From Setbacks in 2016 to Disaster in 2020: Armenia’s Missed Lessons
02․04․2025
The April 2016 clashes were the most intense military confrontation since the 1994 ceasefire. Although active fighting lasted only four days, it served as a kind of "trial of strength" before a larger-scale conflict. The clashes demonstrated a new level of armed confrontation and, in many ways, foreshadowed the course of the 2020 war.
The Course of Fighting: Azerbaijan’s Attack and Its Outcomes
Hostilities broke out on April 2, 2016, and continued until April 5-6. Azerbaijan’s offensive began with intense artillery shelling of Armenian positions along the contact line, followed by attacks involving armored vehicles, helicopters, and— for the first time— the use of loitering munitions and Israeli-made third-generation anti-tank missiles.
In some areas, Azerbaijani forces managed to break through and seize key heights near the village of Talish and in the southern direction (Lalatepe). On April 5, with Russian mediation, a ceasefire agreement was reached, but tensions in the form of positional skirmishes persisted for several months.
Armenian forces managed to halt the enemy’s penetration on the northeastern front through counterattacks, eliminating some Azerbaijani assault groups. However, they failed to recapture all lost positions, suffering both human and territorial losses. Azerbaijan retained control over some areas, including the Talish heights and Lalatepe. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani side suffered significant casualties, including the chief of staff of a Special Forces brigade and several senior officers.
Despite these losses and some operational failures, Azerbaijan achieved interim objectives in its operation and likely learned valuable lessons. The Azerbaijani leadership concluded that their army was capable of modern close-quarters combat and precision strikes, prompting further military modernization. Following the 2016 clashes, Azerbaijan expanded its special forces, significantly increasing their numbers— a factor that played a decisive role in 2020. Alongside the Ministry of Defense’s special forces, Azerbaijan also developed special units within the Interior Ministry, Border Service, and State Security Service. By 2020, Azerbaijan’s special forces had grown several times over.
Similarities and Differences in Tactics Between 2016 and 2020
During both the four-day clashes in 2016 and the 2020 war, Azerbaijan struck along similar main axes. Although the number of major attack directions was greater in 2020, the decisive breakthroughs in both conflicts occurred on the southern and northeastern fronts.
In 2016, Azerbaijan achieved gains in these areas, which later paved the way for a larger-scale offensive in 2020. On the northeastern front, after withdrawing from Talish and Madagiz, Armenian forces managed to regroup and establish defensive positions, preventing further Azerbaijani advances. However, the southern breakthrough, initially tested in April 2016, proved decisive in 2020, opening the road to Hadrut and Shushi. It was in this sector that the most serious vulnerabilities in Armenia’s defenses were exposed.
Unlike 2016— when high-tech weapons and small strike infantry groups played a limited role— Azerbaijan’s 2020 war strategy relied heavily on mass drone warfare, precision strikes, and deep infiltration tactics. The extensive use of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, Israeli loitering munitions, third-generation anti-tank missiles, and long-range precision-guided weapons allowed Azerbaijan to systematically target Armenian defenses both at tactical and operational depths.
Armenian air defenses— which included outdated S-300 systems, Osa-AK, and a few modern Tor-M2KM units— proved largely ineffective against mass drone attacks. By 2016, it was already clear that Azerbaijani drones and loitering munitions posed a serious threat. However, by 2020, Armenia had failed to establish a comprehensive counter-drone system, procure sufficient modern electronic warfare (EW) and air defense systems, or develop its own reconnaissance drones and loitering munitions. Armenia also lacked tactics for concealed and rapid troop redeployment and digital battlefield coordination.
Deficiencies in Armenian Military Strategy
Armenia’s military doctrine remained fixated on passive defense, modernizing outdated Soviet equipment, and relying on static fortifications and artillery. While defensive positions in the mountains and some plains— particularly in the central (Aghdam) sector— were advantageous, they were insufficient to counter modern, high-tech mobile warfare.
Despite the brief nature of the 2016 clashes, they revealed major weaknesses in Armenia’s forces. However, these issues were not addressed in the four years leading up to 2020— and only worsened over time. Armenia needed to modernize its military, reinforce vulnerable defense lines, develop new tactical approaches, train an effective reserve force, and improve its diplomatic positioning ahead of a potential renewed war. By the time the 2020 war began, these measures were either unimplemented or proved inadequate.
The state of Armenia’s mobilized reserves and some volunteer units also posed challenges in coordination and discipline. Many mobilized soldiers and volunteers were unprepared for modern combat, leading to problems in executing military operations. In some cases, panic among mobilized troops exacerbated chaos during critical moments of the war. A robust reserve training system, had it been developed after 2016, could have improved battlefield effectiveness and supported regular forces.
Armenia’s military leadership failed to implement deep structural reforms. Some personnel changes after 2016 and under Armenia’s post-2018 leadership did not strengthen the military system.
Additionally, the cohesion and reaction speed of Armenian forces were poor. Commanders acted slowly and disorganized, allowing Azerbaijan to consolidate gains in 2016 and advance deep into Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. The 2016 clashes exposed Armenia’s command and control weaknesses— including poor coordination between leadership and frontline units, slow decision-making, inadequate troop mobility, and ineffective intelligence. These shortcomings led to surprise attacks, sluggish Armenian responses, and breakdowns in command during critical moments.
In 2016, Azerbaijani forces launched a surprise attack, securing territorial gains within hours— a sign of Armenia’s weak intelligence capabilities, which failed to detect the scale and direction of the assault. Armenian command was unable to quickly assess the offensive’s scale and respond in time, leading to disorganized troop movements.
By 2020, this issue had become catastrophic. Once again, Armenian intelligence failed to detect the attack’s scope in time, and the military leadership was unable to develop a coherent defense or counteroffensive plan throughout the 44-day war. The Armenian military never formulated a single innovative military strategy.
Armenian forces faced overwhelming drone and long-range precision strikes across multiple fronts, creating chaos in defensive positions and panic among civilians. The lack of stable communications between headquarters and frontline units led to fragmented military actions. Slow command responses— often based on incomplete or outdated battlefield information— resulted in poor decision-making. Even when sound strategic choices were made, they were often implemented too late, after battlefield conditions had drastically changed.
The Failure of Passive Defense Strategy
The reliance on passive defense, established after the 1994 ceasefire and maintained for over two decades, was completely outdated for modern warfare. Armenian forces continued to cling to static fortifications, making them easy targets for precision strikes.
In 2016, Azerbaijani forces breached Armenian lines at Talish and Lalatepe, revealing Armenia’s weak adaptation to mobile warfare. Trench-based defense had already proven ineffective against mobile combat tactics that prioritized high-precision strikes and rapid maneuvering.
By 2020, this problem had become even more pronounced. Azerbaijani special forces units quickly infiltrated Armenian positions, disrupting defenses, cutting supply lines, and coordinating drone and artillery strikes. This caused disorder and prevented Armenian forces from regrouping and mounting effective counterattacks.
Following 2016, Armenia failed to prioritize the development of assault units for mobile warfare. By 2020, well-trained mobile battle groups could have executed surprise attacks, ambushes, and localized encirclements of Azerbaijani forces in mountainous terrain. Instead, Armenian forces— facing a numerically superior and technologically advanced enemy— relied on static defenses rather than preparing for combat in a fully encircled environment.
Future Challenges for Armenia
Despite all the negative factors, Armenian soldiers and combat officers demonstrated a number of positive qualities in 2016 and 2020: resilience and courage, the ability of certain units to engage in intense battles, and achieve localized tactical successes. However, these strengths could not compensate for deep systemic issues that proved decisive—namely, the absence of a modern military doctrine, weak leadership, a lack of advanced weaponry, and an inability to adapt to the changing conditions of warfare.
The clashes in 2016 and the full-scale war in 2020 revealed that, given the shifting balance of power in the South Caucasus, reliance on unreliable alliances, outdated warfare methods, and unpreparedness for new challenges can have fatal consequences.
After 2016, it became evident that Russia and the other CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) countries would not intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or offer support, even at the political level. On the contrary, in 2016, several CSTO member states and Turkey backed Azerbaijan. Turkey’s direct support and intervention in 2020 became one of the key factors behind Baku’s victory. Armenia found itself without international backing, unable to counter Turkey’s growing influence in the region, build a reliable system of alliances, or secure guarantees of military assistance. At the critical moment of the 2020 war, this resulted in a lack of international pressure on Azerbaijan.
More than four years have passed since the 2020 war, and Armenia now faces even greater challenges threatening its very statehood. Azerbaijan continues to strengthen its military capabilities, consolidate its positions, and receive support from its closest allies, primarily Turkey.
Unless Armenia implements radical reforms in its military, its security will remain under serious threat. This reassessment must include abandoning outdated combat methods and training new personnel capable of preparing the Armenian army for modern warfare.
Structural reforms in the military are still in their infancy, geopolitical realities continue to deteriorate, and Armenia risks facing another war under unfavorable conditions. Armenia’s ability to confront such challenges remains in question.
The defeat in 2020 was the result of failing to learn the lessons of 2016. The mistakes were not corrected, and their consequences proved disastrous. Only by acknowledging and addressing past failures can Armenia avoid repeating them in the future and prevent facing new threats in a state of complete unpreparedness.
Eduard Arakelyan,
Analyst, Regional Center for Democracy and Security
The article was originally published on Civilnet.