Azerbaijan’s policy of aggressive borderization and its main objectives

                                                                                                                   (The following article was originally published on civilnet.am)

The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan led their respective delegations in four-day talks that concluded in Washington last Thursday. The negotiations were carefully planned by the United States over several weeks, with Louis Bono, the State Department’s Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations and the U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, spending a week in the region in April, likely to work on organizing the talks. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Erika Olson also visited the region during the same time, reportedly for the same reason.

After several months of “online” negotiations on the draft text of a peace agreement, officially titled the “Bilateral agreement on peace and the establishment of interstate relations,’’ the sides were supposed to bridge their differences on the remaining issues and achieve at least some intermediate outcomes. The State Department likely hoped for the adoption of a joint statement similar to the one agreed upon in Prague last year.

However, by the end of the Washington summit, the sides managed only to agree on the text for an identical press release.

It was noted in that statement that “the Ministers and their teams advanced mutual understanding on some articles of the draft bilateral Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations, meanwhile acknowledging that the positions on some key issues remain divergent.”

During the final session of the negotiations, Secretary of State Antony Blinken struck a positive note and stressed that the talks had made tangible progress, noting that an agreement was within reach.

Baku and Yerevan have completely diverging views on three major issues

Despite the upbeat rhetoric from the United States and progress in certain areas, differences over key issues remain, and it will be hard to find compromises in the near future.

There are three major subjects on which Baku and Yerevan have completely diverging views.

The first and most important one is the issue of establishing a direct mechanism for talks between Baku and Stepanakert. Armenia is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan only if the creation of this format is agreed upon. The Armenian government needs assurances that, after the conclusion of the peace deal, issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh will be addressed through direct talks between Baku and Stepanakert. Yerevan’s position is that an international mechanism is necessary to ensure the continuity of those negotiations.

However, Azerbaijan excludes any possibility of international involvement in matters related to Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku’s aim is to hold meetings with representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh with a so-called “integration agenda” and without any third party involvement, using those quasi-talks as window dressing and a substitute for an international mechanism for negotiations.

It is clear that this issue represents a red line for both sides. By signing a peace treaty without establishing an international mechanism for direct talks between Baku and Stepanakert, Yerevan would, in the words of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, give Baku “a mandate for ethnic cleansing” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, without agreeing on this format, it would be incredibly difficult to sell the peace deal to the Armenian public, which already does not support the government’s policies on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The latest polling, organized by the International Republican Institute, indicates that nearly 70% of Armenia’s population is dissatisfied with Pashinyan’s approaches and actions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

This is а red line for Baku as well because the establishment of a negotiating format with international involvement would nullify two of its main post-war narratives: first, that the conflict is over; and second, that issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh are purely domestic matters for Azerbaijan. It would also give agency to the authorities in Stepanakert.

So, it is improbable that a compromise on this issue could be reached through negotiations, and Baku is likely to pursue a policy of coercive diplomacy to pressure Yerevan to abandon its position on an international negotiating mechanism for Stepanakert.

Baku and Yerevan have yet to find common ground on another crucial matter: border disputes. While Armenia is willing to start the delimitation process using maps from the late Soviet period, essentially acknowledging the Soviet-era administrative border as the new state border, Baku talks about delimitation based on historical maps. In a recent speech, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev asserted that the delimitation process must be carried out under Azerbaijan’s conditions.

It’s also clear that Baku has no intention of retreating from the sovereign territories of Armenia that it has been occupying since May 2021. By seizing control of key heights and positions within Armenian territory, the Azerbaijani armed forces have secured a tactical advantage. And it is hard to imagine any tangible progress in peace treaty talks without Baku’s willingness to withdraw its forces from the territory of Armenia.

Finally, Yerevan is seeking clear guarantees that Baku will comply with any document that is signed, particularly in light of Azerbaijan’s increasing violations of the November 2020 ceasefire statement. The Washington talks were held amid the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s recent installation of a checkpoint in the Lachin corridor and its further tightening of the ongoing blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan firmly believes that, without specific mechanisms in place to ensure the treaty’s implementation, it will be nothing more than a meaningless piece of paper.

At the same time, in the current volatile geopolitical environment, it is difficult to expect international guarantees for the implementation of any peace treaty. Despite the considerable time and effort the United States has invested in organizing the latest round of talks, it is surely not prepared to assume greater responsibility in the region. Washington has made it clear that it is not acting as a mediator but rather as a facilitator, emphasizing the need for direct dialogue between Baku and Yerevan. Other stakeholders, including the European Union, lack the leverage and resources necessary to enforce the provisions of any deal. Furthermore, Baku has no interest in the creation of such mechanisms, as it wishes to remain flexible in the future.
These significant differences, particularly regarding the negotiation format for Nagorno-Karabakh, leave very little room for optimism. Even if the vast majority of the text is agreed upon, a peace treaty will not be signed if the parties fail to find solutions to the outstanding issues described above.

It is also apparent that Baku is only interested in signing a document if it is based solely on its own perceptions and positions. Otherwise, Azerbaijan appears prepared to achieve its goals through the use of force.

In this regard, it can be concluded that the signing of a peace treaty will only be possible if Yerevan abandons its positions on a number of crucial issues. But even in such a case, it will be difficult to talk about equitable and comprehensive peace in the region.

Tigran Grigoryan

Head of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security

                                                                                                                            (The following article was originally published on civilnet.am)

On April 23, Azerbaijani forces blocked the Hakari bridge, which is situated at the end of the new route of the Lachin corridor near the Armenian border, and established a checkpoint in that part of the corridor. The bridge was under the full control of the Russian peacekeeping force. This new provocation constitutes a serious breach of the November 9 ceasefire statement and has the potential to exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Several Armenian villages in the Shushi region, which have been cut off from the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh due to the blockade, relied on the new route of the Lachin corridor to receive vital supplies from Armenia. The takeover of the bridge by Azerbaijan will make it even more challenging for these villages to receive essential supplies, which could further compound the humanitarian crisis.

The Hakari bridge is an essential part of the Lachin corridor’s new route and is supposed to be under the control of the Russian peacekeeping force. Prior to this provocation, Azerbaijani forces were utilizing the road passing under the bridge, and the bridge itself was being used by the peacekeepers, the Armenian sides, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It remains unclear how the peacekeepers, who have fortified positions near the bridge, allowed Azerbaijani forces to carry out this operation.

Before this escalation took place, Azerbaijan had been long working to create an information landscape that would support their actions. Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev has been talking about the need to install a checkpoint at the border between the Lachin district and Armenia for months. Baku has also been falsely accusing Armenia of transferring weaponry and landmines to Nagorno-Karabakh with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers. The latest accusation was made by Azerbaijan on the eve of this provocation. During one of his recent interviews, Aliyev made a brazen threat, stating that the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh must either accept Azerbaijani citizenship or leave the territory.

It is also emblematic that Baku no longer makes an effort to mask its actions under the guise of a fake eco-protest. If not challenged, this latest provocation might be the final nail in the coffin of the post-war security architecture in the region and pave the way for the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh. Any sort of Azerbaijani presence on the road will strip it of the ‘corridor’ status and will finalize the encirclement process of Nagorno-Karabakh.

These sentiments were present in a statement issued after an emergency session of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Security Council. The members of the Security Council, particularly, said: “We call on the parties to the Trilateral Statement, and especially the Russian Federation, to immediately begin discussions on lifting the blockade of Artsakh, preventing the installation of the Azerbaijani checkpoint, and providing real security guarantees for the people of Artsakh. We expect effective steps to be taken in the shortest possible time to address the security and humanitarian issues of the people of Artsakh, the absence of which will allow the people and authorities of Artsakh to take further steps.”

There are two noteworthy details in this paragraph. Firstly, the leadership in Stepanakert, which has traditionally been using more conciliatory rhetoric towards Russia, is calling Moscow out and basically demanding from the Kremlin to fulfill its obligations. This is unprecedented and shows the severity of the situation on the ground.

Secondly, the members of the Security Council hint that if the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh is not lifted in the near future and sufficient security guarantees are not provided to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, a hard decision might be made to evacuate the population from their besieged homeland.

This is why it is imperative for all the international actors to comprehend that the recent provocative act carried out by Azerbaijan, specifically the blocking of the Hakari bridge and establishing a checkpoint in the Lachin corridor, is not just another incident. Rather, it is a substantial violation of the November 9 ceasefire statement and is a manifestation of Baku’s policy of creeping ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. If Azerbaijan’s aggressive actions are allowed to go unchecked, it has the potential to trigger a chain of unpredictable events and jeopardize the long-term prospects for peace in the region. Therefore, it is crucial for the international community to respond robustly and prevent any attempts to alter the existing status quo on the ground through the use of force.

Tigran Grigoryan

Head of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security