From Aleppo to the Caucasus: Kurdish Defeat and Turkey’s Expanding Influence

13.01.2025

During the latest wave of the civil war in Syria, which began on November 27, 2024, the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) refused to fight on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Pro-government forces loyal to Assad attempted to involve Kurdish formations in coordinating actions and defending key areas, particularly in Aleppo. However, the Kurdish leadership declined to take part in the fighting, maintaining neutrality and autonomous control over its forces. During the assault on the city, the leadership of the anti-Assad Islamist group issued a statement declaring that its struggle was directed against the Assad regime rather than against the SDF, promising to ensure the safety of the Kurds. This effectively led to a ceasefire or a tacit agreement of non-interference between the sides. Kurdish neutrality allowed anti-Assad forces to avoid large-scale urban fighting and accelerated the overall collapse of the city’s defenses. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the primary reason for Aleppo’s fall in 2024 was, first and foremost, the disorganization and rapid retreat of Assad’s army.

Kurdish strategy after the fall of the Assad regime

The Kurds focused on defending their own territories and took advantage of the chaos to expand control in the east of the country. After the swift collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the Kurdish leadership attempted to build relations with the new authorities in Damascus.

In March 2025, an agreement was reached between the SDF and the transitional government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, which initially appeared to be a compromise. The key provisions of the agreement stipulated the full integration of SDF structures into Syria’s state institutions, with implementation to be completed by the end of 2025. However, the Kurds rejected the merger formula proposed by Syria and Turkey. For the Kurdish leadership, accepting Damascus’s terms would have meant total capitulation and the dismantling of all achievements of their long struggle for autonomy—an outcome they were unwilling to accept.

In April 2025, an additional agreement was concluded concerning the Kurdish districts of Aleppo. Under these arrangements, the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh retained internal self-governance. As a sign of compliance with the deal, the SDF withdrew its main combat-capable units (YPG) from Aleppo, leaving only lightly armed internal security forces (Asayish) in the city to maintain public order.

In early January 2026, the situation changed dramatically. Syria’s new authorities, acting with active support from Turkey, effectively violated the previous agreements, accusing the Kurds of failing to meet their obligations. Taking advantage of the weakening of Kurdish forces in Aleppo after the withdrawal of the main units, the transitional government’s Syrian army and pro-Turkish groups launched a military operation aimed at the total clearance of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh districts. The Kurds found themselves trapped: their neighborhoods were blockaded and subjected to tank and artillery shelling as well as drone attacks.

The West’s position: abandoning the defense of allies

At this critical moment, the SDF’s external allies in the anti-ISIS coalition—above all the United States—did not step in to defend the Kurds in Aleppo. Instead of military intervention or sanctions, Western mediators limited themselves to calls for restraint and facilitated only the organization of corridors for withdrawal.

The diplomatic context added particular symbolism to the situation. It was precisely during the days of fierce fighting in Aleppo (January 9, 2026) that Damascus was visited by a high-level European Union delegation led by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. While fighting was ongoing in Aleppo, European leaders announced the opening of a new chapter in relations with Syria and pledged a €620 million financial package for 2026–2027 to support the country’s reconstruction and state institutions.

European leaders took no actions beyond formal calls for dialogue, effectively recognizing the legitimacy of Damascus’s actions.

By January 11, 2026, resistance in Aleppo had been almost completely suppressed. Under the threat of total destruction, the remaining Kurdish forces were compelled to accept the terms of an ultimatum and leave the city. The remaining fighters and thousands of civilians were evacuated by bus to northeastern Syria.

SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi stated that, with international mediation, an understanding had been reached on a ceasefire and the safe evacuation of fighters and civilians from the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud districts to Kurdish-controlled areas in northern and eastern Syria.

The history of Kurdish self-administration in Aleppo ended with the loss of these enclaves and their transfer under full control of the central government, becoming part of a broader, systematic displacement of Kurdish forces from key areas of Syria. Previously, the Kurds had lost control over Afrin and a number of other territories in the north of the country, which had already highlighted the vulnerability of Kurdish autonomous projects to coercive solutions.

The escalation in Aleppo is viewed as a precedent for a force-based resolution of the Kurdish question across Syria as a whole. After the expulsion of the SDF from Aleppo, Turkish sources reported preparations for a new large-scale operation against Kurdish formations in northeastern Syria, which, according to some reports, could begin as early as February 2026. The central government insists on the implementation of the March 2025 agreement: the transfer of border crossings, airports, and strategic oil and gas fields under state control.

Turkey directly supports Damascus’s actions to clear regions of Kurdish forces. Ankara is categorically opposed to any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria and demands the complete disarmament of the SDF. Syria’s transitional government insists on the state’s exclusive right to bear arms, and the integration of Kurdish units without constitutional security guarantees effectively means the loss of autonomy. As a result, the SDF is now concentrated in a single region east of the Euphrates River and is under significant pressure from both central government forces and the Turkish Armed Forces.

To understand how prepared the SDF is for a likely confrontation with stronger adversaries, it is necessary to assess its current resource potential. At present, the SDF remains an organized and combat-capable non-state army. Its total strength is difficult to estimate precisely, but it is known that a core of more than 30,000 fighters consists of the most capable and experienced Kurdish YPG units. They are equipped with light and medium weapons, anti-tank guided missiles, armored vehicles, tube and rocket artillery, and some captured heavy equipment, but they lack an air force and modern air defense systems. Control over roughly 30 percent of Syria’s territory, including key oil fields and hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates, provides them with substantial autonomy and funding.

Compared to the new Syrian army in Damascus, the SDF has the advantage of high motivation and detailed knowledge of the terrain, while Damascus’s forces possess heavy artillery, tanks, and close coordination with Turkish special forces, intelligence, and aviation.

The main vulnerabilities of Kurdish forces are linked to the open steppe terrain of eastern Syria, which makes them extremely vulnerable to airstrikes and drone attacks, as well as the potentially inconsistent loyalty of Arab tribes within the SDF. The resilience of the SDF also depends to some extent on the U.S. presence. Although the United States allocated $130 million in funding for the SDF in 2026, any change in Washington’s policy could once again leave the Kurds without protection in the face of aggression.

Turkey’s growing role from the Eastern Mediterranean to the South Caucasus

The events in Aleppo strengthen Turkey’s role as a key regional arbiter. Ankara is able to impose strict red lines and ensure their enforcement through military operations. Turkey’s consolidation as a central architect of the new Syria—especially in its northern and central parts—enhances its position across the entire arc from the Eastern Mediterranean to the South Caucasus and shifts the balance of power in Ankara’s favor. At the same time, this limits the influence of traditional external actors, primarily Western countries, which had previously been able to support the SDF and, to some extent, acted as a restraining factor on Turkish activity in northeastern Syria.

In a broader regional context, these developments are also significant for the South Caucasus, especially in light of the process of normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey.

Naturally, dialogue between Armenia and Turkey is developing under conditions of unequal capabilities. Turkey relies on military power, diplomatic pressure, and control over key communication routes, linking political decisions to its own security concerns and transit corridors. Ankara’s actions in the region demonstrate that neutrality and agreements alone do not ensure stability if they are not backed by real instruments of power. Under such conditions, the room for maneuver for smaller players in the emerging regional order is noticeably shrinking.

 

Eduard Arakelyan

RCDS

 

 

The article was originally published on Civilnet.