Four Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Why the Support Program for Karabakh Armenians Should Continue

Four Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Why the Support Program for Karabakh Armenians Should Continue

16.04.2025

Starting April 1, 2025, the Armenian government is reducing financial support allocated for the living expenses of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.


Around 53,000 people will no longer receive assistance. Others will receive 40,000 AMD per month (instead of the previous 50,000), and from June to December, the amount will drop further to 30,000 AMD. This support program has been in place since October 2023, with nearly 5 billion AMD provided monthly. Overall, the total financial assistance allocated to NK Armenians will be reduced by about 40%.

The reduction in social support was the main reason for the March 29 rally by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in Yerevan’s Liberty Square, which in turn sparked heated debates in Armenia. Below, I present the main justifications or narratives used by the government, which distort reality and mislead the public. These narratives also contain targeting elements—seeking to blame Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians for existing problems.

Narrative 1 – The support was temporary by nature; cutting or ending it is logical

The Armenian government has consistently claimed that the financial assistance program cannot continue “forever.” They’ve already made several “concessions” by extending the 40,000 + 10,000 AMD support. According to the authorities, a year and a half was enough time for the displaced persons to find work and solve their material problems independently. This viewpoint distorts reality and creates misconceptions among the public.

The predefined deadline, after which support is reduced or terminated, does not reflect any improvement in the social conditions of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians or any new achievements. These deadlines are mostly arbitrary and calendar-based. It's essential to understand that the goal of the assistance is to cover housing costs for the forcibly displaced—simply put, to compensate for rent. Most of the state support goes to landlords renting out housing to NK Armenians, not directly to the displaced themselves. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians don’t live off state funds—they earn their living by working. It's hard to find an NK Armenian who doesn’t work or isn’t looking for work.

The state’s obligations toward a forcibly displaced person can only end when the loss of their permanent residence is compensated. This logic was applied to those displaced by the 2020 war—some had housing built for them in Nagorno-Karabakh, while others were included in Armenia’s housing programs. All of them continued to receive state support until their housing issue was resolved.

Narrative 2 – Some Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians receive support they don't need; instead, the funds should go to the needy

The government has two approaches to financial assistance: universal and targeted. Universal support means providing assistance to all forcibly displaced people without housing in Armenia. This approach was used until April 1, 2025. Its advantage was inclusiveness—but the government started worrying that some of the displaced have high incomes and don’t need additional support. However, no concrete data has been presented on how many such people there are, or how their income compares to their families' needs. Looking at official salary stats, around 2,000 registered working Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in Armenia earn over 300,000 AMD.

Instead, the government is introducing a targeted approach—providing additional support to the most socially vulnerable families. According to government estimates, this applies to about 3,000 families. Households earning less than 55,000 AMD per person monthly will receive 40,000 AMD per main family member and 10,000 for others. This new program, starting in April, will be complex and burdensome—requiring many documents submitted both online and in person. Then the Unified Social Service will review the applications and decide on the benefit. Given the volume of applications and the time-consuming process, NK Armenians face yet another bureaucratic “odyssey” at these service offices.

While this approach limits the budget from going to high earners, it puts many more people—those just above the poverty threshold—at a disadvantage. Many spend most of their income on rent.

Narrative 3 – Continued financial support hinders the housing program

Officials claim that financial assistance discourages NK Armenians from participating in the housing program. This claim lacks evidence and promotes the emotional narrative that displaced people have gotten too “comfortable” living off state money and don’t want to move on. The government blames NK Armenians while ignoring the shortcomings of its own housing program, which fails to address the core issue: securing permanent housing for the displaced.

It’s been nearly a year since the government adopted the housing program. The number of potential beneficiaries is around 25,000 families. The plan predicted that 4,200 families would apply by December 31, 2024. As of April 16, only about 900 certificates were issued, and only 100 of those were actually used. Such low participation can't be explained by identical behavior among tens of thousands of people.

Also, the housing program has a queue—some families can only apply after January 1, 2026 or 2027, yet the support reduction affects them too. It's worth asking: why is financial assistance seen as an obstacle rather than an incentive? State aid provides families with a more stable financial situation, allowing them to save for a mortgage or construction. If a family knows the state is covering rent, wouldn’t they be more likely to work toward permanent housing while receiving that help?

Narrative 4 – Under the housing program, all Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians can get housing without spending from their own pockets

Another misleading claim is that displaced people can buy or build homes without needing additional mortgages. In reality, this is only true in a few locations where there aren’t enough decent housing options. Often, the government offers two options: either move to these designated areas or be ready to take on a mortgage that may exceed the value of the provided certificate.

Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Khachatryan claims one could buy an apartment in Vanadzor, Armavir, or Hrazdan for 12 million AMD. But fact-checkers reviewed the market and found that even a one-room apartment in bad condition cannot be purchased in those cities for that amount.

The government continues to ignore the objective factors behind the housing program’s failure. Forcibly pushing people into underpopulated or border villages won’t work. This kind of complex, nationwide issue can’t be solved with a slightly more generous housing certificate. Technical and bureaucratic hurdles also abound—for example, applicants must first become Armenian citizens, a process that sometimes requires court rulings due to missing documents. Online applications can be rejected due to minor data entry issues. Banks may hesitate to provide loans for properties where the state is a primary stakeholder. Or the applicant might have an unpaid loan from their time in Nagorno-Karabakh, landing them on a bank blacklist.

Naturally, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians—like all Armenians—want to live in areas with better-paying jobs and good infrastructure. If solving their housing issue requires personal investment (which is fair), then they need more time to get there. Cutting assistance increases the financial burden for all families and further limits their options.

All signs indicate that housing for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is turning into yet another chronic issue in Armenia—one that may persist for decades.

 

Aram Tadevosyan,

RCDS expert

 

The article was originally published on Civilnet.