Armenia–India Defense Cooperation: Outlines of a New Strategic Direction
10․04․2025
On March 19, the Indian press reported on a visit by an Armenian military delegation and negotiations with the command of the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS), also known as the School of Mountain Warfare. One of the key highlights of the visit was a familiarization tour of the 50th Shatrujeet Parachute Brigade, where, in addition to experience-sharing and discussions on modern approaches to combat operations, a likely topic was possible cooperation with elite units of the Indian Special Operations Forces (SOF).
This visit reflects Armenia’s growing interest in revising its military doctrine and reorienting its defense policy toward mobile and professional components. Amid the declining role of Russia as a security guarantor and the limitations of its own resources, Yerevan is increasingly seeking new formats of cooperation — first and foremost with India, which already plays a key role in arms supplies and could become an important partner in training and technical support.
Cooperation with India — along with deepening ties with France and Greece — demonstrates Armenia’s desire to diversify its partners and move away from its previous one-sided dependence on Moscow. Unlike Russia, India does not place political constraints on Armenia and acts as a “partner without conditions,” creating space for an adaptive and innovative defense policy.
One of the few realistic ways for Armenia to overcome its technological and numerical disadvantages is the development of special operations forces. This should not be a reactive measure to specific enemy actions but rather part of a long-term defense reform.
In recent years, the Armenian army has suffered heavy losses and a demoralizing transformation. Following military defeats in 2020 and 2022 and the final loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Armenia has had to come to terms with the limitations of its traditional defense model.
Azerbaijan’s strategic and technological superiority — based on assault units, drone technologies, advanced artillery, and active support from Turkey, Israel, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan — has made effective head-on confrontation impossible.
It is unlikely that Armenia will be able to equalize this advantage in the coming years. However, the development of professionally trained mobile groups could allow Armenia to act asymmetrically, creating localized challenges for the enemy and disrupting its tactical plans through stealth, initiative, and maneuverability. In this context, special operations forces cease to be merely auxiliary units of the regular army and instead acquire a foundational role.
Armenian SOF should be assigned an independent role, with their own doctrine and operational logic. At the core of this doctrine should be the use of small, but professional and technologically equipped units capable of conducting assault, sabotage, and reconnaissance missions — especially in complex terrain.
Potentially, the HAWS can offer Armenia new training standards for mountain warfare: survival skills, covert movement, night operations, and combat by small autonomous groups. These skills are especially relevant given the nature of Armenia’s military theater. Additionally, cooperation with India provides access to new methodologies based on training standards and tactical techniques previously unavailable to Armenia and distinct from the Soviet/Russian school — a particularly valuable development as Armenia reassesses the role of the CSTO.
However, the value and practical benefit of training in India, Greece, and France will be limited without structural reform of the Armenian army. Without systemic changes in command, equipment, and strategy, special forces will remain just a tactical tool amid a massive imbalance. With a systematic approach, SOF could become a key element of a new Armenian defense model centered on mobility, initiative, and deterrence.
Specialized mountain units should be formed with regular rotation through schools such as HAWS or France’s HMMS, while Armenia simultaneously develops its own training centers, adapting Indian and French experience to Armenian conditions. Special attention must be paid to technical equipment: modern anti-tank systems, drones, communications, reconnaissance, and tactical logistics systems must become integral to the new special forces.
The quantitative expansion of SOF should be carried out in a systematic way, with the goal of creating a fully equipped special operations corps capable of conducting autonomous combat operations.
If the development of SOF becomes institutionalized and receives consistent investment, technical modernization, and systematic localization of foreign experience, Armenia will be able to create an effective instrument to partially offset the imbalance of forces and strengthen its national security resilience.
Eduard Arakelyan
Analyst, Regional Center for Democracy and Security
The article was originally published on Civilnet.