Armenia Needs a Competent Army—Not Financial Deals with Its Citizens
06.03.2025
The Armenian government has preliminarily approved an initiative for a new system of mandatory conscription, developed by a ruling party MP and presented by Armenia’s Minister of Defense at a regular cabinet meeting. According to the minister, young men of conscription age can opt out of the two-year military service by paying a sum of just over $60,000. In this case, they undergo one month of “training,” take an oath, and are placed in the mobilization reserve.
Formally, the government is offering an alternative. In reality, the archaic conscription system inherited from the Soviet era remains in place—both in terms of training model and duration of service—now supplemented with a buyout option. Instead of modernizing and creating an effective system for conscription and training of new soldiers, the proposed approach strategically weakens the country’s defense capabilities.
The option to undergo a month of service and then be placed in the reserve is merely an imitation of change. It produces zero results in terms of creating a combat-ready force. The same applies to the four-month service, which is only slightly cheaper ($46,000).
Conscripts who choose to pay will remain untrained and, for the most part, absolutely useless in wartime. After a series of lost wars and in the face of demographic challenges, Armenia’s authorities logically should have focused on improving the quality of training, emphasizing combat, technical, and tactical skills. For Armenia, this could have been a chance to preserve universal conscription, strengthen the reserve, and restore trust in the army through an updated program. Such an approach could potentially allow for a reduction of the service term—for instance, from two years to one—but the authorities are offering nothing of the sort. Armenia faces a choice: continue to maintain an outdated Soviet model with an option for paid evasion, or seize the moment for a deep reform that brings the conscription system and soldier training up to modern standards.
A reform would allow the preservation of mandatory conscription but transition to a qualitative approach—forming a motivated, combat-ready force trained to professional standards even within a shortened term of service.
Undoubtedly, Armenia needs a compact, modern, and capable army. In future conflicts, advantage will belong to those who have highly mobile strike units, can quickly mobilize trained reserves, and effectively apply technology. This requires investment in high-quality training of conscripts who, after service, can become the backbone of the mobilization reserve through annual refresher trainings.
Reducing the service term from two years to one is possible only with a shift to a professional-intensive model, assuming all 12 months are filled with practice and tangible results.
The new system must rethink the very essence of soldier training—training fighters who can operate under real modern combat conditions. The goal should not be a shortened version of the old model, but an intensive course to form a modern soldier.
A key stage should be a unified basic training, conditionally called “initial fighter course,” mandatory for all medically fit conscripts and focused on practical skills. Based on the results of this course, conscripts should be assigned to specific fields—combat, technical, cyber and IT—with continued training in their specialization.
Alternative forms of service should be allowed only in exceptional cases for specialists in critically important areas, and only if they complete the basic training and are integrated into the reserve through regular exercises.
Such an approach would not only prepare a soldier but also eliminate one of the deep-rooted problems of the Armenian army—its criminal subculture and poor discipline. When the entire term of service is filled with study, practice, and responsibility, the breeding ground for such phenomena disappears, and discipline and professionalism become the norm.
The program would be richer and more useful than the post-Soviet two-year system, providing real training, fairness, and a foundation for a semi-professional army suited to 21st-century realities.
Today, the two-year term is used inefficiently. In a new system, a modern soldier can be trained in six months. The remaining time can be dedicated to reinforcing skills in combat units, participating in maneuvers, and completing various tasks. Upon completion of service, the most motivated servicemen can transition to a contract basis and continue serving as professional fighters, forming and strengthening the backbone of a new army.
Conscription should not be a waste of time but a school of survival and skills. Intensive study, technological integration, and a modern approach to recruits will enable the formation of an effective army and reserve with improved quality. For the new model to be more than just a formality, a complete overhaul of the entire system is necessary: revising programs, creating modern training centers, mass deployment of simulators and trainers, preparing a new generation of instructors, developing a strong NCO corps, and results-oriented funding.
Small countries facing increasing threats in recent years are tackling similar challenges. Examples like Finland and, to some extent, Lithuania show that with 9–12 months of service, it is possible to form a combat-ready army and reserve. These countries conduct intensive courses and have public support for the conscription model. While they have not participated in modern wars and therefore cannot serve as direct examples of combat readiness, their experience is still important as a model for systematic reserve training, conscription army functionality, and a military culture where service is seen as a duty rather than punishment. For Armenia, this is especially relevant in light of its demographic crisis and loss of trust in the military.
The Israeli model, despite incomparable service durations (32 months, with plans to increase mandatory service to 36 months), is also important in terms of training structure—emphasizing technological and tactical training, and integrating conscripts and reservists into a unified defense system. Elements such as an intensive basic course, early specialization, development of junior commanders, and a strong reserve system could be adapted to Armenian realities if the service term is shortened wisely.
Reducing the service term to one year is a realistic goal. Even to implement this in pilot form, detailed expert development is needed: scenario analysis, assessment of resources and needs, and a clear training structure.
A deep conceptual elaboration is also required—from doctrinal foundations to educational organization. This is what the government should have been doing over the past four years, instead of disguising existing problems by developing an initiative that legalizes draft evasion.
An intensive conscription course with a shortened term makes any idea of paid exemption meaningless. This is not just a matter of approach—it’s a choice between a system of real defense capability and a socially unjust, caste-based model.
The government’s proposed initiative weakens the principle of universal responsibility for defense and enshrines social inequality. Armenia, which lies in a zone of constant threat, needs an army built on competence, responsibility, and fairness—not on financial transactions between the state and its citizens.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS
The article was originally published on CivilNet.