Armenia’s Potential Arms Deal: The Politics Behind Greece’s Russian-Made Air Defense Systems
10.12.2024
At the end of November, the Greek news outlet Enikos.gr reported that Russian-made air defense systems currently in Greece’s arsenal could be transferred or sold to Armenia. Over the past two years, there had been discussions about their potential transfer to Ukraine.
"The leadership of the Greek Armed Forces is determined to continue the ‘derussification’ of the Greek arsenal and the radical modernization of outdated systems with new Western technologies. According to the portal, the Hellenic National Defence General Staff is at an advanced stage of preparing to provide Armenia with Russian-made weapon systems," the report stated.
The news quickly spread across various media outlets, was widely republished by Armenian media, and sparked discussions at multiple levels in Azerbaijan, as well as a response from the spokesperson of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova. The spokesperson reminded Greece about the regulations governing the transfer of weapons and military equipment to third parties without Russia's permission. Notably, Zakharova, who in recent years has unofficially taken on the role of press secretary for Russia's Ministry of Defense and the "Rosoboronexport" arms exporter, clarified that Greece had not sought Russia's permission for the re-export of air defense systems to a third country but felt it necessary to issue a preemptive warning.
Armenia’s Ministry of Defense chose to ignore and refrain from commenting on the Greek media report, just as it has avoided providing details following reports by Indian and French media about potential arms supplies to Armenia from those countries.
The history of Greece acquiring Russian-made weapons, particularly as a NATO member state, is intriguing.
In the early 1990s, West Germany transferred a number of Osa-AK short-range air defense systems—originally inherited from the East German army—to Greece free of charge. This sparked Greece's interest in the Russian arms market. Throughout the 1990s, Greece actively purchased cost-effective and high-quality products from the Russian military-industrial complex.
By the early 2000s, Greece’s arsenal included approximately 30 Tor-M1 air defense systems (of which six were later transferred to Cyprus), 20 upgraded Osa-AKM systems, and an estimated 18 older Osa-AK systems, along with Kornet-E anti-tank missile systems, three Zubr hovercraft landing ships, two Mi-26 transport helicopters, and, according to materials from Russia's Federation Council, an undisclosed number of Krasnopol-M guided artillery shells.
Greece also possesses two divisions (at least 12 launchers) of S-300 PMU-1 systems purchased by Cyprus. In 1997, Cyprus signed a contract for their delivery, but Turkey objected. As a compromise, Greece, in coordination with Turkey and other NATO members, deployed the systems to Crete, with Cyprus receiving six Tor-M1 systems from Greece in exchange.
Greece intended to order over 400 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles from Russia in 2007, but the deal was canceled during final negotiations.
A post-sale support and parts supply agreement for the Tor-M1 and Osa-AKM systems had been in place between Russia and Greece since 2003. Cooperation continued until sanctions were imposed on Russia. The last contract, valued at €102 million for 10 years of maintenance and parts for these systems, was suspended by Greece in mid-2023. Maintenance deadlines for these systems have already passed, suggesting Greece may seek to dispose of them, ideally at a profit, as they can no longer be supported or kept operational.
For some time, Ukraine appeared to be the primary candidate for acquiring Greece’s air defense systems, given its acute need for such systems amidst ongoing war with Russia. Greece was one of the first nations to supply Ukraine with weapons and military equipment following Russia's aggression. However, when it came to air defense systems—particularly the long-range S-300—Greece delayed its decision for over two years before ultimately refusing.
Initially, Athens played a double game: the Prime Minister denied plans to transfer air defense systems to Ukraine, citing concerns about weakening national defense, while the Defense Minister and other officials expressed willingness to transfer Soviet and Russian-made systems if they were replaced by Western alternatives. For example, older BMP-1 armored vehicles were exchanged for German Marder vehicles.
However, no satisfactory offers for air defense systems have been made to Greece, prompting the country to seek alternative ways to profit from its decommissioned Russian-made systems, replenish its arsenal with modern systems, and build a multi-layered air defense system with Israel. The envisioned Israeli systems include the David’s Sling (range up to 300 km), Barak MX (range 35–150 km), and Spyder (range 20–50 km), with an estimated total cost of $2 billion.
On December 2, the Greek government reaffirmed its refusal to provide Ukraine with its air defense systems without financial compensation or guarantees of equal replacements. The government spokesperson categorically denied any intention to transfer the S-300 systems, stating: “Absolutely not. I categorically refute this.”
A sale or transfer to Armenia remains a realistic option. For Greece, such a deal could resolve its goal of phasing out Russian-made arms, generate financial resources for acquiring Israeli systems, and avoid political and diplomatic conflicts with Russia, which would arise if these systems were sent to Ukraine.
For Armenia, the prospect of acquiring aging, maintenance-dependent Russian-made systems may not be ideal. However, the deal could be logical given Armenia’s familiarity with such systems, which eliminates the need for extensive retraining. Armenia also has experience maintaining and upgrading these systems domestically.
While Greece’s S-300 PMU-1 systems are more advanced than Armenia’s S-300 PS, particularly in range (150 km vs. 75 km) and precision, other systems like Greece's early Tor-M1 models may require significant upgrades to match Armenia's more modern Tor-M2 systems.
The main drawback for Armenia would be the additional dependency on Russian spare parts and technical support—a significant challenge given Russia’s recent failures to fulfill military contracts due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
From Russia’s perspective, allowing Greece to transfer these systems to Armenia would be preferable to their deployment in Ukraine, where they could potentially be used against Russian forces. Nonetheless, Russia may still object to any transfer to a third party as a punitive measure against Greece, reflecting its broader foreign policy stance.
Eduard Arakelyan
Security analyst, RCDS
The article was originally published on Civilnet.am.