Polarization and Its Consequences for Democracy in Armenia

26.01․2026
 

Political polarization is the displacement of social diversity from the political arena, replacing it with a categorical division of “us versus them.” This model becomes the main principle by which the political field is structured and the core subject of political debate—both in form and in substance. All other issues become secondary, and their solutions are dictated by the logic of this division.

Polarization differs from ordinary political competition in that the difference between actors—their opposition to one another—becomes the primary object of politics itself. In normal politics, opponents recognize one another’s right to exist, are prepared to cede power in case of defeat, and organize a peaceful transfer of power by accepting established rules of the game. Under polarization, these norms become problematic, because the poles deny one another the moral, legal, and political right to be subjects. The essence, identity, and freedoms of the opposing side are called into question. In short, we are dealing with an extremely intolerant political confrontation.

Under conditions of polarization, political sides securitize one another—that is, they convince voters that the very existence of the other side constitutes a major threat. Securitization and polarization are based on the friend–enemy dichotomy. This line of thinking is explained by the theory of politics developed by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, in which the opponent is not a competitor but a threat to our existence and our kind—an enemy who must be treated as such. According to this view, no rules are essential in the fight against the enemy; any means are justified in pursuit of this goal. It is hardly surprising that the philosophical roots of Nazism, fascism, and eugenics lead back to this theory.

The Consequences of Polarization

First, polarization is a substantive problem. It implies opposing and uncompromising positions on issues. Complex social problems usually have complex and multilayered solutions. Under polarization, solutions often become black-or-white, ignoring nuanced complexities and the need for social consensus.

The second major problem is the decline of public trust. Research in comparative political science has formed a consensus that polarization reduces both interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. Since the foundational works of Robert Putnam, we know that trust—which constitutes social capital—is crucial for democratization, as it encourages participation, increases legitimacy, and improves governance and accountability. By damaging these elements, polarization indirectly harms democracy.

Third, polarization directly damages democracy, accountability, and the rule of law. Because polarization operates on the logic of “us versus them,” society becomes divided into groups within which there is a high degree of loyalty and outside of which there is a large amount of hostility. We know that democracies remain democratic because when voters’ favored politicians begin to pursue poor policies or take anti-democratic steps, voters punish them at the ballot box. In recent years, research in comparative political science has shown that polarization has broken this mechanism, as polarized voters are willing to forgive and tolerate the mistakes of their own side—mistakes that under other conditions would be punished. When politicians see that they no longer need to restrain themselves by law or democratic norms, and that there is no risk of losing loyal voters, they are tempted to exploit such conditions, leading to democratic decline.

The Armenian Context

In Armenia, political and state institutions suffer from low levels of trust. Notably, surveys consistently show that among the institutions with the lowest public trust is the National Assembly—the main platform vested with a primary mandate in our parliamentary republic. Political parties are also among those institutions. Research by Evgenya Paturyan and Sarah Melkonyan shows that in recent years it is precisely those political forces and institutions that have been involved in polarization since the war that have lost public trust.

Low support for political forces is also a matter of trust and polarization. Surveys over the past four to five years consistently show low and nearly unchanged approval ratings for both ruling and opposition forces, along with 60–65 percent of respondents being undecided or opposed to all. This has many causes, but two are directly related to our discussion.

Returning to comparative political science, research shows that voters who have passed through a phase of populism, become disillusioned, and retain democratic aspirations develop resistance to populism. The majority that once supported the revolution now rejects all alternatives that offer populism. Recall that every time a new opposition movement emerges, the first question many people ask is: what real solution are you proposing? Often agreeing with the problem raised by such movements but hearing populist solutions—or hearing no concrete path to a solution at all—many people reject them and continue to support no one, remaining disengaged from political processes.

The second reason why survey results do not change is the loyalty of polarized masses to their own pole. Just as in Donald Trump’s oft-cited remark that his supporters would defend him under any circumstances, the same phenomenon exists here. Regardless of successes or failures, core supporters remain loyal. The problem, however, is that these forces seem to have exhausted their potential to attract voters beyond their core base. To maintain the support of that core, they must continuously deepen polarization against others, which in turn alienates the 60–65 percent who have largely already rejected this entire dynamic.

In Armenia, questions of identity have also become objects of polarization. According to studies, under conditions of polarization, identity issues have great potential for de-democratization, because on these issues voters are particularly willing to forgive many anti-democratic actions. Since polarization itself has become the main substance of Armenia’s domestic politics (“former versus current”), crucial socio-economic issues become marginal. The problems of Artsakh refugees, unemployment, poverty, the scale of functional illiteracy, growing tax burdens, and many other important socio-economic issues are excluded from political debate and are often left to unaccountable and depoliticized neoliberal administrators. In the worst cases, they are simply ignored.

Hybrid Threats and Polarization

In this important electoral year, the dominant theme appears to be hybrid attacks and the imperative of defending against them. In this context, reducing polarization becomes even more important. Deepening destructive polarization is an invitation to hybrid threats. As Mark Galeotti, one of the key authors on hybrid warfare, suggests, the best components of defense against such wars are social cohesion, an effective law enforcement system, independent and responsible media, honest and properly regulated financial institutions, and legitimate and effective governance. For all stakeholders interested in protecting Armenia and its democracy, these should be the directions of long-term solutions.

 

Narek Sukiasyan

The Center for Culture and Civilization Studies (CCCS)