Does Azerbaijan need justification for new aggression? Analyzing Papikyan's statements

20․01․2025

 

By Eduard Arakelyan

 

On January 15, the Minister of Defense of Armenia held a press conference summarizing the year and answered several questions from journalists.

 

Overall, the speech was restrained and balanced in assessing the Armed Forces' activities. The Minister expressed cautious optimism about the ongoing reform process, army modernization, and the Armed Forces' future development over the next decade, in line with the adopted national concept.

 

One of the Minister's remarks in response to a journalist's question about Aliyev's statements regarding Armenia and threats of a forceful opening of a land transport corridor to Nakhchivan through Armenian territory sounded paradoxical.

 

“Rhetoric remains just rhetoric, but any act of aggression must be grounded in valid justification, and I see no legitimate basis for escalation in the region. Armenia has comprehensive proposals and actionable solutions for every issue," the Minister of Defense remarked in response to Aliyev's threats.

 

On May 12, 2021, Azerbaijani troops advanced without any legitimate justification and took positions. Subsequently, the Azerbaijani side attempted to rationalize their actions by citing so-called "border clarification activities." Under this pretext, Azerbaijani forces occupied the positions and have since refused to withdraw.

 

A similar incident occurred on November 16, 2021, after which the Armenian Minister of Defense was dismissed. At that time, the Azerbaijani army attacked Armenian positions, while Azerbaijan's state propaganda claimed that Armenian forces allegedly "attacked Azerbaijani positions." As a result, Armenia suffered losses, two combat positions came under Azerbaijani control, and another invasion with the consolidation of Azerbaijani forces on Armenian sovereign territory occurred.

 

On September 13, the Azerbaijani army launched a large-scale attack against Armenia, seizing territories and causing the heaviest casualties among Armenian troops since the end of the 2020 war. Azerbaijan officially justified its actions by claiming to "prevent Armenian troops from laying mines between Azerbaijani army positions and supply routes." Over two years have passed since Azerbaijani forces entrenched themselves on Armenian sovereign territory, with no intention of withdrawing while strengthening their presence.

 

In all three instances, not to mention the smaller skirmishes between these major confrontations, Azerbaijan consistently fabricated various justifications for its actions. These justifications were blatantly absurd and baseless, not only from Armenia's perspective but also in the eyes of international actors—excluding Turkey and other allies of Azerbaijan, who remained indifferent to their implausibility.

 

Azerbaijan undertook aggressive actions without any legitimate justification for its advances. According to Soviet General Staff maps, which the Armenian leadership views as a "sacred Bible," these territories are recognized as sovereign Armenian lands and were within the borders of the Armenian SSR at the time of the Soviet Union's dissolution.

 

So why wouldn't Azerbaijan find new justifications for its future aggressive actions against Armenia? Especially since it conducts near-daily informational preparations for such a turn of events and lacks deterrent factors against aggression, including external ones.

 

According to Azerbaijani state propaganda, Armenia is constructing defensive fortifications, conducting control and monitoring activities along the border, and acquiring modern weaponry "exclusively for offensive purposes against Azerbaijan."

 

Azerbaijan continues to insist that Armenia comply with Point 9 of the trilateral statement signed on November 9, 2020, which pertains to the opening of transport links between Nakhchivan and western Azerbaijan. Despite Russia and Azerbaijan failing to implement the first eight points of the agreement, and the effective dissolution of the entity whose status the agreement sought to address, Armenia has not formally withdrawn from the trilateral accord on Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

Thus, the judgment that Azerbaijan has no grounds for a new escalation is highly questionable. Azerbaijan seems to think otherwise, and finding legitimate grounds for its future actions is the least of its concerns.

 

Returning to other aspects of the press conference, bold statements about 2024 being a year of Armed Forces reform are noteworthy. However, it is too early to claim that Armenia is entering 2025 with a modernized army.

 

"In recent times, Armenia has formed Special Operations Forces (SOF), territorial (local) defense units, and a drone department to coordinate drone unit activities. Establishing these military structures is crucial for enhancing the army's combat capabilities," Armenian media quoted the Minister of Defense.

 

This does not mean that the operational capabilities of these military structures are already at an acceptable level. Like all systemic military reforms, this is a long and labor-intensive process that starts with selecting appropriate personnel and requires a comprehensive approach with regular training, exercises, and continuous equipping of SOF units with modern weapons, technology, intelligence tools, communication systems, etc.

 

SOF units are intended to effectively solve complex combat tasks and, depending on the situation, independently determine new objectives regardless of the battlefield's extremity.

 

Given Armenia's challenges, there should be more well-prepared SOF units, which should ideally become elite units of the future Armenian army. The same applies to territorial (local) defense. The experience of creating militias and their involvement in the 2020 war was not only unsuccessful but, in some aspects, detrimental. Authorities must adopt previously uncharacteristic approaches to creating effective territorial defense forces by involving regional authorities, public organizations, paramilitary volunteer communities, and establishing mechanisms for their interaction and coordination with the Armed Forces.

 

Territorial defense forces comprised of civilians, reservists, and volunteers must have stable management, clearly understand their purpose and area of responsibility, and conduct regular exercises, live-fire drills, tactical training, drone operation skills, and proficiency with not only firearms but also anti-tank weapons and light mortars. Without such basic combat knowledge, full-fledged support for the Armed Forces is out of the question. Additionally, adopting some local defense formation practices from countries that have successfully implemented such sustainable combat structures could be beneficial.

 

The process will also require involving the population, especially from border regions, and conducting ongoing public awareness campaigns. This is a challenging task, as the population needs to understand that the Armenian government's "peace agenda" necessitates corresponding preparation for armed defense against aggression during relatively peaceful times and naturally aligns with this agenda's logic.

 

Establishing units and structures with the specified functions is only the initial step toward transitioning to a combat-ready army, and such initiatives should be welcomed and supported. The key is ensuring the process continues to develop, becomes functional, and proves effective in practice.