Foreign interference is real, but not Armenia’s only election risk
11.03.2026
By Tigran Grigoryan
#DemocracyWatch - Three months remain before Armenia’s parliamentary elections, and discussions in the country are increasingly dominated by the topic of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). Practically all efforts by Armenia’s international partners are now focused on assisting the country in countering hybrid threats stemming from external actors, predominantly Russia. Nearly every discussion, round table, and conference today revolves around the risks of foreign interference and hybrid threats.
Some opposition parties, politicians, and media outlets have downplayed this threat, arguing that it simply does not exist. As a civil society organization that has systematically been targeted by foreign malign actors, we can refute that claim with concrete examples. Only in the past week, we at the Regional Center for Democracy and Security were subjected to two phishing attacks, in which unknown actors attempted to gain access to our data through emails sent in the name of fake accounts supposedly affiliated with the ruling party and the National Assembly. Cybersecurity experts have identified Russia-affiliated actors behind these campaigns.
A recent Factor TV investigation revealed that a newly established bilingual newspaper called Wyoming Star, filled with disinformation, is being distributed for free in Yerevan. When Factor TV contacted an individual legally connected to the outlet, he inadvertently admitted during the phone call that he was about to travel to Moscow to bring a new batch of newspapers. Interestingly, an online news outlet with the same name had reached out to us in July 2025 requesting a comment on the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. The mere fact that someone from Wyoming would be interested in the technical details of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict immediately raised suspicions. After a few simple searches, it became obvious that this was a so-called “doppelganger” website created specifically to target audiences in Armenia and Moldova. Now the same operation have expanded into the offline space through the distribution of a free newspaper in Armenia.
Beyond these specific examples, there is a broader consensus among cybersecurity experts and fact-checking journalists that a Russia-affiliated information infrastructure is targeting Armenia during the pre-election period. This fact should not be contested by any serious or honest observers. At the same time, the scope and ultimate goals of these campaigns remain unclear. Artur Papyan, Armenia’s leading cybersecurity expert, noted during a panel discussion on domestic challenges at the Third Annual Armenian Conference on Democratic Security that, in his assessment, the level of Russian interference may not reach the scale observed during the 2021 snap parliamentary elections.
While acknowledging the very real threat posed by external actors to electoral integrity, it is important to remember that FIMI is only one of the challenges Armenia faces ahead of the elections. The growing preoccupation of civil society, the media landscape, international partners, and donors with this issue risks creating a vacuum in addressing other equally important problems.
Many domestic and international actors now appear more focused on potential foreign interference than on clear violations of the rule of law and democratic norms at home. Issues related to the effective organization of elections—such as illicit campaign financing and misuse of administrative resources—also require serious attention.
Another trend that has emerged among international actors less familiar with the Armenian context is the tendency to draw simplistic parallels between Armenia and Moldova. While some of the methods observed in Moldova’s recent electoral processes are also visible in Armenia, the comparison often lacks nuance. Armenia and Moldova differ significantly in their foreign policy choices, their economic and trade relations with Russia, the level of leverage Moscow possesses in each country, and the broader geopolitical and geographic environments in which they operate. These differences matter. Simplified comparisons can easily lead to inaccurate conclusions and misguided policy responses.
Finally, an excessive focus on FIMI risks sidelining another important reality: much of the disinformation and manipulation circulating during the election cycle will likely originate from domestic actors. Political forces within Armenia, including the ruling party, have long relied on misinformation and polarizing rhetoric as tools of political competition. Ignoring this dimension would leave a significant part of the problem unaddressed.
Countering foreign information manipulation is undoubtedly important, and Armenia should continue strengthening its resilience against such threats. But this effort should not overshadow other structural challenges facing the country’s democratic process. Ensuring free and fair elections requires a comprehensive approach that addresses both external and internal risks. Striking the right balance between these priorities will be essential if Armenia wants to safeguard not only the integrity of its upcoming elections, but also the long-term health of its democracy.
Democracy Watch is a joint initiative of CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security.
This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.