Armenia's democratic gains at risk: what the West should and shouldn't do

28.08.2024

 

By Tigran Grigoryan 

Armenia has been lauded for its democratic progress in the years following the 2018 Velvet Revolution. The promise of a more transparent, accountable, and inclusive government ignited hope among its citizens and caught the attention of the international community․ However, alongside notable advancements in electoral processes and freedom of speech, concerning trends have been occurring in recent years in the country’s democratic trajectory. 

 

These trends have become especially evident since Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent period of domestic instability and geopolitical fragility. The ruling party, facing internal and external challenges, has adopted approaches that are not in line with the values that underpinned the Velvet Revolution of 2018. Instead of focusing on building strong institutions that would channel existing societal and political conflicts toward non-violent solutions, the ruling party has borrowed its opponents' practices and rhetoric in the domestic political struggle. This has raised questions about the ruling party’s commitment to the process of democratic consolidation in Armenia.

 

Since the snap parliamentary elections of 2021, certain patterns of behavior and trends have emerged that jeopardize the democratic achievements of the Velvet Revolution. These concerning developments can be categorized into several key areas.

 

The first is political polarization and divisive rhetoric. After the transition of power in 2018, the former ruling elites, now in opposition, began targeting the new government, labeling them as disciples of George Soros and as individuals inserted into Armenia’s political scene by external actors. Following the defeat in the Second Karabakh War, the opposition escalated its attacks, labeling Nikol Pashinyan and his team as 'traitors.'

 

Instead of addressing the problem of divisive and polarizing political rhetoric, the ruling party followed the opposition's lead and created its own narratives targeting political opponents. At some point, Nikol Pashinyan and his team began positioning themselves as defenders of sovereignty, labeling all their challengers as a "fifth column." The pinnacle of this approach was the 2022 Yerevan mayoral race, when Pashinyan and other members of the ruling party targeted their former ally and main contender, Hayk Marutyan, with these narratives.

 

As a result of this policy, the problem of political polarization and divisive rhetoric has become more severe. This poses a deadly threat to the newly emerging Armenian democracy, as all the main political actors tend to delegitimize their opponents and shrink the space for civilized political debate. The dichotomous, black-and-white narratives create fertile ground for political radicalization.

 

Another concerning trend that could push Armenia toward democratic backsliding is the ruling party's takeover of independent bodies. This trend intensified after the snap parliamentary elections of 2021. Facing challenges both from within and outside the system, the ruling party began systematically taking control of institutions that are supposed to be autonomous.

 

For example, the President of Armenia is a former minister in the Pashinyan government, as is the head of the Supreme Judicial Council. The head of the Central Electoral Commission is a former MP from the ruling party. Armenia's public television is also controlled by former ruling party MPs and individuals close to the Pashinyan family.

 

The ruling party's intolerance toward the existence of independent public institutions was recently demonstrated by the replacement of the director of Armenia’s public radio, Garegin Khumaryan. A key official involved in this process admitted that the primary reason for the decision was Khumaryan’s public criticism of Prime Minister Pashinyan’s policies.

 

The logic behind these actions is clear: after a tumultuous post-war period, the ruling party seeks to have full control over all state institutions. However, it is obvious that in the absence of institutional checks and balances, democratic consolidation is not feasible.

 

Local elections are another problematic area that raises questions about the ruling party’s commitment to democratic norms. Although the quality of elections at all levels has significantly improved after the revolution, the ruling party has initiated post-electoral processes in several towns to oust elected opposition mayors and appoint its allies. This pattern casts serious doubt on the ruling party’s assurances that there won’t be a return to the era of electoral fraud.

 

The aforementioned trends are reminiscent of the processes that led to democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade. In this sense, Armenia is currently closer to "Hungarization" than to democratic consolidation. Another cautionary tale for Armenia is neighboring Georgia, where similar processes have unfolded in recent years.

 

To prevent these scenarios from unfolding in Armenia, the country’s Western partners should reconsider their approach. Too often, the serious mistakes and shortcomings of Armenia’s ruling elite are overlooked by Western governments. For instance, both the US and the EU continue to praise the Armenian government for its commitment to the reform process, despite the fact that some major reforms supported by these external actors have failed.

 

The most vivid example of this is the police reform. The entire concept behind establishing the Ministry of Internal Affairs was to ensure civilian oversight of security institutions. However, this plan ended with Nikol Pashinyan appointing Vahe Ghazaryan, the chief of police and a close ally and schoolmate of the prime minister, as the head of the newly created ministry. In this case, domestic political goals took precedence over the need for genuine institutional reform. 

 

After this intentional sabotage of a Western-supported reform, there has been no strong reaction from either the EU or the US. The same was true following the brutal use of police force against protesters on June 12. While several Armenian civil society organizations and international watchdogs condemned the police violence, the reaction from Western governments was notably weak.

 

This passive and at times supportive stance of Western partners might encourage Armenia’s ruling party to prioritize consolidating its power over democratic consolidation. The EU and the US should focus on supporting democratic institutions and norms, rather than individuals and political forces they consider pro-democracy. Moreover, the increasing economic support to Armenia should also include conditionalities designed to mitigate the risks of democratic backsliding. 

 

Democracy Watch is a joint initiative by CivilNet and the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank.

 

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.