Azerbaijan’s Tightening Grip: Expelling International Organizations and Silencing Media
11.03.2025
Recently, the Azerbaijani authorities have made several decisions that effectively limit the presence of international organizations and independent media in the country.
Official Baku has decided to close four UN offices, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In addition, the Azerbaijani authorities have announced the closure of the local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While the government claims that Azerbaijan is not ceasing cooperation with UN agencies and prefers to continue working with their regional offices, the closure of the ICRC office was justified by the "lack of necessity."
Additionally, Transparency International and the Erasmus+ program, a major European Union educational exchange program, are ceasing their operations in Azerbaijan.
Earlier, the Azerbaijani authorities had also announced the closure of the “Russian House,” a project of Rossotrudnichestvo, and had suspended the activities of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
The closure of the Red Cross offices, UN agencies, international media representations, and other institutions has not sparked significant concern among international actors or the broader Azerbaijani public, including opposition forces, many of which operate in a near-underground state.
Azerbaijan has long been moving toward isolation, where information is controlled by the state, and access for international organizations to internal processes is minimized. While a complete transformation of Azerbaijan into a North Korea-like state is unlikely due to the country’s reliance on energy exports and its geopolitical position, Azerbaijan is following the path of authoritarian states—tightening control over domestic politics while maintaining relative openness in economic affairs.
Whether this policy will be long-term depends on the reaction of the international community and internal factors, including the economic situation and public opinion.
This approach could damage Azerbaijan’s international image, complicate economic relations, and reduce foreign investment. However, Azerbaijani authorities believe otherwise, viewing the restriction of external influence as a means to strengthen internal control and, most importantly, prevent a change in power, including through democratic elections.
The outcomes of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the broader conflict with Armenia have suppressed remaining pro-democracy sentiments within the country. Azerbaijan has also strengthened its ties with Turkey and Russia, both of which exert no pressure on Baku regarding democracy and human rights.
Tightening Control Over the Media
A recent crisis in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan—triggered by the crash of an Azerbaijani passenger plane due to Russian military actions—allowed Azerbaijan to ban the activities of the Baku office of the Russian state news agency "Russia Today" and, on a reciprocal basis, revoke the accreditation of Western media offices in Azerbaijan, including BBC News, Bloomberg, and Radio "Voice of America." This marked the beginning of stricter media control.
This move enabled the authorities to establish a framework in which any foreign-sourced information—whether from Moscow, London, or Washington—can be restricted or banned in the interest of the state. These actions reflect Baku’s recent policy of balancing between major powers to achieve its own objectives.
Azerbaijan’s decisions to shut down international humanitarian organizations and foreign media offices may draw some criticism from human rights organizations, journalist unions, and individual members of the European Parliament.
However, Western governments are unlikely to take concrete action against Azerbaijan. The EU and the U.S. lack effective levers of pressure, such as sanctions, and any response is likely to be symbolic at best.
Azerbaijan has strengthened its position in the European oil and gas market, reducing the EU’s influence over its domestic policies. The energy factor plays a crucial role in the West’s restrained reaction to Azerbaijan’s authoritarian tendencies.
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which supplies Azerbaijani gas to Europe, is considered a strategically important project for the EU. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan views Europe as a major market for its oil and gas exports.
Western countries are unwilling to jeopardize their energy security and geopolitical cooperation for the sake of promoting democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan. The Aliyev regime remains acceptable to them as long as it remains predictable and, to some extent, a useful partner.
The Opposition's Perspective on Government Actions
Isa Gambar, leader of the opposition and Azerbaijan’s oldest political party, Musavat, commented on the closure of international organizations. He believes that Azerbaijani authorities are inspired by Donald Trump’s presidency in the U.S., which focused on reducing American global engagement and funding for foreign projects.
According to Gambar, Azerbaijani authorities aim to limit the country’s ties with the modern world and monopolize all aspects of national life.
After Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war, opposition forces had hoped for a political liberalization. Their hopes were not realized; instead, Azerbaijan systematically tightened internal controls, restricted civil liberties, and suppressed freedom of speech.
The opposition and civil society expected that post-war patriotic sentiment would reduce the need for repression and that the government would become less reliant on harsh crackdowns, given the broad support it had received from all political factions.
However, the opposite occurred: the government became even more repressive, further restricting political activity and intensifying crackdowns on dissent. The victory in the war bolstered Ilham Aliyev’s authority and gave the government the opportunity to crush the opposition and sterilize the political and media landscape.
The blocking and dismantling of independent media, arrests and persecution of activists, politicians, journalists, and anti-war public figures on fabricated charges—such as drug possession, tax fraud, smuggling, or espionage—have become routine.
Following the war, a series of personnel changes further consolidated the ruling elite’s power. The role of First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva was strengthened, and Aliyev’s son was brought into the country’s governance, signaling the reinforcement of a “dynastic model.”
As a result, Azerbaijan’s military successes—initially supported by all opposition forces—only accelerated its political transformation into an even more rigid authoritarian state.
At first glance, there are no clear signs of public discontent with the ruling regime in Azerbaijan. Much of the public, many of whom were unaware of the presence of international organizations and media in the country, remains indifferent to ongoing political developments.
However, if necessary, the government can organize mass demonstrations of public support for its decisions, creating an illusion of grassroots activism.
A large portion of the population respects authority, particularly after the victorious war. Many young professionals prioritize career growth within the system over opposition activities.
Many citizens support the regime as the force that secured military victory and later carried out the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, minimizing protest sentiment. The authorities continue to exploit the Karabakh issue and alleged Armenian revanchist threats to mobilize the public around the ruling family and suppress internal criticism.
After the political instability of the 1990s, many Azerbaijanis fear chaos and view the government as a guarantor of stability. Moreover, Azerbaijan lacks a long history of democratic governance and traditions, making high levels of political and civic engagement unlikely.
Formally, civil society exists in Azerbaijan, but it is entirely controlled by the state. This allows the authorities to showcase the presence of a public sector while preventing any real political alternative. The government manages its civil society by creating loyal organizations that formally act as independent NGOs and think tanks but are, in reality, under full state control. These puppet NGOs and activists participate in international forums, promote Azerbaijan's political agenda on global platforms, and present a national "alternative viewpoint" on issues such as human rights, democratic elections, and freedom of speech.
Restrictions on Protest Activity
Street protests, public demonstrations, and even solitary pickets have long been banned in Azerbaijan. Anti-government protests occur rarely and are usually suppressed at the earliest stages. The country has a strict permit system for mass gatherings, and any unauthorized protest is swiftly dispersed by security forces.
At times, however, the authorities allow and even orchestrate street protests—particularly when they are directed against the policies of another country with which Azerbaijan has strained relations at the time. For example, in 2022, a flash mob took place in Baku in support of protesters in Iran, where young women expressed solidarity with the fight for women's rights. Such a protest poses no threat to the regime, yet it serves as a demonstration that freedom of speech supposedly exists in Azerbaijan.
Despite the tight control over society, dissatisfaction with government policies is still expressed, often exclusively through social media by emigrants or anonymous users from within Azerbaijan. Rising prices, corruption, social inequality, and broader economic problems are sources of concern among the population. However, thanks to oil and gas revenues—though decreasing annually but not yet reaching critical levels—the standard of living, while low, remains relatively stable. Economic issues have not yet reached a breaking point that could trigger mass discontent and protest activity.
Discussions about the need for protests occasionally emerge on social media, and the next step for the Azerbaijani authorities may be to tighten control over online platforms.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS analyst
This article was originally published on CivilNet.