Baku is legitimizing Northern Cyprus, but in no hurry to recognize it
28.04.2025
In recent years, Azerbaijan has increasingly shifted from a policy of restrained support to active involvement in the affairs of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), viewing this direction as part of its long-term strategy for regional leadership. Its diplomatic and political efforts regarding the TRNC—the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus recognized only by Turkey—go beyond symbolic solidarity with Turkish Cypriots.
After resolving the Karabakh issue by force in 2023, Baku felt it could act with greater freedom and confidence in international politics. The military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, which effectively amounted to a classic case of ethnic cleansing, did not provoke a serious international response: rhetorical condemnations were not followed by real sanctions or deterrent measures. The success in Karabakh gave Azerbaijan not only military and political capital but also the confidence to act more aggressively in other directions without fearing a strong response. Drawing on this experience, Azerbaijan has been actively strengthening its alliance with Turkey and expanding its influence. Ankara, both ideologically and institutionally, is promoting Turkic integration through the Organization of Turkic States, created under Turkey’s auspices, with the TRNC playing a special role in this concept—its international status being something President Erdoğan seeks to advance through regional alliances.
As Turkey’s primary ally, Baku has become a key player in this process, actively engaging in the “Cyprus question” and essentially acting as a guarantor of Turkey’s authority within the Turkic community. Since 2023, Azerbaijan has been implementing a program to legitimize the TRNC: the TRNC leader Ersin Tatar paid his first official visit to Baku, a TRNC representative office with consular functions was opened, TRNC passports were recognized, air travel between Baku and Nicosia resumed, and a friendship group with the TRNC was established in Azerbaijan’s Milli Majlis (parliament). Azerbaijan also lobbied for the TRNC to receive observer status in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and supported the TRNC leader’s participation in the OTS summit in Shushi. Additionally, Azerbaijan regularly participates in military exercises in Turkey involving Turkish Armed Forces units stationed in Northern Cyprus.
At the rhetorical level, President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized that Baku intends to provide comprehensive support to the TRNC “until its recognition.” “We are always by our brothers’ side. Our policy has always been clear. We have no other agenda on this issue. We only think about how we can help our brothers preserve their state. They have earned this through their history and actions,” said Aliyev. Such statements only enhance the value of Azerbaijan’s position for Ankara. Support for the TRNC is a component of Baku’s broader strategy aimed at strengthening its military-political and economic alliance with Ankara and preparing for possible changes in Turkey after Erdoğan.
Baku is aware that if Turkey’s current policy changes and Erdoğan leaves power, Ankara might temporarily scale back its expansion and activity in the post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan, in turn, would need to maintain the Turkish course and take the lead in integration processes, since the vision for resolving the Cyprus issue is nearly identical across all major Turkish political parties and movements, with only minor variations.
Nevertheless, despite these steps and declarations, Azerbaijan remains cautious and does not follow Turkey’s lead in officially recognizing the TRNC as an independent state. Baku walks a fine line—strengthening the TRNC’s de facto legitimacy without crossing the legal threshold—in order to minimize challenges and avoid unforeseen risks. This approach is especially important given the caution shown by other members of the Organization of Turkic States—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan—who, seeking to balance relations with Turkey, Russia, China, and the West, refuse to recognize or openly support the TRNC. In this context, Azerbaijan’s role becomes even more significant for Turkey: aside from Ankara, it remains the only active supporter of TRNC integration into Turkic structures.
Theoretically, Baku’s political maneuvering carries certain risks. Chief among them is a potential deterioration in relations with the European Union, particularly with Greece, which plays a key transit role in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)—a major infrastructure chain designed to deliver gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to Europe. Without Greece, the SGC cannot function fully. Azerbaijan could also be accused of double standards: while supporting the right to self-determination for Turkish Cypriots, it simultaneously defends the principle of territorial integrity in the cases of Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea—not to mention its own actions against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, such accusations are of minimal concern to Baku. Given Turkey’s support, energy cooperation with the EU, and the general trend of weakening international responses to border revisions, Baku considers the remaining risks manageable. Despite President Aliyev’s often harsh rhetoric and regular accusations of Western hypocrisy, double standards, and interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs, Baku remains an important energy partner for Europe. In April 2025, European Commissioner Kaja Kallas referred to Azerbaijan as a “reliable partner,” indicating that the EU’s geopolitical and energy priorities outweigh its declared fundamental values regarding democracy and human rights—even when faced with Azerbaijan’s anti-European foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, Baku has begun using the “right to self-determination” as a tool of pressure on France—for example, by supporting separatist sentiments and encouraging radical nationalist actions in New Caledonia and other French overseas territories.
This new foreign policy direction reflects Azerbaijan’s attempt to play a more sophisticated geopolitical game and engage diplomatically with global heavyweights. Baku practices selective pragmatism: supporting the “right to self-determination” where it benefits its interests, while insisting on “territorial integrity” where it does not. Its foreign policy is driven by calculation and advantage, seeking every opportunity to strengthen its position.
Azerbaijan’s policy toward the TRNC is part of a strategy in which national interests are placed above international legal norms. Its de facto support for the TRNC bolsters the alliance with Turkey while also allowing Azerbaijan to present itself as an independent center of power in the Turkic world—regardless of future political changes in Ankara.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS analyst
The article was originally published on CivilNet.am