Azerbaijan’s Gas Promises to Europe: Political Commitments Without Resource Backing
15.12.2025
In recent years, Azerbaijan has been positioned as a key alternative gas supplier for Europe. A recent statement by President Ilham Aliyev about gas supplies to 14 countries creates the impression of a large-scale expansion of export geography. Moreover, Aliyev previously promised to double Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe by 2027, increasing them to around 20 billion cubic meters per year. The European side perceived this as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on Russian energy resources, viewing Azerbaijan as a key partner in supply diversification. However, an analysis of official gas production forecasts shows that these promises run up against resource constraints and strategic limitations.
According to materials prepared by the Azerbaijani government for the 2026 state budget, natural gas production in the coming years will fluctuate in the range of 45–48 billion cubic meters:
2026: 48.437 bcm (marketable gas – 38 bcm)
2027: 47.924 bcm (marketable gas – 36.7 bcm)
2028: 45.667 bcm (marketable gas – 34.5 bcm)
2029: 48.063 bcm (marketable gas – 37 bcm)
In Azerbaijan, the gap between total production and the volume of marketable gas consistently amounts to about 10–11 bcm. Marketable gas—i.e., the volume available for domestic consumption and exports (the remainder is used to maintain reservoir pressure and for other technical needs)—is projected at 38 bcm in 2026, followed by a decline to 34.5 bcm in 2028 and a subsequent increase to 37 bcm in 2029, which does not even reach the 2024 level.
By 2027, the year when supplies to Europe were supposed to be doubled, the actual available volume of marketable gas will amount to 36.7 bcm. Given current mandatory supplies to the domestic market and neighboring countries, Azerbaijan is left with only about one third of total marketable gas for all other destinations. This physically precludes an increase in exports to Europe, let alone a doubling.
As of 2024, part of the gas was allocated to growing domestic consumption (around 13.6 bcm) and exports to Turkey (9.9 bcm) and Georgia (2.4 bcm). These deliveries absorb more than 25 bcm per year, significantly limiting the ability to increase export flows to Europe, which in 2024 amounted to 12.9 bcm. From August 2025, Syria has been added to mandatory supply commitments, with planned deliveries exceeding 1 bcm and a prospect of increasing to 2 bcm per year.
Azerbaijan’s largest gas-export-generating project, Shah Deniz, produced more than 28 bcm of natural gas in 2024 and appears to be operating at peak production capacity. Current hopes for growth are linked to the Absheron gas condensate field. Materials accompanying Azerbaijan’s 2026 state budget project note that large-scale development of Absheron in 2029 will become an important driver of sectoral growth. The project operator, France’s TotalEnergies, began the second phase of Absheron development in summer 2025 using a “new technological concept.” Phase 1 envisaged production of 1.3–1.5 bcm per year for the domestic market; Phase 2 envisages 5–6 bcm per year, with commissioning no earlier than 2028–2029. However, even at full design capacity, the net export effect may amount to only 3–4 bcm, which does not solve the task of doubling supplies.
Given limited domestic resources, Azerbaijan may be forced to rely on re-exports not so much for growth as for maintaining current supply levels to Europe. The main potential sources are Russia and Turkmenistan.
Russia could provide a relatively stable volume of gas through direct commercial operations, possibly under the guise of gas for domestic consumption, but this would entail high political and sanctions-related risks. To meet its export commitments, Azerbaijan has already resorted to purchasing gas from Russia: in 2023, such purchases exceeded 0.8 bcm, and in 2024 the country continued to buy some gas to meet domestic needs, volumes of which are not always fully disclosed.
Turkmenistan could continue to participate via swap supplies, increasing annual gas deliveries to Azerbaijan, with transit ensured by Iran. Iran plays a key role in the swap supply scheme between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.
Turkmenistan’s leadership has already stated its readiness to supply natural gas to Europe through Azerbaijan’s territory and infrastructure, but only after the possible construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, speaking at the fifth meeting of energy ministers of the Organization of Turkic States in Istanbul, said that transporting hydrocarbon resources from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea to the western shore (to Azerbaijan) should become one of the priorities for the Turkic states. According to him, Ankara is ready to move to practical steps to realize its 30-year strategic dream of supplying natural gas to Turkey via a pipeline across the Caspian Sea, noting that infrastructure on the western shore of the Caspian (in Azerbaijan) is already ready to receive such volumes.
However, implementation of such a project directly affects the interests of other Caspian states, primarily Russia and Iran, whose position on the Trans-Caspian pipeline (Central Asia–Europe along the seabed of the Caspian Sea) remains cautiously negative. Under these conditions, it is impossible to expect consensus among the Caspian states, and practical implementation of the project could create a direct conflict of interests among major players.
Moreover, the Turkish energy minister’s statement about Azerbaijan’s infrastructure being ready to receive large volumes of gas from Central Asia effectively confirms that the constraints on exports to Europe are resource-based rather than infrastructural. The key problem of Azerbaijani gas exports lies not in transportation or pipeline capacity, but in insufficient domestic production. Under these conditions, Azerbaijan is simply taking on more export commitments than it can deliver, thereby underscoring its transit and infrastructure role.
Political statements about Azerbaijan’s gas capabilities turn out to be more bluff than reality. President Aliyev’s statements about supplies to 14 countries create the impression of Azerbaijani gas expansion; however, most destinations—apart from Turkey and Italy, and to a much lesser extent Georgia, Greece, and Bulgaria—receive negligible volumes or no gas at all, holding only memoranda of understanding. The increase in the number of consumers of Azerbaijani gas (the list of 14 countries) is achieved by fragmenting existing flows.
European hopes of doubling supplies to 20 bcm by 2027 are based more on political promises. Azerbaijan’s gas strategy for 2026–2029, as reflected in the draft state budget, clearly demonstrates a structural gap between political rhetoric and actual capabilities. Baku remains an important element of the Southern Gas Corridor, but its own reserves and capacities never allowed for expectations of a significant increase in supplies to European countries. Independent experts and analysts repeatedly warned of this even before the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the European Commission and Azerbaijan on doubling gas supplies by 2027.
In this context, it is becoming increasingly clear that the 2022 agreement to double Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe by 2027 was not backed by a sufficient resource base or real investments. If current trends persist, one may assume that as 2027 approaches, Brussels and Baku will likely have to prepare a new agreement to double supplies by 2032, using the same arguments and hopes.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS
The article was originally published on CivilNet.