Invisible Barrels: How Azerbaijan Hides Its Oil Shipments to Israel
26.11.2025
According to Oil Change International, between November 1, 2023 and October 1, 2025, Israel received 17.9 million tons of oil from 12 countries, with around 70% of the total coming from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
The largest supplier is listed as “Turkey (Azeri)” – 7.146 million tons delivered by 61 tankers entering Israeli ports. Formally, the country of origin in the documents is the Turkish port of Ceyhan, but the grade of oil, Azeri BTC, clearly indicates that it is of Azerbaijani origin.
These figures sharply contrast with the reporting of the Azerbaijani Customs Committee from November 17, 2025, where Israel is absent from the list of crude oil export destinations. In the Customs Committee’s reports, Israel—previously consistently in the top five—no longer appears even in the top ten or top twenty importers.
For 2024 and January–October 2025, the main oil export destinations are listed as Italy, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Greece, Germany, Portugal, France, India, etc. Thus, the Israel-related data collected by international monitoring projects directly contradict Azerbaijani customs figures.
However, the most curious part is that the Azerbaijani Customs Committee not only contradicts international monitoring projects, but also contradicts itself. Azerbaijani statistics have become problematic even for the simplest arithmetic calculations—a direct consequence of a policy of concealment. For example, according to the same committee, in data published in pro-government sources, between January and September 2024 Azerbaijan supplied Israel with 2.37 million tons of crude oil, a volume 18.9% higher than in the same period of 2023.
Yet, for the entirety of 2024, the annual Customs Committee report indicates exports to Israel of only 1.73 million tons. Therefore, 0.5 million tons previously supplied to Israel in the first nine months retroactively disappeared from the official annual report. This clearly points to deliberate backdated data adjustments or the reallocation of these volumes to other buyers.
Azerbaijan had long emphasized its important role as an energy partner of Israel, sometimes doing so without any particular reason. This was also actively used to strengthen Baku’s position in Washington with support from influential pro-Israel lobbying circles in the U.S., which view Azerbaijan as a strategic ally. But as Israel’s war in Gaza dragged on, accompanied by accusations of genocide, rising anti-Israel sentiment in the Muslim—and not only Muslim—world, and the need to consider Turkey’s position as a key political and military ally, Baku became more cautious in the public sphere. This prompted Azerbaijan to stop listing Israel in its official reports, allowing it to maintain a domestic informational narrative that no real shipments are taking place.
Some time ago, an interesting political ploy was employed by Hikmet Hajiyev, aide to the Azerbaijani president, in response to accusations that Azerbaijani oil supports Israel’s economy during the war. He asserted: “Azerbaijan does not sell oil directly to Israel. We export oil to traders at the port of Ceyhan, and the final buyer is determined by the traders themselves.”
Hajiyev presents a scheme in which traders independently determine shipment destinations. However, his argument does not withstand scrutiny. Oil exports are one of the most controlled and centralized sectors of Azerbaijan’s economy, and large volumes of oil moving through Ceyhan under the “Azeri-BTC” label cannot be accidentally redirected in quantities of several million tons. Hajiyev’s claim that “the final buyer is determined by traders” contradicts the principles of control and reporting within Azerbaijan’s economy and government regulation. Azerbaijan reports oil exports to Italy, France, Portugal, and other countries via Ceyhan; therefore, it knows where the oil goes. If oil were sold only to traders without specifying the final destination, as Hajiyev claims in the case of Israel, then Azerbaijan’s official statistics would not include buyer-country breakdowns at all.
Ilham Shaban, director of the Azerbaijani oil research center Caspian Barrel, stated that by selling oil through intermediaries, Baku avoids publicity over the fact that the oil ultimately ends up in Israel. According to him, this allows Azerbaijan to claim that the sales “do not go toward fuel for planes that kill Palestinian children,” which essentially explains the scheme described by Hajiyev. If Hajiyev claims that Baku does not know the final buyer, Shaban (an expert close to the oil sector) explains why Baku uses a mechanism to conceal deliveries and pretends not to know.
The continuation of shipments, which have now taken on a hidden character, follows its own strategic logic. Israel remains a defense partner of Azerbaijan: Israeli weapons, technologies, surveillance, and intelligence systems form an important part of Baku’s military capabilities. Oil flows from Baku can be used directly to pay for extensive deliveries of high-tech equipment from Israel, including systems showcased during the recent military parade in Baku, which essentially served as a display of Israeli weapons. Hajiyev himself has publicly acknowledged the importance of Israeli support in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh, noting: “During the war, we bought weapons from Israel, we paid for them, and Israel provided diplomatic support.”
These defense relations are inseparable from economic interests. Between November 1, 2023 and October 1, 2025, approximately 52 million barrels were delivered to Israel. In 2024, the average price of Azeri Light was around $84 per barrel, and in 2025 it has been approximately $70+. With such average pricing, potential revenue could amount to around $4 billion. Even with price fluctuations of plus/minus $5–6, the overall range changes insignificantly, making shipments to Israel one of the most profitable export directions in Azerbaijan’s oil trade.
Despite political tensions and harsh rhetoric, Turkey has not stopped the transit of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its territory. There were reports of protests in Turkey against the transit of Azerbaijani oil to Israel, and statements from the Turkish Ministry of Energy denying shipments to Israeli ports. However, monitoring data and reports indicate the opposite.
Ultimately, Israel’s disappearance from Azerbaijani customs reporting does not signify the end of economic ties. According to Haaretz sources, Azerbaijan promised Israel that it would continue supplying oil despite the unofficial halt in recorded sales.
Taken together, monitoring data and the durable ties between Baku and Tel Aviv indicate that Azerbaijani oil deliveries to Israel have not stopped—they have been shifted into a non-transparent format. The concealment of statistics has political motives, while the economic benefits and the depth of defense cooperation make halting these flows impossible for now.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS
The article was originally published on CivilNet.