rewriting the constitution for narrow aims contradicts democracy

rewriting the constitution for narrow aims contradicts democracy

25.02.2026

 

By Tigran Grigoryan

On February 12, at the congress of the newly established Strong Armenia party, it was announced that the political force’s candidate for prime minister would be Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. The main issue with this decision is that, under the Constitution of Armenia, only individuals who have been solely citizens of the Republic of Armenia during the previous four years may be elected as members of parliament or appointed to the government.

Article 148 of the Constitution stipulates that a member of the government must meet the requirements set for a member of parliament. Any person may be elected to the National Assembly who is at least 25 years old, has been only an Armenian citizen for the last four years, has permanently resided in Armenia during that period, has voting rights, and is proficient in Armenian.

In addition to Armenian citizenship, Samvel Karapetyan also holds Russian and Cypriot citizenship.

The Strong Armenia party plans to overcome this constitutional obstacle after winning a parliamentary majority in the elections. During the party congress, Karapetyan’s nephew Narek Karapetyan presented a roadmap:  “Twenty days after the elections, at the first session of the National Assembly, we will immediately introduce a decision on the relevant legislative change—based on the people’s trust and our parliamentary mandate—to allow any person holding only Armenian citizenship to become prime minister. At that time, Samvel Karapetyan will be solely a citizen of the Republic of Armenia.”

This is not the first time in recent years that the leader of a major opposition force or movement has sought to assume the post of prime minister without meeting constitutional requirements. In May 2024, the leader of the Tavush for the Homeland movement, Bagrat Galstanyan, also announced his ambition to become prime minister while holding dual citizenship (Armenian and Canadian). At the time, it was argued that public pressure should be applied to members of parliament to remove the constitutional restriction requiring sole Armenian citizenship during the previous four years.

In both cases, various lawyers have argued—and continue to argue—that statements and intentions to amend or repeal this constitutional provision are not legally problematic and can be implemented, especially if a majority of voters support a political force that has publicly announced such a roadmap.

Nevertheless, this approach represents a very narrow and one-sided view of democracy and democratic governance. Democratic development and stability often depend not only on written laws and procedures but also on unwritten political norms. One of the key conditions for democratic consolidation is the existence of rules of the game accepted by all political actors, which do not change from election to election and are not shaped by narrow group preferences. These rules may be both written and unwritten. In this sense, constitutional amendments or the adoption of new constitutions for narrow political purposes have become important indicators of democratic backsliding in various parts of the world in recent decades.

The history of Armenia’s last decade also speaks to this. In the case of the 2015 constitutional changes carried out by Serzh Sargsyan, formally no laws or procedures were violated; moreover, they were implemented through a nationwide referendum. Nevertheless, it was evident that the primary goal of those amendments was narrowly political—to create a mechanism allowing Serzh Sargsyan to remain in power—which contradicted fundamental democratic norms.

This, of course, does not mean that constitutions cannot be amended over time or that new constitutions cannot be adopted. Even in the world’s most consolidated democracies, such needs occasionally arise. It is widely known that  the Constitution of the United States has been amended 27 times over more than 200 years. However, in this and similar cases, amendments generally occurred in response to broad public demand, to overcome societal conflicts, or for other substantial and objective reasons, usually following lengthy public debate.

The goal announced by Samvel Karapetyan’s political team does not meet any of the above conditions. In recent years in Armenia, aside from occasional situational statements by individual politicians, the issue of changing the citizenship-related restriction has never been seriously discussed. To date, there has been no substantial civic initiative or political agenda on this topic. It is therefore clear that the proposed change is intended solely to remove the obstacle facing Samvel Karapetyan. This situation—where political actors seek to reshape the rules of the game based on their narrow interests—is highly dangerous for the prospects of democratic consolidation in Armenia.

The same problem exists regarding the stance of the prime minister and the ruling party on constitutional change. Statements by Nikol Pashinyan that there is a need not merely to amend the Constitution but to adopt a new one have never been properly substantiated. In this regard, the absence of an open and honest conversation with the public about the real reasons behind the intention to change the Constitution is likely to create serious problems for its legitimacy in both the short and long term.

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative of CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security.

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.