov, have been labeled as agents, spies, and leaders of a "fifth column." Naturally, those accused have dismissed these claims as ridiculous. Mammadyarov stated that those accusing him of spying for Russia do so based on the fact that he was educated in Russia, yet he also studied in the U.S., which, by the same logic, would make him a CIA agent. In a way, Mammadyarov has a point, as by such criteria, one could also consider State Security Service head Ali Nagiyev, who graduated from the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR, Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov, who studied at a military academy and served in Russia, and even President Ilham Aliyev, who was both a student and lecturer at MGIMO, an institution that, alongside training diplomats, has historically prepared future informants and agents of Russian intelligence services.

Azerbaijan and Russia maintain a strategic partnership, having signed numerous agreements on friendship and cooperation, the most significant being the Moscow Declaration on Allied Interaction. However, their relationship is primarily based on pragmatism and a balance of interests.

Azerbaijan has positively assessed Russia's role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its favor, including Russia's actions during the 2020 war and its peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh until September 2023. Meanwhile, Moscow values Azerbaijan's neutrality regarding Ukraine—Baku has not joined sanctions against Russia, though it does not overtly support Moscow and officially recognizes Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Russia is among Azerbaijan's largest trading partners, with close cooperation in energy, agriculture, and transportation.

Azerbaijan plays a key role in the North-South Transport Corridor project, connecting Russia, Iran, and India. It is possible that Azerbaijan, by escalating tensions, is trying to enhance its significance in Russia’s eyes, leveraging its strategic geographic position in the corridor project.

Baku understands that Russia depends on uninterrupted transit of goods through Azerbaijan amid Western sanctions. Any restrictions or complications in transit could create significant difficulties for Russian trade.

Azerbaijan is also actively developing cooperation with Turkey, particularly through the Middle Corridor project, an alternative to the North-South Corridor. This gives Baku leverage over Moscow, which it uses to gain political and economic benefits.

Under the current circumstances, Baku may seek to extract the most favorable terms from Russia while minimizing Moscow’s influence on its domestic and foreign policy. Russia, in turn, has its own pressure tools against Azerbaijan.

The main one is migration policy. Russia could tighten controls on Azerbaijani labor migrants working in the country, which could negatively impact Azerbaijan’s economy. Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia are a key source of remittances to Azerbaijan. From January to September 2024 alone, remittances from Russia to Azerbaijan amounted to $410.7 million, and in 2023, they exceeded $1 billion.

Theoretically, Moscow could also impose restrictions on Azerbaijani imports or complicate conditions for Azerbaijani businesses in Russia, which would negatively impact bilateral trade. Azerbaijani business in Russia also includes major Azerbaijani businessmen who are Russian citizens and simultaneously engage in active pro-Azerbaijani lobbying in Russia’s highest political circles.

Russia is the largest importer of Azerbaijan’s non-oil products, providing a stable market for Azerbaijani goods. Azerbaijan’s government aims to increase non-oil exports from the current $3.4 billion to $5 billion by 2026, a goal that would be nearly impossible without access to the Russian market.

In 2024, total trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Russia reached nearly $4.8 billion, a 10.1% increase compared to 2023. Of this, Azerbaijani exports to Russia amounted to $1.3 billion, an 8.7% increase from the previous year.

Thus, Russia remains one of Azerbaijan’s key trading partners, particularly in the non-oil sector. Azerbaijan exports a diverse range of products to Russia, mainly agricultural goods, food products, chemicals, polymers, and textiles. Meanwhile, imports from Russia play a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s economy. In 2024, imports from Russia accounted for 17.2% of Azerbaijan’s total imports.

Dependency on Russian imports is especially noticeable in agriculture, where Russia supplies a significant share of Azerbaijan’s grain and food needs, as well as in oil and petroleum products, industrial goods, and construction materials.

Despite active military cooperation with Turkey and Israel, Azerbaijan has long purchased Russian weapons and developed military-technical cooperation with Moscow. Azerbaijan has bought over $5 billion worth of arms from Russia, which has significantly contributed to strengthening its defense capabilities.

However, after 2020, Baku has shifted its arms procurement focus toward Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and some European countries. This may also be due to the fact that Russia’s defense industry is currently prioritizing domestic needs.

In a December 2024 interview with RIA Novosti, President Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had not signed new arms contracts with Russia in the past three years. However, Baku has submitted requests to purchase Russian weapons and plans to continue cooperation in this area as soon as Russia is ready. Many types of Russian-made military equipment are in service in Azerbaijan and require regular spare parts and technical maintenance.

Tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan could develop along multiple scenarios, but the most likely path appears to be finding a compromise—a course Russia currently prefers. It is highly probable that Baku and Moscow will find a mutually acceptable solution. Russia is not interested in worsening relations with Azerbaijan, especially given its geopolitical challenges related to the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions.

Azerbaijan, despite its close alliance with Turkey, is unlikely to completely sever ties with Russia, as it seeks to avoid future economic and political risks.

Baku is signaling to Moscow that it has alternative partners, but it is unlikely to cross certain red lines in its relations with Russia, avoiding open confrontation. Relations may remain cool for some time, but they are unlikely to escalate into direct conflict.

If the situation takes a new turn and Russia is forced to adopt a tougher stance—such as imposing economic restrictions, creating obstacles for Azerbaijani labor migrants, or intensifying anti-Azerbaijani propaganda—tensions could rise and lead to a crisis in relations. However, at this moment, Russia does not appear to be taking such steps.

High-ranking Kremlin officials either refrain from making harsh statements about Azerbaijan’s anti-Russian actions or speak in a detached manner, implying that "third forces" are trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Ultimately, as Mammadyarov said in his latest interview: “After the official completion of the investigation into the Azerbaijani passenger plane crash, Russia will undoubtedly issue an official apology to Azerbaijan, punish those responsible, and pay the demanded compensation.”

The real question is whether Azerbaijan will be satisfied with the punishment of those whom Russia deems responsible and how exactly Russia’s apology will be presented.

So far, Azerbaijan does not appear to have any intention of further escalating tensions beyond what has already been done and announced—aside from imposing additional restrictions on Russian state media operating in Azerbaijan.

Eduard Arakelyan 

The artcle was originally published on CivilNet.