Anti-Karabakh Rhetoric in the Public Sphere and Politics: Causes and Ways to Counter It
03.03.2025
The History of Intolerance in Armenian Society
Intolerance between different segments of Armenian society has a long history. Large population shifts in the past century have been accompanied by similar, and often even harsher, problems to those now faced by the forcibly displaced Artsakh Armenians. A key issue has been, and remains, the targeting of the displaced group and the resulting mutual intolerance. The latest wave of displacement has reignited tensions, but the narratives remain largely unchanged—centered around the notion that the other group lacks the qualities of a “true” Armenian.
Many instances of mutual targeting have been preserved in contemporary writings. A well-known example is the mutual hostility between the Armenians of the Ararat Plain and those displaced from the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the last century. In his memoirs, linguist Hrachia Acharian describes the pronounced hostility he faced in Etchmiadzin for being an Ottoman Armenian. He recounts:
“…Thus began the hatred between the two groups. The term ‘Tachkahay’ (Ottoman Armenian) became even more despised and derogatory. Even marital alliances between the two groups ceased, and the entire Caucasus, especially the Ararat province, was consumed by mutual hatred, contempt, and conflict” (Hrachia Acharian, From My Life, p. 203).
At the same time, Acharian himself harbored prejudices, viewing the inhabitants of the Ararat Plain as less industrious and physically describing them as “ugly.”
The thoughts of an Armenian refugee from the Ottoman Empire regarding the local population are also reflected in Yeghishe Charents’ Brigadier Shavarsh.
“They accepted them—worse than the Turks, yes.
‘Russian-Armenian brothers’… ‘Fatherland’… ‘Armenian,’
Content, ears relaxed, secure.
But why did they accept them so poorly, so badly,
Like strangers, enemies, outcasts?
Well, Armenians are deceitful, hypocritical—
Shavarsh thought—they are ugly Armenians,
Degenerate Armenians, Russified…”
Conversely, the dominant narrative among local Armenians accused the incoming Ottoman Armenians of being “Turkified” and ungrateful.
A more recent example concerns the displacement of Armenians from Azerbaijan after 1988, which Armenia faced as an independent state. Due to the post-Soviet economic realities, most of these displaced persons struggled to permanently settle in Armenia. In her monograph, Nona Shahnazaryan writes:
“In the post-war Karabakh society at the time of the study, several groups had undergone multiple marginalizations. Among them were refugees from Azerbaijan and women. The trajectory of refugees followed this pattern: expelled from Azerbaijan for being Armenian, they were then perceived as outsiders in Armenia and Karabakh. Having lost everything in Azerbaijan, they arrived in impoverished regions, compounded by post-Soviet hardships. The transition to a clan-based society also disproportionately affected them.”
These examples illustrate that intolerance at the everyday level is fueled by the same narratives, with only the targeted groups changing. If in the past, Armenians of the Caucasus were considered “Russified” and Ottoman Armenians “Turkified,” later, Baku Armenians were labeled “Russified,” while Karabakh Armenians were branded as “Turkified.” In the absence of visible external differences, language—whether a foreign language or a dialect—often becomes the primary trigger for intolerance.
Anti-Artsakh Sentiment in Contemporary Armenia
Following the 2020 war and the forced displacement of 2023, hostility toward Artsakh Armenians (Artsakhatyatsutyun) has reached alarming levels. Social media provides vast opportunities for the spread of hate speech. Any news about Artsakh or its people, even if apolitical, can generate thousands of hateful and offensive comments. For example, Azatutyun published a Facebook post about the court case of an elderly Artsakh Armenian who threw an apple at the Prime Minister. Though the report did not discuss a nationally significant issue, it became one of the most viewed and commented-on posts on the media’s page, gathering around 1,000 comments. Anticipating the reaction, the editorial team pinned a comment urging people not to post insults, hate speech, or calls for violence—but to no avail. The comments alone illustrate the extent of intolerance prevailing in Armenian society, at least in the virtual space.
Currently, there are no signs that intolerance will subside anytime soon, but several factors and actors are making matters worse. The primary aggravating factor is the rhetoric of the ruling party and affiliated individuals, who directly or indirectly target Artsakh Armenians. These narratives are amplified by pro-government media outlets.
A new trend emerged after the 2020 war: the targeting of Artsakh Armenians reached political platforms. Amid internal political tensions caused by the war, anti-Artsakh sentiment became a component of government propaganda. While this rhetoric is not systematic, it is notable that the same narratives used in everyday discourse are now employed in political speech. These narratives fit seamlessly into a political discourse saturated with mutual insults and labels. When uttered by high-ranking officials, such narratives gain a degree of legitimacy, normalizing targeted speech.
For example, the widely circulated claim that Artsakh Armenians engaged in mass desertion during the war is echoed in the public statements of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his wife, Anna Hakobyan. In late July 2023, during a press conference, Pashinyan lost his temper after a provocative question and accused Artsakh Armenians of “fleeing,” adding that speaking the Karabakh dialect does not make one a hero. Similarly, after the cancellation of a New Year’s event by Anna Hakobyan’s foundation in Stepanakert, she accused Artsakh Armenians of cowardice and of using children for political purposes.
Tense relations between the Armenian and Artsakh authorities have resulted in mutual accusations, where statements about specific individuals are often generalized to the entire population. For instance, Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan’s remark about “staying and fighting till the end” is difficult to interpret as directed at just a few individuals, as he later claimed. Even if it were meant for a select few, his words have no basis in reality and only serve to legitimize baseless accusations that the Artsakh authorities were solely responsible for surrendering the weapons provided by Armenia.
Another aspect of targeting concerns the status of displaced Artsakh Armenians in Armenia. The participation of non-citizens in Armenian political processes, such as opposition protests, has been used as grounds for discriminatory rhetoric by government figures and their media allies. Pashinyan argues that in the past, the people of Artsakh were used to keep the government in power, and now they are being used by the opposition as “protest material.” He justifies his criticism of their participation in Armenian political affairs by claiming that they did not take part in Armenian elections, equating their involvement with that of foreign citizens joining political actions. “By blaming Armenia’s elected leader, who are the Artsakh Armenians indirectly blaming?” he asks.
A similar sentiment is echoed by pro-government MP Gagik Melkonyan:
“Let the Artsakh Armenians live and work here, but they should not interfere in our country’s affairs. They should behave like guests, not try to become the hosts. They were the hosts for twenty years, and that’s why the country is in this state.”
Another notable example of targeting Artsakh Armenians due to their participation in protests is the leaked wiretap from the Investigative Committee, in which demonstrators were recorded speaking in the Karabakh dialect. All pro-government media outlets, including Public TV, disseminated the recording, emphasizing that the speakers were from Artsakh. Amusingly, Haykakan Zhamanak even published a “translation” of the conversation—not into standard Armenian but into the Ararat dialect. The government-controlled media covered the protests in a way that suggested most participants were Artsakh Armenians, reinforcing the narrative that they were non-citizens and outsiders.
This naturally leads to the labeling of Artsakh Armenians—particularly its leadership—as proxies of foreign powers (i.e., Russia). According to Pashinyan, "Certain groups among the forcibly displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh, whether intentionally or unintentionally, are taking actions and steps that pose a threat to Armenia’s national security... and, if necessary, appropriate measures should be taken to ensure that foreign forces do not use certain groups to create threats to the security of the Republic of Armenia."
Ruling party MP Artur Hovhannisyan has no doubt that "some Karabakh Armenians,particularly Samvel Shahramanyan, are being controlled by foreign forces against Armenia’s interests. According to him, Shahramanyan was "parachuted" into Yerevan with the aim of dismantling the Republic of Armenia. Even the official statement from the Investigative Committee exhibits discriminatory elements by specifically highlighting the fact that some of the individuals accused of attempting to seize power are former residents of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The targeting of Karabakh Armenians is not limited to these false narratives. Another widespread narrative portrays them as "ungrateful," claiming that despite receiving government assistance, they continue to complain. Pashinyan himself openly stated: "Why are you accepting assistance from a 'treasonous government'?" Another recurring theme is the identification of Karabakh Armenians with Armenia’s second and third presidents.
Given all this, it is crucial to understand the motivation behind such statements and how to counter them. Some individuals may have personal biases, but a more fundamental explanation is the attempt to shift blame for the government's own failures onto others. Assigning responsibility for the defeat and the loss of Artsakh to its leadership and population serves Armenia’s authorities well—both because the accused party, having lost its legitimacy and being in a vulnerable position, cannot effectively respond, and because this narrative finds support among parts of the public. Another reason is that politicians and media outlets face little to no consequences for spreading hate speech and stigmatization.
By promoting and legitimizing baseless narratives, Armenian authorities are treading a dangerous path. The use of divisive rhetoric to appeal to certain audiences primarily undermines social cohesion in Armenia and fosters a toxic psychological environment. In this regard, there is a high probability that such unacceptable tendencies will intensify as the upcoming elections approach.
The intolerance and mutual hatred present in society have deeper underlying causes, and the emotions stemming from the "Karabakh Armenian–Armenian from Armenia" distinction are just one component of a larger issue. Overcoming these divisions requires long-term, multifaceted efforts. It is essential that no topic is treated as taboo, and that discussions take place with all sides in order to break stereotypes.
Such manifestations in political discourse and the media are even more dangerous, and a more targeted effort must be made to counter them. The case of Alexander Sirunyan demonstrated that the authorities saw no problem in his overt anti-Karabakh stance, but at the same time, sufficient public backlash yielded results. Armenian civil society organizations played a significant role in blocking Sirunyan’s nomination.
The media plays a crucial role in countering the targeting of Karabakh Armenians. There are major news outlets in Armenia that consistently address this issue constructively and generate broad public awareness. Efforts should also be made to influence those media outlets that propagate anti-Karabakh narratives by engaging with their editors and working to change their approach.
Aram Tadevosyan
RCDS analyst
The article was originally published in Armenian on Step1.am.
On February 26, the "Stepanakert" media club organized a discussion on the causes and consequences of the spread of hate speech against forcibly displaced people from Artsakh, as well as ways to counter it and contribute to a healthier atmosphere for public discussions on this topic. This article also includes the viewpoints and recommendations expressed during the discussion.