Democracy Under Pressure: The Role of Civil Society in Armenia

12.11.2025

 

By Tigran Grigoryan

In recent months, developments in Armenia’s domestic political life have increasingly reflected a serious democratic backslide. The country’s law enforcement and judicial systems have been instrumentalized to serve the ruling party’s internal political interests. Selective justice, the use of disproportionate legal measures, and illegal wiretapping to persecute political opponents have become commonplace features of Armenia’s political landscape.

The authorities — Prime Minister Pashinyan and other ruling party figures — make little effort to conceal their involvement in these processes. These actions are often framed as necessary steps to counter external interference and hybrid threats, according to the government and pro-government actors.

These worrying developments have been a consistent theme in our Democracy Watch reports over the past several months. Another recurring theme is the silence — or, at times, even support — of parts of Armenia’s civil society for the ongoing normalization of anti-democratic practices in the name of “protecting democracy.”

While many civil society groups and organizations have been vocal in condemning the abuse of law enforcement, the judiciary, and the broader state apparatus by the ruling party to neutralize political opponents, others have chosen to turn a blind eye, rationalize, or downplay these actions.

One widely held view within civil society is that, following the Velvet Revolution, the relationship between civil society and the new government had to evolve to reflect the new reality. Proponents of this argument draw comparisons with civil societies in consolidated democracies, where NGOs collaborate with their respective governments to address common challenges. While it is true that avenues for cooperation between the government and civil society in Armenia have expanded, and that civil society is more involved in various processes, this comparison — and the resulting claims about the nature of the new relationship — are misleading.

Constructive engagement is necessary and welcome when it leads to practical problem-solving, but it should never come at the cost of tolerating abuses of power and democratic backsliding. Armenia remains far from a situation where democratic erosion is impossible, and the civil society and NGO sector cannot afford to abandon its watchdog role. The last decade has shown that even advanced democracies are not immune to democratic backsliding, and the presence of independent, proactive institutions and groups remains one of the key guardrails that can slow or counter this process.

A related argument made by some civil society actors is that it is acceptable to be less critical of the current government compared with the pre-revolutionary one because the current government was elected in free and fair elections and therefore enjoys democratic legitimacy. While this assumption is factually correct–the 2018 and 2021 parliamentary elections were not contested by major domestic or international actors, and no violations were recorded that could have affected the outcomes–free and fair elections are only one feature of consolidated democracies.

Elected leaders can still embark on paths of repression and undermine the rule of law. Hungary, which has become a symbol of democratic corrosion in Eastern Europe, still scores higher than Armenia in Freedom House’s Global Freedom Index in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and overall score. Yet it would have been inconceivable for Hungarian civil society to ignore Viktor Orbán’s anti-democratic measures simply because he was an elected leader.

Another common narrative among some civil society actors is the call to “see the bigger picture.” In this framing, Armenia’s nascent democracy is under hybrid attacks by hostile foreign actors such as Russia, and the government must do whatever it takes to neutralize these risks. Proponents of this narrative downplay the significance of ongoing processes–selective justice, the weaponization of law enforcement, illegal wiretaps–sometimes describing them as necessary evils, and in some cases even fully endorsing them.

As a think-tanker often invited to meetings with international delegations, I encounter this rationalization of abuse frequently. While such arguments may be understandable when voiced by government officials with apparent political self-interest, they are inappropriate coming from representatives of independent civil society organizations, whose focus should be on defending democratic norms and practices. The threat of external interference is real and merits serious discussion, but the solution lies in strengthening institutions and reinforcing democratic norms, not undermining them.

A further problem with the “bigger picture” argument is that it provides the government with a pretext to arbitrarily attack critics and consolidate power. In virtually all historical cases of authoritarian backsliding, appeals to a “greater purpose” were used to justify such processes.If this framing becomes normalized in Armenia, civil society and independent media could soon face attacks under the same rationale — a pattern already visible in neighboring Georgia.

In fragile political systems with weak institutions, civil society plays an especially important role as a guardrail against democratic backsliding. Armenia has traditionally had a strong and vibrant civil society that constrained authoritarian power, created space for free and independent public discourse, and ultimately contributed to opening the system. Today, however, an identity crisis affecting parts of civil society is creating a space for democratic backsliding. If this crisis is not addressed, it will deal a significant blow to both the prospects of democratic consolidation in Armenia and the credibility of these actors—an impact that malign internal and external forces are likely to exploit to undermine the entire civil society sector.

 

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative by CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank.

 

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.