Pashinyan’s one-man rule threatens Armenia’s democratic development

Pashinyan’s one-man rule threatens Armenia’s democratic development

14.01.2025

 

By Aram Tadevosyan

 

Armenia entered a phase of democratic transition in 2018, marking some initial achievements – particularly two nationwide elections that were notably free and competitive. However, the country’s democratic consolidation faces significant challenges, primarily stemming from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s increasingly personalistic style of governance.

 

Democratic theorists, including Samuel Huntington, consider the peaceful transfer of power between different political forces through free and transparent elections at least twice a key indicator of democratic consolidation. Armenia has yet to achieve even a single peaceful transfer of power through elections. Moreover, in the Armenian context, it’s difficult to envision a scenario where parties or alliances regularly alternate power through elections. This would require, at minimum, that parties survive losing power without collapse – a common occurrence in Armenia’s political landscape.

 

The current political system in Armenia lacks strong political institutions. For those in power, losing it means not only losing access to resources but also potentially facing political and legal persecution. This threat of criminal prosecution is a significant factor that will likely drive the ruling party to maintain power at any cost – a particular concern for Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party leadership.

 

Despite the ruling Civil Contract party’s growing influence in the country, it’s experiencing inflation rather than strengthening – similar to what happened with the previous Republican Party. Pashinyan’s party has failed to overcome the challenge of becoming more than a one-man show, with decision-making concentrated in the hands of a single individual, much like previous ruling parties.

 

The concentration of power is further reinforced by the Constitution, which grants the Prime Minister extensive authority. While Pashinyan previously criticized this system and promised to dismantle it after taking office, no such reforms have materialized. Instead, he has fully embraced these inherited powers.

 

The ruling party faces a paradox: while promoting democracy as Armenia’s “brand” in a region marked by authoritarianism or democratic backsliding, it creates obstacles for crucial democratic institutions. Key checks and balances – including the judiciary, the presidency, and the Human Rights Defender’s office – have come under the ruling party’s control in recent years.

 

This trend intensified following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent political instability. Rather than strengthening institutions, the government opted for complete control over independent institutions and establishment of a personalistic mode of governance.

 

Pashinyan’s system operates on classic personalistic regime principles:

1. Unpredictability: Frequent government reshuffles and sudden dismissals of high-ranking officials, who may face smear campaigns or criminal prosecution. Policy decisions can be equally unpredictable, with cabinet members forced to adapt to sudden announcements or decisions.

2. Populism: Direct “connection” between the leader and the people, where issues are resolved only through personal intervention. Successes are attributed to the leader while failures are blamed on others. Pashinyan positions himself as a defender of people’s interests against “corrupt elites.’’

3. Absence of influential figures within the ruling party: Zero tolerance for independent-minded individuals, even within the team. The ruling team is staffed with individuals unlikely to develop into political alternatives to the leader.

This personalistic governance style and lack of institutionalized decision-making pose serious challenges for Armenia’s democratic development. International practice shows that personalizing democracy and identifying it with specific individuals corrodes democratic institutions. Additionally, these factors are already creating significant problems in security and foreign policy domains, introducing external threats to democratic consolidation.

 

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative of CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security.

 

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.