Armenia’s Artillery Choice: An Analysis of Robert Kocharyan’s Statements
02.05.2025
Second President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan, speaking recently to students and faculty at the “Armenian University,” questioned the feasibility of conducting large-scale military reforms and criticized the transition of Armenian artillery to new standards.
At first glance, Kocharyan’s criticism of army reforms seems logical. However, his arguments against switching to new artillery calibers bring the discussion back to the model of dependence on Russia—a model that has already proven ineffective.
In his recent speech during a meeting with young people, Robert Kocharyan briefly touched upon issues related to military reforms and arms procurement.
Kocharyan stated that “military reforms in Armenia are possible within three to five years.” This thesis was part of his 2021 election platform and likely implied a certain strategy and reform timeline.
The claim is generally realistic. With political will, proper organization, and external support, it is possible to transform the army within such a timeframe—even if that includes adopting new standards, increasing mobility, and modernizing command and control structures.
In this important aspect, Kocharyan’s critical view—that the current authorities do not represent a strong state capable of planning and implementing reforms in the Armed Forces—has some merit. The problem lies not only in limited resources but also in the lack of a strategy and the inability to implement institutionally sustainable reforms. Even with a transition to new weapon standards, a change in suppliers, and expanded foreign partnerships, reforms in the Armenian army remain fragmented.
Nonetheless, constructive criticism is different from a desire to justify outdated approaches. Kocharyan’s arguments about the weakness of the current government often serve as a backdrop for returning to obsolete models and orientations that have proven ineffective.
In this context, Kocharyan’s praise of Russian air defense systems and weaponry in general appears curious. These have long been elements of political propaganda using templates and clichés convenient for a particular audience.
The Soviet legacy versus modern standards: the caliber becomes a reflection of strategic choice
Of particular interest is Kocharyan’s critical remark about the transition of Armenian tube artillery to the 155mm caliber. According to his logic, Armenia should stick to the familiar Soviet standard of 152mm. However, Armenia does not produce 152mm shells domestically and is entirely dependent on Russia for this component.
The second president claims that switching to 155mm causes or will cause logistical difficulties and higher expenses: “One shell costs on average $5,000.” He cites open internet sources as the basis for this figure but does not clarify which types of munitions, in what quantities, or from which producers.
Kocharyan’s estimate is partially correct: 155mm shells produced by the U.S. or some EU countries, due to increased demand from Ukraine, can indeed cost between $3,000 and even $8,489. The cost of ammunition largely depends on the supplier, while logistical issues are generally addressed in advance as part of the procurement plan.
Much of the detail concerning Armenia’s defense imports (prices, volumes, timelines, contract terms, logistics) remains classified and is known only to professionals involved in the process. Additionally, supplier countries’ strategic priorities significantly influence pricing and availability.
The vast majority of artillery tasks are fulfilled using conventional high-explosive fragmentation shells, whose cost varies depending on the producing country and order size. Based on open-source data that Kocharyan himself could have used, India—with which Armenia has established defense cooperation—produces 155mm shells starting at around $300, which is significantly cheaper than their Western counterparts. Notably, the factory cost of a Russian-made 152mm shell in 2024 was estimated at $1,000, with export prices even higher.
As for logistics, continuing to rely on Russian supplies does not make things any easier. Compared to deliveries from Russia, the delivery routes differ only in direction—not in the number of obstacles. Russian ammunition must still pass through Georgia and Iran. In the context of Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine, sanctions, and its own strategic priorities, the reliability of these deliveries is no greater than those from India or even Europe.
A New Caliber Means a New Architecture of Defense Partnerships
The 155mm caliber is the most widespread standard for tube artillery in NATO, the EU, India, South Korea, Japan, Ukraine, and many other countries—including Armenia’s southern neighbor, Iran, which possesses hundreds of self-propelled and towed howitzers of this caliber. Ukraine, which has one of the most battle-hardened armies, has actively transitioned to 155mm in the context of full-scale war, purchasing shells from India—either directly or via third countries. These munitions have proven effective when paired with M777 howitzers, Caesar self-propelled guns, Archer systems, and others. Meanwhile, the main users and producers of 152mm shells are Russia and North Korea.
Russia’s production capacity is overwhelmed, and its armed forces have experienced ammunition shortages—alleviated only by supplies from North Korea. According to the Open Source Centre, between August 2023 and March 2025, Russia received between 4.2 million and 5.8 million munitions from North Korea, including 152mm shells. These figures show that Russia cannot even meet its own needs for these munitions, let alone offer export capacity. Russia, once Armenia’s primary arms supplier, is now itself dependent on North Korea.
Transitioning to the 155mm caliber opens Armenia to a global ammunition market with greater competition, technological variety, and lower political risks—laying the groundwork for a more diversified defense partnership. Armenia has already taken concrete steps in this direction, ordering Indian ATAGS 155/52 howitzers, MArG 155/39 self-propelled guns, and French Caesar 155/52 systems.
The Old Model No Longer Works for Armenia
It is also worth addressing the political and psychological aspect of Kocharyan’s statement. His speech is not an analytical assessment but a clearly political one, and it cannot be viewed as an expert opinion. Moreover, his statement ignores a key fact: Russia is no longer a reliable supplier of the munitions he proposes Armenia should remain dependent on and cannot even fulfill paid contracts—making reliance on it a strategic vulnerability. In 2021, Armenia paid for a large Russian arms contract but has yet to receive the full delivery.
Kocharyan’s rhetoric against switching to the 155mm standard is not a genuine attempt to offer an alternative strategy for modernizing Armenian artillery. Rather, it promotes a return to a previously failed system of dependence, while ignoring its proven dysfunctionality.
Kocharyan omits the fact that Armenia’s move away from total military-technical dependence on Russia was more of a forced measure than a pre-planned strategy. Moscow’s indifference to Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia, the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh under the watch of Russian peacekeepers, and Russia’s failure to fulfill arms delivery obligations were key triggers in Armenia’s pivot toward India, France, and other sources.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS analyst